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ABSTRACT
This study examines the scope, intensity, and complexity of the
interracial violence in the ex-Confederate states from 1940 through 19460
Employing a survey and analysis approach, with the major peaks of violence during May 1943-August 1944 and August 1945-September 1946 as the
most significant periods, this work will demonstrate that blacks in the
South underwent a generally oppressive, not uplifting, experience during
the war.

While northern blacks and northern-based civil rights groups

seemed to utilize the war era as a springboard for the "Second Reconstruction," most of the positive changes in fact emanated from political,
economic, and military necessity rather than any great humanitarian impulse.
Three forms of violence--lynchings, civilian riots, and military- \
related conflicts--confirm and illustrate the overall thesis.

From 1940

through the spring of 1943 both lynching and military violence escalated
in direct response to the exigencies of war, black attempts to break down
the color line, and white attempts to preserve it.

Duxing mid-1943 major

civilian riots erupted in Hobile and :Beaumont, together with an alarming
rise in mutinies by black soldiers in southern camps and bases.

From

then to the end of the war mutinies and lynchings continued, but with the
end of the conflict came a resurgence of violence as the nation reconverted
to a peacetime footing.

Riots in Columbia, Tennessee, and Athens, Ala-

bama., along with a serious increase in lynching, showed white reaction
to wartime gains for blacks and a general fear of the changes returning
black veterans might bring.

In the end, blacks remained in as separate
iv

V

and unequal a society in 1946 as they had in 1940 below the_Ma.son-Dixon
Line.

Thus, the wartime experience for southern blacks proved to be

different from that of their counterparts elsewhere.
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CHAPTER I
"THE PROBLEM OF THE COLOR-LINE"
"The problem of the twentieth century," W. E. B. DuJ3ois observed at

the fin de si~cle, "is the problem of the color-line."

Having lived through

the trials, accomplishments, and shattered dreams of black people in the
United States since the Civil War, DuBois' perception of what the future
held was based both on keen observation and his training as a historian
and sociologist.

His words proved prophetic. 1

Throughout American history the problem of race relations and the
role of ethnic and racial minorities has been a major historical theme.
Conflict between minority groups and the majority has often produced racial
violence, and in the twentieth cen~LL-r:f racial discord was especially visible
during the two world wars and the 1960s.

In each of these pericxls, as in

others, violence often reflected an attempt by blacks to bre~ out of the
racial caste system and, during the wars, a corresponding white desire to
maintain the racial status quo.

Indeed, American race relations in general

have bad as a major characteristic black desire to end discrimination and
segregation and a white desire to preserve them.
Conflict over whether World War II could change the status of blacks
produced racial violence from

1940 through 1946. Black aspirations to

destroy the color line during a period of widespread change and gradual
improvement, and white fears that blacks were threatening a major upheaval

1w.
(New York,

E. B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk, in Three Negro Classics

1965), 221.
1

2

in a time of national crisis, resulted in one of the worst concentrations
of violence in this century.

Southern racial disorder was a major theme

during the war, for the six civilian riots, over twenty military riots
and mutinies, and forty to seventy-five lynchings not only hampered seriously the region's contribution to the war effort but also showed the extent to which southern whites would go to preserve the color line.

The

southern black experience was different from the northern one during the
war because of the white South's rigid adherence to racial separation.
The history of racial violence in the South dated back to the origins of slavery in the seventeenth century.

Since the region maintained

a system of African slavery for 250 years, ths.t i~~titution fomed a major
part of southern society and its vestiges lingered into twentieth century
life.

In a sense, the earliest form of racial violence, slave revolts,

had much in common with the urban protest riots of the 1960s.

Both showed

black desires to escape either literal or figurative bondage, and the often
swift white reaction.

While North American slave uprisings did not occur

as frequently as Caribbean or Latin American outbreaks, the Stone Rebellion of 1739, the Gabriel Prosser insurrection of 1800, and the Nat Turner
revolt of 1831 resulted in consternation among whites that often bordered
on paranoia.

These three rebellions, along with at least a dozen others,

illustrated some slaves' willingness to rebel openly against their oppressors even in the face of almost insurmountable odds.

As Eugene Genovese

has observed, "the significance of the slave revolts in the United States
lies neither in their frequency nor in their extent, but in their very

3
existence as the ultimate manifestation of class war under the most unfavo:rable conditions. 112
Following the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, collective
racial violence transformed from the slave revolt to the race riot.

Since

freedmen now posed a distinct threat to white hegemony, the postwar riots
saw whites attack blacks and their property, especially during periods of
change or transition.

1831

Actually, the first lmown race riot occurred in

in Providence, Rhode Island, when white sailors assaulted black resi-

dents.

The largest riot in American history in terms of the number of

lives lost erupted in New York City in 1863.

Between 105 and 120 blacks

lost their lives in this .11 draft riot" which exhibited racial connotationso
Because of new and unwelcome adjustments and the attendant friction that
the free blacks created in the South, a :rash of riots by southern whites
against blacks occurred during Reconstruction.

Riots in Memphis and New

Orleans in 1866, Vicksburg in 1874, and Bamburg, South Carolina, in 1876,
among others, showed whites forcing blacks into a new southern system of
:race relations.

At the turn of the century the Wilmington, North Carolina,

riot of 1898 and the September 1906 Atlanta riot resulted from turmoil that
accompanied the Populist and Progressive movements, the white reaction to
Reconstruction's elevation of blacks to citizenship, and the rise of
legalized segregation.

2

In both cases whites forced blacks out of political

Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made
(New York, 1974), 588. For a recent discussion of American slave revolts
and slave resistance, see ibid., 587-660; Peter H. Wood, Black Majority:
Ne roes in Colonial South Carolina from 16 0 thro h the Stono Rebellion
New York, 1974, 308-26.

4
and economic power as the color line once again solidifiedo

These riots

served as violent confirmation of DuBois' observation. 3
Though slave revolts and race riots seemed more spectacular, lynching also reflected strained race relations.

Like whippings and other forms

of slave punishment, lynching was a symbol of domination and authority
meant to keep blacks in their "place."

As with slave revolts and riots,

lynching began early in American history.

The meaning of the term has

varied over the years; it involved both blacks and whites and occurred
throughout the United States until around 1920 when it essentially became
a southern phenomenon.

No accurate count of the number of lynchi..71gs

exists, but in the peak years, 1889 to 1930, some 3,724 people died at
the hands of lynch mobs.

Increasingly, southern blacks became the victims.

Though lynching declined after 1930, this form of racial violence plagued
the nation from colonial days through World War II. 4

3 rrving J. Bartlett, "The Free Negro in Providence, Rhode Island,"
Negro History Bulletin, 14 (December 1950), 51-54, 66-67; Adrian Cook,
The Armies of the Streets: The New York Cit Draft Riots of 186 (Lexington, 1974; Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Cons irac
and Southern Reconstruction (New York, 1971; Vernon Lane Wharton, The
Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (Chapel Hill, 1947); Carl N. Degler,
The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Cent
(New York,
1974; Charles Crowe, "Racial Violence and Social Reform: Origins of the
Atlanta Riot of 1906," Journal of Negro History, 53 (July 1968), 234-56;
idem, "Racial Massacre in Atlanta, September 22, 1906," ibid., 54 (April
1969), 150-73; Arthur I. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In: 1919 and the
1960s (Garden City, 1966).

4James

Elbert Cutler,
ch-Law: An Investi tion into the Risto
of Lynching in the United States New York, 1969 1905 ; Arthur F. Raper,
The Tragedy of Lynching {Chapel Hill, 1933). The term "lynching'' originally
referred to physical harassment, such as tarring and. feathering or whipping,
but after the Civil War the term came to be closely associated with mistreatment of blacks by whites that usually resulted in death for the
victims. The word also carried the connotation of death by hanging, but
this was never the exclusive method. The general public increasingly
accepted the myth that lynching occurred in interracial rape cases, but
in fact less than one-fourth of the people lynched between 1889 and 1930
had been accused of that crime.

5
Racial violence involving military personnel also had pre-1900
precedents, and though such violence usually occurred during periods of
war, there were exceptions.

Perhaps the earliest military mutiny involving

black soldiers occurred in Louisiana in 1863 among the men of the Corps
d 1 Afrique.

Although the blacks killed no one, they reacted violently

when a white officer whipped a black soldier.

As a result a court-martial

convicted ten men and the white officer was discharged.

During the late

nineteenth century, violence by black troops against real or perceived
mistreatment occurred at San Angelo, Texas; Sturgis City, Dakota Territor.v; Suggs, Wyoming; Walla Walla, Washington; and Winnemucca, Nevada.
Similar incidents broke out during the Spa..~ish-American War, most notably
in Florid.a.

These incidents contained general characteristics that were

reflected in later military violence.

In some minor cases chronic trouble-

makers, bored with military routine, caused violence.

In others ill-feeling

between two units gradually built to the breaking point.

Because the uni-

form represented the right to enjoy the freedom exhibited by white troops,
blacks often reacted violently when local white citizens tried to implement or enforce segregation against them.
In the early twentieth century riots erupted at Brownsville, Texas,
in 1906, and in Houston in

1917. Recent scholarship indicates ths.t the

black soldiers stationed in Brownsville did not cause the violence.

In

the Houston riot, however, black soldiers, following weeks of intimidation,
revolted against the local system of discrimiriation.
whites considered the troops guilty.

In both cases local

President Theodore Roosevelt sum-

marily dismissed the Brownsville defendents from the service, while the
War Department convicted the Houston insurgents through highly prejudicial

6

courts-martial.

Such treatment helped destroy black military mom.le, and

other incidents that did not develop into riots met with similar white
response.

These characteristics surfaced again in World War II when

military violence occurred on a much larger scale.5
During both world wars, lynchings, riots, and military violence
occurred simultaneously.

Even though lynchings and riots took place in

large numbers during the First World War, the only full-scale military
/

riot came in Houston. ' During World War II, in contmst, military violence
constituted a large~ of the overall discord, and most of it occurred
in the South, reflecting causal pattems common to earlier incidents.

~-

',/

J

From 1940 through 1942 the stationing of large numbers of black troops
in the South, many of them northemers unaccustomed to a rigid color line,
and black soldiers' insistence on being given the dignity they thought the /
uniform carried prompted violent reactions by whites who saw these servicemen as threats to racial harmony.

From 1943 through 1944, however,

blacks began to mutiny against oppressive conditions, in part because of
the belief that if they were willing to give their lives for the country,
they should be entitled to fair and impartial treatment.
in tum, saw in this attitude a threat to the color line.

Southem whites,
The War Depart-

ment, supporting segregation as a matter of expediency, remained

5The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate A:rmies, 127 vols., series I, vol. 26, pt. 1
(Washington, 1889), 456-79; U.S., Congress, Senate, Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting a Report from the Secretary
of War Together with Several Documents, Including a Letter of General
Nettleton, and Memoranda as to Precedents for the Summary Discharge or
Mustering Out of Regiments or Companies, S. Doc. 402, 60th Cong., 1st seas.;
Willard :B. Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans and the White Ma.n's Burden 18 81903 (Urbana, 1975); John D. Weaver, The :Brownsville Raid New York, 1973
Robert V. Haynes, A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917 (Baton
Rouge, 1976).

)

1
insensitive to these problems and intervened only when conditions forced
it to do so.
Through the lynchings, riots, and military violence of World War II,
DuJ3ois 1 assertion that the problem of the century was the problem of the
color line held true, especially in the South.

In reiterating the situ-

ation Gordon B. Hancock, a southern black scholar, stated in 1944 that
"there is no way to avoid a head-on collision with the color question.
It has been raised by the white man who dominates the Twentieth Century
world."

At the same time DuJ3ois 1 contemporary and fellow sociologist,

Charles S. Jolmson, articulated the situation and sharpened its focus
on World War II by observing that total war "is a cataclysmic national
event that shakes and loosens many traditions from their deep moorings,
whether these traditions are economic, religious, racial or romantic."
The imperatives of war, he continued, "cannot trace a careful path arotmd
the embedded orthodoxies of race any more than can a flood or earthquake."
When racial traditions have been disrupted and the familiar patterns of
life altered, "a sense of insecurity is inevitable.

The race problem in

such situations becomes more personal, and in becoming more personal it
becomes more emotional."

Jolmson saw that the tmpredictable changes of

World War II clarified issues so tmt normally sensitive problems took on
vastly more important connotations; race relations rated as a most critical issue.

Blacks became more reluctant to accept second class citizen-

ship while fighting to preserve the "Four Freedoms," while most whites
were tmable to contemplate the possibility of any ftmdamental change in
race relations.

In the South, where almost 80 percent of the nation's

8

blacks lived, the racial conflict became a central issue. 6
During the war, when familiar institutions were threatened by

forces beyond the South's control, insecurity developed into a potent
force that pervaded every aspect of life.

As in the Reconstruction era

seventy years before, the white South beca.Ee monolithic in the face of
uncertainty.

Wilbur Cash in The Mind of the South suggested how whites,

"~

threatened by changes in race relations, reacted to create a "savage
ideal "--a state of mind "whereunder dissent a..'l'ld variety are completely
/

/

.

/

/

./

suppressed and men become, in all their attitudes, professions, and
actions, virtual replicas of one another."
southern assumptions, beliefs, and values

An endangering of sensitive
in

turn produced an "incalculably

sensitive and fierce determination engendered in the South not to be co-

-)
,,, • • 1

erced or destroyed in any essential part of its being."

This attitude,

of course, muted the voices of the small core of southern white and black
liberals, representatives of what Carl Degler recognized as "the other
South. 117
During World War II, the enduring conflict between whites and blacks
over the

color line emerged once again.

The white South's dogged insist-

ence upon racial segregation confronted black demands for radical changes
and created conditions under which violent response from both sides proved
inevitable.

In the end the black minority lost, but it was an empty

6Gord.on B. Hancock, "Race Relations in the United States: A Summary,"

in What the Negro Wants, ed. Rayford W. Logan (Chapel Hill, 1944), 217;
Charles S. Johnson, "The Present Status of Race Relations in the South,"
Social Forces, 23 (October 1944), 27, 30.

7wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York, 1941), 93-94, 140;
Degler, The Other South.

9
victory for the white South.

It could no longer forestall the resurrection

of fundamental rights that blacks had technically gained seventy years before.
This study will probe the scope, intensity, complexity, and impact
of the interracial violence in the ex-Confederat~ states from 1940 through

1946, while an examination of disorder in other periods and outside the
South will be made to provide the larger context.

As the result of the

clash between two powerful forces, blacks in the region underwent an experience that proved as oppressive in some ways as it was uplifting in
others.

While northe:m blacks and northern-based civil rights groups

utilized the war years as a springboard for the "Second Reconstruction,"
many of the positive changes emanated not so much from their efforts as

from political, economic, and military imperatives.

Nationwide there

appeared a renewal of assertiveness among blacks and a corresponding
attempt to portray the war as a struggle for victory at home as well as
victory abroad.

The "Double V" slogan epitomized this feeling, and it

became more obvious to blacks as the war progressed that a fundamental
paradox existed as had existed in World War I.

While the nation as a

whole professed to be fighting for the Four Freedoms just as it bad
fought a "War to Save Democracy" in 1917-18, in neither case bad those
lofty ideals been applied to blacks.

It seemed that freedom and democ-

racy in a real sense were for whites only.

In the South militant blacks,

northe:m soldiers stationed there, and northern-based organizations like
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
brought what they considered the irony and hypocrisy of the war effort
home to many black citizens.

Increasingly, they became aware of this

10

contradictory situation, and efforts to gain victory at home through political and economic achievements grew more intense as the war progressed.
At the same time statements reflecting these contradictions pointed out
black perceptions.

One soldier requested that when he died in battle his

epitaph should read, "here lies a black man killed fighting a yellow man
for the glory of a white man. 118
Most southern whites could not see the logic in black assertions
that the war represented for them an inescapable irony.
existed between the two groups on this problem.

No communication

For example, whites con-

sidered black assertiveness and the Double V slogan antithetical to the
war effort.

For blacks the war effort was hypocritical; such sentiments

seemed incomprehensible to whites.

The mayor of Eufaula, Alabama, con-

veyed this confusion in a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, complaining that
"since the outbreak of the present war, the Negro has adopted a policy of
his own, being so bold as to state in some instances that 'when the war
is over, the Negroes will take aver the South.'"

He believed that such

attitudes, if left unchecked, would disrupt the war effort.

Similarly,

the commissioner of public safety in Birmingham, Eugene "Bull" Connor,
saw danger in black expressions of militance.

"It is not right or demo-

cratic that negroes, who compose about ten per cent of our population,
shape the policy of the Southern states," Connor grumbled.

"In these

perilous times, the most patriotic part of America should be allowed to
live 'its own way of life. 119

8

Harvard Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the
Second World War," Journal of American History, 58 (December 1971), 666-67.

9M. M. Moultrop to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 21, 1942; Statement by

Eugene Connor, September 1, 1942, in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports:

Labor

11
Such differing perceptions of the role of blacks in southern wartime society reflected the same lack of communication and understanding
that characterized earlier periods.

Historical traditions, the color

line, and the exigencies of war brought about widespread racial violence
that climaxed in mid-1943 as the intensity of black assertiveness and
white reaction peaked.

From then through the end of the conflict, vio-

lence compelled blacks in the South to abandon direct forms of militance
and retreat into rigidly segregated, alienated subsocieties.

When the war

ended, more violence resulted from the tension inherent in reconverting
from a war to a peacetime society.

The ultimate irony manifested itself

as whites, who generally proved either directly or indirectly responsible
for the wartime racial violence in the South, placed the blame for violence on blackso
The South in 1940 was a region WJ:acked by depression.

The South

of 1946 had achieved considerable economic recovery, and along the way
blacks had, in small ways, shared in tbat recovery.

Yet most of the 7.4

million blacks in 1946 had attained but small economic or political gains.
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwri&rht (1944) outlawed the white primary,
but other forms of discrimination against blacks at the polls continued.

10

Mobilization and Utilization, Negro Recruitment," Series 11, Central Files
and Monthly Mopac Area Reports, Records of the War Manpower Commission,
Record Group 211, National Archives (hereafter cited as WMC Records, RG
211). The records of the WMC for Region VII, which includes most of the
South, are housed in the Federal Archives and Records Center in East
Point, Georgia. The National Archives prefers that material from its
collections be documented by folder heading rather than by box number.
lOSm.ith v. Allwright, 321 U. s. 649 (1944). This decision, rendered
on April 3, struck down the white primary in Texas.
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Black soldiers, perhaps the most militant segment of the race, remained
in second class positions despite symbolic gestures during the war.

Black

southerners simply could not overcome the savage ideal despite increased
racial awareness; the N.AACP's rolls, for example, increased from

50,500

in 1940 to 450,000 in 1946, much of the increase coming from the South.
At the beginning of the conflict many blacks advocated equal employment opportunities through the unprecedented March on Washington Movement of 1941, though this remained largely a northern-based effort.
Southern blacks also wanted equal opportunity as they sought to realize
the Four Freedoms, but they gradually became more pessimistic in the face
of escalating violence such as the Fort Bragg incident of mid-1941, the
Alexandria, Louisiana, riot of early 1942, and three deaths by lynching
within one week in Mississippi during late 1942.

Southern black soldiers,

influenced by their northern black counterparts stationed with them in
southern camps, in some cases sparked the violence by merely representing
a threat to the status quo.

In the Mobile and Beaumont riots and continu-

ing military-related incidents across the South during 1943 and 1944, the
white backlash proved so forceful that blacks began to recoil.

This de-

velopment held true in the North as well, but in the 1943 Harlem riot
northern blacks demonstrated their impatience by using retaliatory violence against the most accessible symbols of oppression, white-owned
property in and around the ghetto.
By the end of the war further violence had forced blacks in the
South to abandon direct forms of mili tance, and such incidents as the
Columbia, Tennessee, riot of 1946 served notice that since the crisis had
passed, the situation was going to return to "normal."

Separate and

13
unequal black communities continued, and the region's black people, intimidated by a number of lynchings in 1946, returned to an uneasy coexistence
with whites or left the region altogether.
prevailedo

In general the savage ideal

But within ten years more far-reaching changes would emanate

from the federal government, signaling the beginning of the Second Reconstruction.
The justification for a study of racial violence in the South
during World War II rests not only on its importance as a significant
theme in American history but also on an assessment of the existing
scholarly work in a variety of areas:

sociological and historical

studies of violence, the recent "information explosion" in Afro-American
history, and volumes done in recent American and southern history dealing
with the war.

None of this writing has dealt explicitly with racial vio-

lence in the South.

While the disorder of World War I and the "Red

Summer" of 1919 has stirred academic interest, the violence of World
War II and afterward has generated comparatively little historical
research.
Much of the published material on wartime violence came from contemporary writers who were concerned about the obvious rise of violence
and sought to educate and enlighten the public.
reached a narrow readership.
of departure.

Invariably such writing

It does, however, provide worthwhile points

The most influential of the contemporary voluroos, Gunnar

Myrdal's massive An American Dilemma, examined a variety of subjects pertaining to southern race relations such as lynching and ":racial etiquette."
Other authors whose work took the South under examination included John

14
Temple Graves, Charles S. Johnson, and Howard W. Odum. 11

In some

in-

stances contemporary authors studied specific incidents of racial violence to heighten public awareness of interracial problems. 12
Interest in race relations remained limited, however, until the
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s brought the problem into
clearer focus.

Sociologists effectively probed racial theory, racial

oppression, and violence.

In addition to Myrdal's classic and the theo-

retical work of such people as Robert E. Park and John Dollard, other
literature dealing to some extent with southern racial disorders E.!ld violence in general appeared during the 1960s.

Several of these volumes

combined theo:ry with historical examples to provide interdiscipli~~r~
anthologies. 13

11

Gunnar Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner ani A.mold
Rose, An American Dilemma: The Ne _o Problem and Modem Democracv (New
York, 1944; John Temple Graves, The Fighting South New York, 1943);
Charles S. Jolmson, To Stem This Tide: A Su.rve of Racial Tension Areas
in the United States New York, 1969 [1943 ; Howard W. Odum, Race and
Rumors of Race: Challenge to an American Crisis (Chapel Hill, 1943).
12see, for example, Alfred McClung Lee and Norman Da.ymond Humphrey,
Race Riot (New York, 1943); Harold Orlansky, The Harlem Riot: A St-i
in
Mass Frustration, Social Analysis Report No. 1 New York, 1943, copy in
collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison; Terror
in Tennessee .(New York, 1946), copy in "Press Releases--Colu.mbia Tenn.
Riot," General Office File (GOF), Papers of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, Library of Congress (hereafter cited
as NAACP Papers). This collection was being reprocessed in 1976. To cite
old box numbers, which in many cases referred to sets of four to eight
containers, would therefore be inappropriate. Instead, the separate
folder headings (i.e. : "Lynching--1940") and general series (i.e. :
"General Office File or abbreviation "GOF"), will be used.
13
·
Robert E. Park, Race and Culture (Glencoe, 1950); John Dollard,
Caste and Class in a Southern Town (Garden City, 1957 [1937]); eee also
Allen D. Grimshaw, ed., Racial Violence in the United States (Chicago,
1969); James F. Short, Jr., and Marvin E. Wolfgang, eds., Collective
Violence (Chicago, 1972); Robert M. Fogelson, Violence as Protest: A
Study of Riots and Ghettos (Garden City, 1971); National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission

1.5
Historians of violence began studies at about the same time as·
the sociologists, but the amount of worthwhile historical literature on
the subject is neither as vast nor as comprehensive by comparison.

Pre-

eminent among the historians in this field, Richard Maxwell Brown has
focused on colonial and frontier violence.

Other authors who rave written

general studies of violence have in most cases ignored or minimized both
southern conflict and World War II disorder, preferring instead to cover
more sensational outbreaks in northem and midwestem cities.
ceptions, however, exist.

Some ex-

Robert V. Haynes dealt with southern discord in

A Night of Violence, which examined the Houston riot of 1917.

His insights,

especially in dealing with military-related racial violence, are indispensable.

On the subject of World War II conflict, Harvard Sitkoff's

"Racial !-Lili ta.ncy and Interracial Violence in the Second World War" stands
as the single most important study of that topic.
southem conflict, however, was minimal.

1

His discussion of

4

With the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 19.54 and the subsequent civil rights legislation and reaction of the next fifteen years,
interest among historians in Afro-American affairs increased.
of black history, part of the interest focused on World War II.

In the field
A few

on Civil Disorders (Washington, 1968); Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert
Gurr, eds., Violence in America: Historical and Com rative Pers ectives
(New York, 1969.
14:ru.chard. Maxwell Brown, Strain of Violence: Historical Studies
of American Violence and Vigilantism (New York, 197.5); Haynes, A Night of
Violence; Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy," 661-81; in addition, see Waskow,
From Race Riot to Sit-In; Elliott Rudwick, Race Riot at Fast St. Louis,
July 2, 1917 (Carbondale, 1964); William M. Tuttle, Jr., Race Riot:
Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919; Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace,
eds., American Violence: A Documentary History (New York, 1970).
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important volumes appeared during the 1950s, but the next decade witnessed
the publication of many valuable studies, some of which dealt at least
briefly with southern violence.

In 1966, as part of the Army's official

history of World War II, Ulysses Lee's The Employment of Negro Troops was
published and continues as the single most valuable source on blacks in
the military during the war.
military discord.

It contained a limited discussion of southern

Three years later Richard Dalfiume brought out Desegre-

gation of the U.S. Armed Forces, broader in scope than Lee's book yet
less detailed.

In both this study and in an earlier article, Dalfiume

provided worthwhile but brief descriptions of southern interracial con-

. t • 15
n l.C
Historians in the 1970s continued research in World War II era
black history, finally producing two book-length eY..aminations of the subject.

In 1976 Neil A. Wynn, a British scholar, published The Afro-American

in the Second World War.

It stands among the two or three most significant

works on wartime black history, but its discussion of southern violence
is lacking.

One year later A. Russell Buchanan brought out Black Americans

in World War II.

It provides interesting conclusions in a variety of

areas, and takes a topical, semi-biographical approach.

16

l5Louis Ruchames, ~ce, Jobs, and Politics: The Story of FEPC (New
York, 1953); Herbert Garfinkel, When Ne roes March: The March on Washi ton Movement in the Or
izational Politics for FEPC Glencoe, 1959;
Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops Washington, 1966); Richard M.
Dalfiume, Dese re tion of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fi ht·
on Two Fronts
1939-1953 Columbia, 1969; idem, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro
Revolution," Journal of American History, 55 (June 1968), 90-106.
16
Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War (London,
1976); A. Russell ::Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II (Santa Barbara,
1977); other recent works on World War II black history include Allan M.
Winkler, "The Philadelphia Tra.I1si t Strike of 1944," Journal of American
History, 59 (June 1972), 73-89; Lee Finkle, "The Conservative Aims of

17
General writing on World War II and southern history has not effectively developed the strain of violence.

Recent overall studies, in-

cluding Richard Polenberg's War and Society and George B. Tindall 1 s The
Emergence of the New South, have presented balanced yet limited accounts
of interracial conflict in the South during the war.

Earlier contemporary

volumes, rather than the recent ones, remain the best sources on the subject from these categories. 17
World War II provided the South with another opportunity to reassert its violent tradition.

From 1940 through 1946 "the problem of the

color-line" re-emerged in violent fashion, and once again the conflict
between what whites wanted to preserve and what blacks sought to achieve
became a central issue.

This issue was one that linked the Old South to

the New, for throughout the region's history the effort to keep blacks on
the bottom, to limit their lives, and the simultaneous fight for racial
dignity and equal treatment, provided a continual theme for the South and
for Afro-Americans.

The story of racial violence in the South during

World War II was part of that theme.

Militant Rhetoric: Black Protest Thlring World War II," ibid., 60 (December 1973), 692-713; idem, Forum for Protest: The Black Press Du.ri
World
War II (Rutherford Heights, 1975; Mary Penick Motley, ed., The Invisible
Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier, World War II (Detroit, 1975).

17Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945
(Philadelphia, 1972); George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South,
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, 1967); see also John Morton Blum, V was for Victory:
Politics and American Culture During World War II (New York, 1976);
Sheldon Hackney, "Southern Violence," American Historical Review, 74
(February 1969), 906-25.

CHA.PI'ER II

CLOUDS OF WAR
The United States in 1940 was a nation at a crossroads.

After a

decade of depression, the clouds of war promised renewed prosperity even
as they augured death and destruction.

A glimpse of what was to come

had occurred in 1939 when, at the behest of the War Department, President

Franklin D. Roosevelt created the short-lived War Resources :Soard.
host of alphabet agencies followed in 1940 and 1941.

A

If "Dr. New Deal"

was being replaced by "Dr. Win-the ..War" during these months, he apparently
had inherited the same penchant for creating a maze of overlapping authoriReacting to the German invasion of France in mid-1940, Congress

ties.

quickly passed the National Defense Act, providing tangible evidence of
the United States• intent to gear up for possible entry into World War
II.

By 1941 the signs of American involvement were unmistakable despite

Roosevelt's reassurances that no American blood would be shed on foreign
·11
SOl.
•
These beginnings would ultims.tely grow to the largest and most successful war mobilization in the nation's history.

For example, the federal

government's outlay for physical expansion within the borders of the fortyeight states alone eventually amounted to an unheard of $74 billion, a third
of which went into new manufacturing facilities.

In addition, $11 billion

was spent for military facilities such as forts, posts, and cantonments,

1Polenberg, War and Society, 6-7;FrederickL. Deming and Weldon A.
Stein, Disposal of Southern War Plants, National Planning Association, Committee of the South, Reports, No. 2 (Washington (1949]), 12.
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and another $10 billion was converted into non-farm housing.

The remainder

went for expansion of industrial services, petroleum extraction, highways,
agriculture, and a variety of other areas. 2
If this elephantine growth proved beneficial for millions of Americans, it was a godsend to southerners.

The South had been termed "the

Nation's No. 1 economic problem" for good reason.

In many economic sectors

it had not shared the prosperity of the 1920s and as late as 1939 was still
shrouded by depression.

While the region possessed almost 41 percent of the

nation's farm land, its farmers received only 2lo5 percent of the total
gross agricultural income.

And while Dixie contained 15.3 percent of the

country's industrial workers, they took home a modest 10 percent of the industrial wages.

No matter how the figures were computed, the South was in

the doldrums on the eve of World War II. 3
If life was hard for white southerners, it was even worse for the
802 of the nation's 12.8 million blacks who still lived in the eleven exConfederate states. 4 Blacks had historically been discriminated ~gainst in
virtually every aspect of life.

Of the southern black population, only

about 34 percent were urban dwellers and this meant that for a large number
of blacks sharecropping continued as a way of life.

An accurate rule of

thumb was (and is) that the black rate of unemployment usually ran twice
that of whites, a problem the South was unable and perhaps unwilling to confront. 5
2Deming and Stein, Southern War Plants, 1.
3Ralph C. Hon, "The South in a War Economy," Southern Economic Journal,
8 (January 1942), 292.
4Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, ed., Negro Year Book:
Affecting Negro Life, 1941-1946 (Tuskegee, 1947), 1-2.

5rbid., 7.
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Since the South possessed few of the nation's heavy industries, initial war contracts did not greatly affect it.

In addition, of the $74

billion spent in the states du.ring the war for physical expansion, the South
was the recipient of only about $10 billion; of this, half went for the construction and refurbishing of military facilities.

Most of the remainder

was spent on explosives and ammunition, chemicals and energy, and shiPbuilding.

Thus, the South received comparatively little (12 percent) of

the wartime expenditures for physical expansion, and of the total, half
was spent on areas th.at did not return major benefits in peacetime.

In

the meantime, the largest single area of southern expansion, military camps,
was 36 percent of the national total expended.

This brought a huge influx

of federal money, partially offsetting the lack of industrial expansion.

1940 the South quickly be6
came the campground, if not the arsenal, of democr:acyo

When Selective Service got underway in October

Overall, the value of southern production rose from 12.7 percent to

14.4 percent of the nation's total during the war, representing an increase
in the number of manufacturing plants from

26,516 to 42,739. If this was

in part a tempor:ary development, it was nonetheless better economic progress

than the South had seen since the Civil Waro 7
Increasing industrialization meant changes in southern demogm.pbyo
During the first three years of the war the region lost

6Deming

3.4 percent of its

and Stein, Southern War Plants, 11, 17; Rudolph Heberle,
The Impact of the War on Population Redistribution in the South, Papers
of the Institute of Research and Training in the Social Sciences, No. 7
(Nashville, 1945), 5.

7Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 700-1.
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population, yet its urban-areas grew markedlyo

Savannah, for example,

increased 28.9 percent, Charleston 37.5 percent, and Mobile by an astonishing 60.9 percent by late 1943.

It proved a major disruption for a

people "always accustomed to the quasi-nomadic migmtions of share
croppers and mill workers. 118
These wartime problems were not confined to the South, but because
it traditionally had been the most conservative region in the nation, such
sweeping changes had perhaps a greater impact on southemers.

Of all the

alterations wrought by the war buildup, none was as potentially dangerous
as the pressure placed on the delicate system of southem race relations.
Gearing up for war meant the possibility of employment, and for
depression-wracked black Americans this boded a brighter future.

For black

southerners it meant even more, for while the North had not proven to be
the mecca many blacks had dreamed of, the South was even less inviting.
Decades of explicit and implicit segregation and discrimination bad forced
southern blacks into a caste system that was virtually impossible to escape.
Furthermore, the South of the 1930s bad been a land of unremitting hardship.

The Scottsboro case was a well publicized example of southern injus-

tice, but the discriminatory measures of the Agricultural Adjustment Ad.ministration and the continued abuses in sharecropping arrangements indicated
that the South remained hostile toward blacks.
For blacks in the South, the clouds of war fostered feelings both
of hope and cynicism--though the cynicism usually remained repressed.

They

8Heberle, Impact of the War, 5, 14; U.S., Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, "Estimated Civilian Population of the United States,
by Cormties: November 1, 1943," Population--Special Reports, Series P-44,
No. 3 (Washington, 1944), 3-5.
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remembered not only the hardships of depression but what many of them regarded as betrayal after the First World War.

Most black Americans had

gone into that conflict with high morale, "generated by the belief that
the democratic slogans literally meant what they said."

:But the "close

ranks" admonition of W. E. B. DuBois had seemingly produced no more than
the "Red Summer" of 1919, when riots erupted in several cities in reaction to what whites perceived as a dangerous attempt by blacks to disrupt
the racial caste system. 9
By 1940 blacks knew better, especially southern blacks.

They lived

in a segregated world prescribed for them by the white power structure.

While northern-based civil rights groups began to assert themselves,
southern blacks generally adopted a passive optimism.

This did not mean

that they failed to support such groups as the NJ...ACP, but they had carefully to hide their feelings.

While racial militancy escalated after 1940,

little of it was directly traceable to the South.
The Pittsburgh Courier's drive in mid-1940 to integmte the national/
defense program proved one of the best examples of increased hope a.~d
cynicism as the clouds of war approached.

The Courier, an important black

newspaper, recognized the need for prompt action to keep black morale from
plummeting into despair, so it sponsored the "Committee on Participation
of Negroes in the National Defense Program."

Headed by Rayford W. Logan

of Howard University, the Courier group appeared in May before a· subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations which was considering the

1941 military budget.

9Dalfiume, "Forgotten Years," 92.
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Logan asked the committee for amendments to the budget, requiring

among other things that the armed forces contain 10 percent black servicemen, a figure derived from the overall percentage of blacks in the American
population.

In addition, he requested that all b:ranches of the service be

fully integrated.

Citing the favorable record of black servicemen in past

wars, Logan alluded to the potential domestic :racial problems if something
were not done.

"At a time when President Roosevelt is urging again, in

almost the same lar1gu.age as did Woodrow Wilson, that we preserve democracy
in the world," he wamed, "the United States mu.st not marshal her

military

forces in such a way as to discriminate against some of the most loyal and
efficient soldiers of this country."

10

That ~ame day a statement from

Charles H. Houston, World War I veteran and noted black attomey, set an
even more ominous tone.

"The morale of Negro citizens regarding national

defense is probably at the lowest ebb in the history of this country," he
cautioned.

Blacks had no faith in the leadership of the military, he

added, a fact that the nation's black press made painfully clear.

Houston

concluded on a stern note by telling the senators that the government "cannot expect Negroes to be valiant defenders in time of war when it ignores
and insu.1 ts them in time of peace."

11

Logan's committee accomplished nothing beyond the addition of an
amendment to the appropriations bill that reiterated existing antidiscrimination directives.

10u. s.,

Change in the armed forces policies would come

Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings
before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States
Senate, on H. R. 9209: A :Sill Making Appropriations for the Military
Establishment for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1941, and for Other
Purposes, 76th Cong., 3d sess., 374.
11

Ibid., 372.
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only when the manpower shortage grew so acute that there was no other recourse.
Because 1940 was an election year, the Roosevelt-led Democrats
needed to woo northern black voters, who had supported him in previous
campaigns in response to New Deal social and economic policieso

The white-

led southern Democrats, however, did not permit blacks to vote in significant numbers.

On October 25, 1940, as a sop to the Courier and bJack

leadership in general, Roosevelt appointed William H. Hastie civilian aide
to the Secretary of War and Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., as the first
black brigadier general in the United States Army.

Later, other blacks

would be appointed to similar positions with impressive sounding titles
but which carried little actual responsibility. 12

In the meantime the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) took shape
to contest discrimination against bJacks in defense industries.

Generally

regarded as the single most militant action by black leaders during the
entire war period, the MOWM forced Roosevelt to create the Fair Employment
Practice Committee (FEPC).

Where the Courier group failed (at least tem-

porarily) to gain significant advancement for blacks in the military, the
MOWM succeeded (at least temporarily) on the civilian front.

The movement

bad been conceived by the militant black labor leader A. Philip Randolph,
who saw it as a technique to force the administration to give blacks an
equal oppotunity to participate in upholding the Four Freedoms through
employment in defense industries.

1

2v.

In a January

1941 letter to the Courier,

O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York,

1949), 619-43; Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 79-80; Wilma Dykeman and
James Stokely, Seeds of Southern Change:
(Chicago, 1962), 256-58.

The Life of Will Alexander
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Randolph complained that "Negroes are not getting anywhere with National
Defense.

The whole National Defense setup reeks and stinks with race

prejudice, hatred, and discrimination."

To show the nation tbat blacks

would not be shoved aside, Randolph called for a march on Washington by
10,000 blacks. 13

The Courier, even though it had sponsored a committee to lobby
Congress to integrate the armed forces and bring in 10 percent black servicemen, dismissed Randolph's scheme as a "crackpot proposal" which was
i..~

effect a nuisance "organized by publicity hounds, job-hunters and.

addlepates."

The Courier remained the only major black newspaper to oppose

Randolph's plan. 14
The march never took place because of a last-minute meeting at the
White House, resulting on June 2.5 in Executive Order 8802.

This order

created the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, designed
to prevent employers with federal defense contracts from discriminating
against minority groups in hiring practices.

In theory it looked good,

but in fact the FEPC had few teeth with which to bite offenderso

During

its turbulent five-year life, the committee was bandied around Washington like an illegitimate child--no one wanted it. 15

13Pittsburgh Courier, January 25, 1941.
14-ibid., June 14, 1941; Finkle, Forum for Protest, 123. F-i_r,..kle
suggests that the main reason the Courier opposed the MOWM was because of
personal enmity toward Randolph and bis socialistic views by the newspaper's editor, P. L. Prattis.
15u.

s., President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, First
Report, July 1943-December 1944 (Washington, 1945), 104-.5; Garfinkel,
When Negroes March, 7; Rucha.mes, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 140.
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Historians since World War II have cited the March on Washington
Movement and to a lesser extent the Courier committee and other smallerscale actions as proof that militancy visibly increased among black Ameri16
cans.
While militancy no doubt increased, neither the M0WM nor the
Courier committee had solid grassroots backing.

That Randolph was per-

fectly willing to call off a demonstration that had been at least a year
in the making indicates that he could not guarantee a 10,000 person gathering.

Fortunately, blacks who backed the M0WM did not have to show up at

the Capitol to prove their support.

The many claims made for the march

proved in part nnjus tified.
Support of these early efforts at black advancement in the prewar
months remained perceptibly quiet in the South.
responded to almost everything in whispers.

In fact, southern blacks

The southern black press,

along with the scattered southem branches of civil rights organizations,
had not become forceful.

Whites did most of the responding in that region,

as they had for decades.
The NAACP, which in 1940 counted a modest

50,556

members in

355

branches, usually concentrated on legal problems and anti-lynching bills.
At that time the association bad no real positive program conceming the
defense effort so it occupied itself in sympathizing with the M0WM and the
Courier committee.

With some exceptions, it remained inactive until after

the nation entered the war. 17

16

s ee,

for example, Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March.

17Da.lfiume, "Forgotten Years," 99-100; Finkle, Forum for Protest,
139-40.
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_The National Urban League proved even more lethargic than the NAACP.
The NUL was from the beginning primarily a northem-based concern and in

1940 counted only seven affiliates in the ex-Confederate states out of a
nationwide total of

45. 18

Both the Urban League and the somewhat more

militant NAACP experienced severe financial problems, and during the depression neither could afford sweeping reform movements.

Significantly,

these organizations, as well as the southem black press, usually played
possum in Dixie.
If southem blacks sympathized with the M0WM or the NAACP, few
whites knew about it.

The black southerner's existence depended upon

getting along with whites, and while some militants did form ideological
alliances among themselves and with such white liberals as Will Alexar:der,
Virginius Dabney, Jonathan Daniels, and ¥ark Ethridge, ordinary folk
shunned publicity.

They coexisted in a separate and unequal society with-

in the bounds prescribed for them.

Although southern blacks remained outwardly calm, white southemers
in

1940 took a defensive stance.

The vague rumors about the radical Chicago

Defender, Pittsburgh Courier, and NAACP suggested outside threats to an
ordered society.

As C. Vann Woodward observed, the "southern identity" was

one of "frustration, failure, and defeat."

As such, it bore a defensive

attitude toward many things, not the least of which was the system of race
relations. 19

18Nancy J. Weiss, The National Urban League, 1910-1940 (New York,
1974), 246.
19c. Vann Woodward, "The Search for Southern Identity," in Woodward,
The Burden of Southem History (Baton Rouge, 1968), 19-21.
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As American entry into the war drew closer this delicate caste system
appeared to the white southerner to be in jeopardy.

Already, war prepared-

ness affected the southern (as well as the non-southem) way of life.

When

something as historically sensitive as the relationship between blacks and
whites began to show signs of change, the ordinary white began to wonder,
as Gunnar Myrdal revealed, whether he would be forced to "relinquish white
supremacy."

Would he have to allow blacks to marry his daughters or build

good schools for blacks even though the schools his own children attended
were not adequate?
tions?'

"Is he supposed to retreat from all 'southern tradi-

He sees 'outside aggression' wherever he turns. 1120
As the nation shifted to a wartime footing, alterations bad to be

made in many areas of life, testing the southern system of race relations.
Population redistribution, previously mentioned, caused potentially critical
difficulties in war centers.

A Senate committee charged with investigating

this problem estimated in 1941 that because of the growth of defense industries and military facilities, the populations of some thirty-eight
"critical" defense areas would rise markedly.

For the eight southeastern

states that formed the Army's Fourth Corps area, the civilian population
in nineteen defense centers would increase by 296,220, apparently within a
year.

For the same centers, the committee estimated that

ing units and

1,542

hospital beds would be required.

72,545

new hous-

All of this l:ad to

take place in areas with.inadequate transportation (no new buses or autos
after

1941),

inadequate public services, and increasing manpower shortages.

20
Myrda.1, An American Dilemma, 1012.
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As a result, when blacks and whites began to pour into these areas friction
mounted.

21

As war preparedness in the South continued through 1940 and 1941,
straining race relations, violence began to appear.

Urban riots would

·✓

emerge later, but two forms of violence grew ominously during this period-lynching and military violence.

Both reflected growing racial tension in

the South, tension which would by 1943 evince such destructive force that
it would seriously jeopardize the domestic war effort.

The violence of

1940-1941 was a prologue for what was to come.
Lynching had been a concem in the South for many years.

It had

grown to fearful proportions during Reconstruction and reached another peak
around the tum of the century.

Tuskegee Institute, the NAACP, and the

Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching kept statistics for each year, publishing the gory details to gamer support for antilynching legislation.
Part of the legal difficulty in dealing with lynch mobs lay in the
conflict between federal and state jurisdiction.

If no civil liberties

had been violated under federal law, the Justice Department could not enter
a case.

The state, in turn, passed a lynching case along to the local law

enforcement system; this normally resulted in no indictments and no punishment.

Lynchings usually occurred in thinly populated areas where everybody

21 The eight Fourth Corps Area states were Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense
Migration, Hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National
Defense Migration, Pursuant to H. Res. 113: A Resolution to Inquire Further into the Interstate Migration of Citizens, Emphasizing the Present
and Potential Consequences of the ~ligration Caused by the National Defense
Program, pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 4374-77•
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knew each other; there was a certain amount of risk involved if a grand
jury indicted a neighbor.
regarded as expendable.

Moreover, in many instances local blacks were
Because of the lack of adequate law enforcement

in rural areas, a lynching could be made into a public spectacle without
a:ny

of the offenders having to worry about reprisals.
Seeking to solve the jurisdictional tangle, the NAACP had been

actively committed to a federal anti-lynching measure since 1911, two years
after its formation.

In 1922 the Dyer Bill, sponsored in part by the NAACP,

passed the House of Representatives but never got to the Senate floor.
Eleven years later the association tried again--this time with the Costigan.Wagner Bill.

This provided for the punishment of local officials found

delinquent in protecting citizens from mobs, stiff penalties for lawmen
who aided lynchers, and federal intervention in a lynching case if local
authorities bad ta.ken no action within thirty days after the alleged crime.
In addition, the bill defined the crime in general terms as any non-labor
related attempt on the part of a mob (three or more persons) to exercise
"by physical violence and without authority of law, any power of correction
or punishment over any citizen" under the pale of the law.

Any such vio-

lence "which results in the death or maiming of the victim," the bill concluded, "shall constitute 'lynching' within the meaning of this Act."

22

Although the NAACP sponsored a sizeable publicity campaign to gain support
for the Costigan-Wagner Bill, its efforts proved fruitless.

The

22Robert L. Zangrando, "The NAACP and a Federal Anitilynching Bill,
1934-1940," Journal of Negro History, 50 (April 1965), 106-8; U. S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Assure to Persons Within the Jurisdiction of
Every State Due Process of Law and Equal Protection of the Laws, and to
Prevent the Crime of Lynching, 76th Cong., 1st sess., S. 845, p. 2. Copy
in "Lynching--1940," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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legislation failed in the Senate, and when it was revived in 1940, its
proponents could not garner enough votes to invoke cloture. 23
During the course of the 1940 fight over the anti-lynching bill,
a series of letters between Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP,
and Alben W. :Barkley of Kentucky, Senate majority leader, reflected the
hostility generated by the controversy.

White evidently had a way of

irritating people, and when in April he accused :Barkley of holding up the
anti-lynching bill, the Kentuckian hotly denied it, protesting that "this
statement is so ridiculous and baseless that no one outside an insane
asylum would believe it, and no one who had any regard for truth would
make it. 1124
Yet in October :Barkley found an excuse to remove the bill from consideration when he stated that "I am willing to take the responsibility of
saying that in the midst of our international situation ••• it is impractical at this time to make a futile effort to obtain a vote on the
bill."

Not 'Wltil near the end of the war would another anti-lynching

measure be seriously considered in Congress. 25
The overall impact of the anti-lynching effort from 1933 to 1940
had both positive and negative aspects.

The increased attention that the

debate focused on lynching did much to heighten public awareness of the
problem.

Also the number of reported lynchings declined markedly after

23zangrando, "Federal Antil~ching :Bill," 108-14.
24Alben W. :Barkley to Walter White, April 22, 1940, in "Antilynching: Alben Barkley, 1940," GOF, NAACP Papers.
2SPittsburgh Courier, October 19, 1940.
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mid-decade, a trend attributed to the publicity given to the anti-lynching
efforts.
On the other band, there was a change in the character of lynching
after the mid-1930s.

Beginning around 1936 the typical lynching became

less a spectator event and more a covert act undertaken by small mobs in
quick and quiet fashion.

Lynching victims were less likely to be hanged

publicly from a tree and blow-torched and more likely to be fished out of
a river or discovered in a remote area days after the incident.

It became

increasingly difficult to determine whether black homicides were the work
of mobs or just individual murdero

While the number of reported lynchings

decreased during the 1930s, the actual number of persons lynched probably
remained near previous levels.

26

For example, during 1940 and 1941 there

were eight reported lynchings, but for 1940 alone the NAACP kept files on
four additional suspected incidents.

Moreover, for the two year period

the NAACP discovered forty-nine "threatened" lynchings.

While the authen-

ticity of some incidents and near-incidents may be questioned, there can
be little doubt that during the war years some lynchings remained undisclosea.27
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Jessie Daniel Ames, The Cha.nging Character of Lynching (New Yo:r:k,
1973 [1942]), 2-5.
27 The eight lynchings during 1940 and 1941 were: Ike Gaston (white),
March 7, 1940, near Atlanta; Elbert Williams (black), June 20, 1940,
Brownsville, Tennessee; Jesse Thomton (black), June 22, 1940, Luveme,
Alabama; Austin Callaway (black), September 8, 1940, La.Grange, Georgia;
Bruce Tisdale (black), February 15, 1941, Andrews, South Carolina;
Robert Malker (black), April 13, 1941, Cherryville, North Carolina;
Robert Sapp (black), May 6, 1941, Blakely, Georgia; A. C. Williams (black)
May 13, 1941, Quincy, Florida; "Lynching-1940, " GOF, NAACP Papers;
'
Guzman, Negro Year Book, 302-11.
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A 1940 lynching in Tennessee illustrated the tensions created in
many areas by increasing black militance and corresponding white alarm as

the defense effort quickened.

In 1939 some black citizens of Brownsville

organized a small but active NAACP chapter.

As the general election of

1940 approached, its leaders undertook a voter registration drive among
the black townspeople.

The president of the NAACP branch, the Reverend

Buster Walker, met on May 6 with some town officials, who, while not
ecstatic about the idea, remained noncommittal.

The next day, however,

a local deputy sheriff told Walker that he had better stop encouraging
blacks to register "or there would be troubleo"

The whites had reason

enough to be concemed, for blacks in Haywood County, of which Brownsville
was the seat, outnumbered whites two to one.

28

As the days passed more militant whites in Brownsville issued
threats to the NAACP leaders and in particular harassed Walker, Elisha
Davis, and Elbert Williams.

Periodically carloads of whites drifted

through town visiting the homes of NAACP officials, asking "what about
that nigger meeting?"
At about 1:00 a~m. on June 16 whites forced Elisha Davis, a filling
station opera.tor and father of seven children, into a car and drove him
to a secluded area several miles from town.

Some fifty whites awaited

him and threatened to kill him if he did not give them the names of the
local NAACP members.

Davis complied, providing the names of the officers,

but reminding the whites that the city fathers had approved the fo:cna.tion

2811 statement of Facts in the Brownville [sic] Tennessee, Case," in
"Brownsville, Tennessee--Dept. of Justice"; ":Brownsville, Tenn., Investigation, June 27th, 1940, 11 in ":Brownsville Tenn. Lynching," GOF, NAACP
Papers; Memphis Commercial Appeal, June 28, 1940.
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of the branch the year before.

The mob then threatened Davis' life and

told him never to set foot in the county again.

He walked the eight or

nine miles to Jackson, where he contacted the local president of the NAACP.
Meanwhile, Reverend Walker and a "Professor Outlaw" were also run out of
town, and eventually every one of the local NAACP officers fled. 29
Elbert Williams, another NAACP member who advocated black voter
registration, was not so fortunate.

On the night of June 20 a local

policeman called on Williams at his house and demanded that he get in the
car. 30 Williams, an employee of the Sunshine Laundry, was not permitted
to get dressed, so he got into the car containing several white men barefooted and clad only in his pajamas.

The whites apparently took Williams

a short distance to the banks of the Eatchie River where he met his death.
On Sunday, June 23, two fishermen found Williams' body tied to a log float-

ing down the river.
two bullet holes in

The corpse had been severely beaten and there were

the chest.31

As soon as the body had been recovered from the river and local
blacks realized what had happened, Milmon Mitchell, president of the
Jackson branch of the NAACP, contacted the national office.
Walter White met with officials of the Department of Justice.

On June

24

By July 1

the Federal :Bureau of Investigation (F.BI) had entered the case in an effort

29White to William McCla.naban, July 1, 1940,

in "Brownsville Tenno
Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers; Jackson S11-ll, June 26, 1940.

30There is a discrepancy in the various reports about the date on
which Williams died. Several sources reported the day as June 15, but
others, including his widow, said June 20.
3111 statement of Facts in the Brownville [sic], Tennessee, Case";
White to McClanahan, July 1, 1940, GOF, N.A.ACP Papers; Nashville Globe and
Inde~endent, June 28, 1940; Memphis Co:::::1ercial Anneal, Ju_~e 28, 1940.
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to determine whether federal laws bad been violated in Williams' death
and in the forced flight of Elisha Davis and the Reverend Walker.

At the

same time Mitchell charged that the U.S. District Attorney in Memphis,
William McClanahan, a native of Covington (near Brownsville), was a
"dyed in the wool" white supremacist who would probably do nothing unless
"pressure is brought upon his office. 11 32
Since the Williams lynching occurred in the midst of the Congressional furor over the anti-lynching bill, Walter White reminded Senator
Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee of his responsibility as an elected representative.

"During the 1938 debate in the Senate over the Anti-Lynching

Bill," White began, "you introduced

o

••

telegrams and other communica-

tions from southern governors stating that a federal law against lynching
was unnecessary as these governors could and would stop lynching."

In

light of the Brownsville affair, however, "we respectfully inquire what
steps you and other Tennesseeans [sic] holding office will take to make
good on the promise made in 1938. 11

Unless such terrorism were stopped and

the lynchers of Elbert Williams brought to justice, White declared, "this
incident will prove that the states themselves cannot cope with mob violence."33
While the FBI investigation continued in hopes of finding enough
evidence to prosecute under federal law, a Haywood County grand jury convened.

It deliberated for two days, and on August 13 declared its findings:

320. John Rogge to White, July 10, 1940, in "Brownsville, Tennessee-Dept. of Justice"; Milman Mitchell to White, July 1, 1940, in "Brownsville
Tenn. Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers.
33wru.te to Kenneth McKellar, July
ibid.

3, 1940,

in "Lynching--1940,"
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"The jury has made a careful and earnest investigation, examining people
from all walks of life, including relatives of Williams, and no evidence
has been brought out that might place suspicion on anyone as having a part
in the case. 1134

The NAACP had expected this and would have been genuinely

surprised at any other finding.

The burden thus rested as always with the

Justice Department.
In early September a rumor circulated that despite the Williams
lynching the town's black citizens had successfully registered to vote.
The NAACP national office cranked out an ecstatic press release claiming
"complete victory."

:But the report proved false, illustrating the NAACP's

failure to verify this story as it bad occasionally done others, before
proclaiming it as the truth.

Ecstacy gave way to despair as the national

office received reports from Brownsville to the effect that, in fact, blacks
had been informed that "the river will be full of niggers" if they tried to
register for the November election. 35
As the F.BI investigation continued, despair turned to utter defeat.
Despite assurances that the identities of the men who lynched Williams
were known and that there was ample evidence of a violation of federal laws,
there were no arrests.

O. John Rogge of the Attorney Genera.l's office re-

assured Walter White that the investigation was continuing and implied that
a federal case would ensue.

The F.BI was reportedly "actively pursuing its

leads," but a year passed, then eighteen months without action.

Finally,

34J3rownsville States-Graphic, August 16, 1940.
35Press release, September 13, 1940, in "::Brownsville Tenn. Lynching";
"Statement of Facts in the :Brownville [sic], Tennessee, Case," GOF, NAACP
Papers.
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on February 11, 1942, the Justice Department informed NAACP special counsel Thurgood Marshall that it had ended the investigation, explaining
that "it was the studied opinion of the Department that the facts developed did not justify prosecutive actions. 1136
The lynching of Elbert Williams and its aftermath traced pattern.s
characteristic both of the other lynchings of this period and those of
the later war years.

Perhaps the clearest pattern, ironically, was that

it coincided with the new trend toward covert violence.

It provided a

vivid eY.ample of small mobs disposing of victims with quiet efficie~cy.
This new development in techniques was known at the time as "streamlined"
lynching because it contained all the major elements without the UI1-~ecessary frills.
Local whites perceived Williar.1s 1 NAACP activities as milita.~t, and
his subsequent lynching for activism characterized other wartime violence.
Whites saw the racial status quo threatened by black participation in an
NAACP chapter.

For blacks, however, the lynching seemed to contmdict the

idealistic goals expressed in the "Four Freedoms" slogan under which the
United States aided her allies in opposition to the Axis powers.

Such a

contmdiction resembled Gunnar Myrdal I s juxtaposition of an "American
Creed" where "the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of
high national and Christian precepts," with the heart of the "American
Dilemma," involving "valuations on specific planes of individual and group
living" that included "prejudice against particular persons or types of

3611 correspondence with Department of Justice re: Brownsville,
Tennessee Case," undated; Wendell Berge to Thurgood Marshall, February 11,
1942, in "Brownsville, Tennessee--Dept. of Justice," ibid.
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people."

Thus, because the nation busily prepared to defend the Four Free-

doms, the lynching of Elbert Williams denied blacks in :Brownsville, in
Tennessee, or in the South the right to view those freedoms as pertaining
to them. 37

In this case as in others, the Justice Department failed to prosecute even when federally guaranteed civil liberties under the Fourteenth
Amendment were clearly violated.

True, the department labored under a

jurisdictional burden, but because grand juries typically failed to return indictments, the federal law enforcement agencies remained the last
bulwark of justice.

With a few important exceptions, during the war era

this bulwark proved as flimsy as in the past.
Although lynching had been typical of southern violence, urban
racial conflicts bad not.

Previous outbreaks such as the Wilmington riot

of 1898 and the Atlanta riot of 1906 had shown white resistance to black
advancement, as had the Longview, Texas, affair of 191.9, the last major
riot in the region prior to World War II.

Although another major southern

urban riot would not take place until 1943, during the prewar defense
effort a series of outbreaks erupted in Dallas, foreshadowing what would
happen in southern cities when the exigencies of war strained race relations to the breaking point.
From September 1940 through February 1941 street riots wracked the
southem section of Dallas.

The city administration, in an effort to

support the growing population, bought out several black homeowners in
the Howell Street section, intending to raze the area and then build lowrent housing.

This plan temporarily displaced a number of blacks, and

37Myroal,

An American Dilemma, lxxi.
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wily real estate agents sold several houses in adjacent white blocks to
some of these families.
On September 3 violence erupted.

About two hundred white home-

owners gathered and began throwing rocks and bricks at these houses.

When

police arrived, the mob split into smaller groups and eluded the lawmen
with ease.

As white tempers continued to flare, passing black motorists

became objects of attention, and police diverted traffic around the area.
While the fracas continued, a sizeable white woman spied an agent who had
sold one of the houses in dispute and, in a stroke of revenge, flattened
him with a "hayma.ker."

The police restored temporary order, but sporadic

violence continued for the rest of the week as hastily formed white homeowners' committees demanded tmt the city pass a jim crow ordinance for
the area. 38
Du.ring the weeks that followed the initial outbreak, homemade bombs
exploded in various front yards as isolated violence continued.
and Texas Rangers had little influence in denting the terrorism.

The

F.BI

In mid-

Feb:ruary, five months after the initial violence, the Dallas Housing
Authority announced that the housing project already underway would be
rushed to completion and that a second project vrould begin immediately.

In addition, it persuaded real estate brokers to refund money to blacks
who were willing to move elsewoore, and in anot:ter section it cajoled
several white families into selling out so tm t the housing :problem could
be temporarily solved.

Only three days after the housing authority an-

nounced its decision, another bomb destroyed a house in the beleaguered

38nallas Morning News, September 4, 6, 1940; Pittsburgh Courier,
September 14, 1940.
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area.

Whites bad gotten in the last wora..39
The real issue, however, proved to be not one of temporary accommo-

dations but of long-term solutions.

"Completion of the public housing

project, a year hence, will give decent homes to 650 Negro families," explained the New Republic, "but Dallas has yet to decide what, if ar.:.y-thing,
will be done for the thousands remaining in barbarous shanties and to provide for orderly expansion of bulging Negro neighborhoods."

In Dallas,

however, the prevailing sentiment rested not upon housing policy but upon
racial separation.

The editor of the Dallas Mo ming News pro clai ::Ed that

"white neighborhoods do not want Negro residents.

No law can eradicate

p:rsonal prejudice or by mere fiat e::-a.se the color line."

Hou.sir.~ prob-

lems and black encroachment on white areas faced many cities as the pace
of war preparedness quickened.
tempers, and white

In addition, congestion, confusion, flaying

backlash to racial change contributed to the later

and more S?vere urban racial violence in the South and elsewhere.

The

Dallas outbreaks and the Sojourner Truth housing riots in Detroit i...~ 1942
provided glimpses of what lay ahead for cities where race relations was
evidently the least concem.4°
During 1940 and 1941 a facet of racial violence generally peculiar
to periods of war emerged--the growth of tension and violence between black
servicemen and whites.

As previously noted, black leaders exhibited con-

sidemble concern over the role black Americans would play in the defense

39Pittsburgh Courier, September 21, 1940; October 19, 1940; January
25, 1941; February 22, 1941; Dallas Moming News, Feb:ruary 9, 1941; "Racial
Dynamism in Dallas," New Republic, March 24, 1941, pp. 389-90.
40"Racial Dynamism in Dallas," New Republic, March 24, 1941, pp.
389-90; Dallas Morning News, September 6, 1940.

effort.

The Courier committee had protested the continuation of segregated

units and the failure to utilize maximum black strength, yet during the
first two years of the war era, the barriers remained.

A 1922 Army deci-

sion had set black strength in regular units at the same percentage they
represented in the total population, but only half of the black troops
were to be used in combat uni ts.
never reached the prescribed

In practice black strength in the Army

9 or 10 percent, because that service main-

tained only four jim crow units.

The Navy restricted blacks to the mess-

men's branch, the Marines excluded them altogether, and the Army Air Force
deemed it unwise to train blacks as pilots. 41
The chorus of protests from black organizations and the black press
reached such a crescendo by late 1940 that President Roosevelt, in an effort
to keep the black vote that helped put him in office, announced several
changes in policy.

On September 16 a White House statement declared that

36,000 out of the first 400,000 men drafted under the new Selective Service
Act would be black.

It also reported that the Amy Air Force would begin

developing black air units.

While that reassured a number of blacks, North

and South, others refused to be mollified.

They saw that at least half

and perhaps a majority of the 36,000 "lucky" draftees would be placed in
non-combatant units such as supply and maintenance.

The men would also

be segregated. 42
:Slacks remembered the World War I era with bi ttemess.

In a ''War

to Save Democracy" many of them had assumed that active support of

41nalfiume, Desegregation of

42 Ibid. , 36-37.

A:rmed Forces, 22.
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America's war effort would result in improvement of their status.

When

the postwar violence against them erupted instead, blacks felt betrayed.
To them, the First World War contained a hypocritical element, and based
on that thinking they proved wary as American entry into World War II
approached.

Thus, DuBois' "close ranks" philosophy seemed as improbable

in 1940 as the likelihood that he would repeat it.
In the military more than in a:ny other area of the defense effort,
hope and cynicism pervaded the black mind.

As Percival Lo Prattis, a

black journalist, observed, "the morale of the Negro in tbe anned services
of the United States is an amalgam composed of his tendency to share the
general popular reaction to the challenge of war and death and his reaction
to the special treatment he is the victim of in the Army and Navy." 43

Al-

most all blacks, whether enlisted or drafted, shared these sentiments.
they could do little to change the situation.

Yet·

The burden of proof lay with

them, and each instance of failure, such as when the 368th Infantry Regiment failed in one of its assignments during the Argonne Offensive of 1918
while fighting under conditions that made success impossible, was a further indication to the War Department that blacks did not make good soldierso
Black troops faced pressures that whites did not, and, as it turned out,
there were limits to how much these men would take.
Knowing full well black Americans' ambivalent attitude toward the
impending war, on the eve of the general election Roosevelt appointed William
H. Hastie civilian aide to the secretary of war.

43 Ibid.,

This appointment proved

113-15; P. L. Prattis, "The Morale of the Negro in the Armed
Services of the United States," Journal of Negro Education, 12 (Summer 1943),

355.
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as significant to most blacks as the elevation of Benjamin O. Davis, Sr.,
to brigadier general.

Hastie, who assumed his duties on November 1, 1940,

had graduated from Harvard University, served as dean of the Howard University Law School, and sat as a federal judge in the Virgin Islands.
He faced an unenviable task.

On the one hand, the Anny held him at ann's

length, regarding him as an "NAACP man."

On the other hand, civil rights

groups and much of the black population asked him to perform impossible
tasks.

His failure to do the impossible frequently resulted in his being

referred to as a puppet for the Armyo 44
The preparedness effort affected most keenly the men who entered
the service.

Between the invasion of Poland in 1939 and the attack on

Pearl Harbor in 1941, the black strength of the Anny increased from 3,640
to 97,725; by 1943 the figure had risen to 467,883.
the Army inducted 920,000 blacks.

During the entire war

While the black percentage never reached

10 percent, the meteoric rise in absolute numbers created tense conditions.45
Part of the racial difficulty arose from the location of the training camps.

The Amy in 1940 decided to construct a large proportion of

these camps in the South, and most had to be built within a few monthso
The temperate climate and open spaces with cut-over pinelands "afforded
room for maneuvers, resulting in the least damage and delays for faming
and other civilian pursuits."

Also, southem camps could be built with

44Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 79-80; Da.lfiume, Desegregation
of Armed Forces,

42.

45Da.lfiume, Dese re c::.tion of Armed Forces, 44; Jean Byers, "A Study
of the Negro in Military Service" Washington, 1950), 26 [Unpublished:
mimeographed copy in Lib:rary of Congress]~

44
fewer vital building materials such as heating equipment and insulation.46
A:n estimated 80 percent of the black troops received their t:rain-

ing in the South, in part because the Army still clung to the belief that

southern whites could best handle blacks.

Northern urban black soldiers

reacted more vociferously than southern black soldiers to southem racism,
and their negative attitude was contagious.

In sum, the black trainees

in southem camps underwent experiences that "had an impressive uniformity. 1147

In April 1941, shortly after black inductees began to enter the
Army, the first "major symbolic event in the long chain of :racial violence" occurred.

During the first week of April, Lieutenant Colonel

Herbert B. Laux, Provost Marshal at Fort Benning (Columbus), Georgia,
disclosed that positive identification had been made of a body found on
March 28 hanging from a tree in a wooded section of the fort's confineso
The victim was Private Felix Hall, a black man from Montgomery, Alabama,
attached to the 24th Infantry.

The Army had kept the murder a secret

until identification could be made.

Hall had died sometime around March

1, and when a group of soldiers out on a field assignment discovered his
body, both the Army and the FBI began investigations.

The study had

4~ers, "Negro in Military Service," 62; Lenore Fine and Jesse A.
Remington, The Co s of
ineers: Construction in the United States
{Washington, 1972, 273-308.

47For

example, as early as June 1941, only a few months after
blacks had begun to be inducted in large numbers, they were being stationed mainly in the South. Of the fifteen camps at that time with the
largest number of black troops, nine were in the ex-Confede:rate states
and two more were in border states. Pittsburgh Courier, April 12, 191.µ;
Byers, "Negro in Military Service," 62.
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not been completed when news of Hall's demise reached the public. 48
The reaction of the black community proved to be as predictable
as it was expeditious.

The NAACP directed letters to William Hastie,

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and President Roosevelt demanding a
complete inquiry into the incident.

The Southern Negro Youth Congress

also wrote the President, demanding, among other things, a $20,000 indemnity to Hall's family.

Southern white liberal Jonathan Daniels, editor

of the Raleigh News and Observer, used the occasion to militate for an
anti-lynching law.4 9
In spite of this and other protestations, especially vehement since
Hall was in uniform when he died, the Army appeared to bide its time in
explaining the mystery.

In fact, suicide was not ruled out as the cause

of death, even though the victim 1 s hands and feet were bound.

The very

mention of suicide in this instance sent black organizations and the press
into a frenzy.

Adding to the ten$ion, the commanding general of Fort

Benning thought it was "a sex murder rather than the result of any race
feeling."SO

481ee, Employment of Negro Troops, 349; Pittsburgh Courier, April
19, 1941; Memorandum, Office of the Chief of Staff, War DeIBrtment, to
William H. Hastie, April 19, 1941, in "Violence Against Negro Military
Personnel," Records of the Office of the Secretary of War [Civilian Aide
to the Secretary of War], Record Group 107, National Archives (hereafter
cited as CASW Records, RG 107).

49Pittsbu.rgh Courier, April 26, 1941; "Lynching of Felix Hall,
Fort Benning, Ga., April, 1941"; Jonathan Daniels, "The Army Camp Mystery,"
in "Ft. Benning, Georgia," GOF, NAACP Papers; Southern Negro Youth Congress to Roosevelt, April 14, 1941, AG 291.21, Records of the Adjutant
General's Office, 1917, Record Group 407, National Archives (hereafter cited as AG, followed by the decimal file number under which the
document is catalogued, RG 407).

50Ma.j. Gen. L. R. Fredenllall to S. Ralph Harlow, June 11, 1941,
in "Ft. Benning, Georgia," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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Despite the official pronouncements, the case had all the elements
of a "streamlined" lynching, in this case of a man in uniform.

The in-

vestigation uncovered no motive, and no one was apprehended or charged.
But the publicity the Hall case generated caused grave concern among
both blacks and whites over the future of military race relations.
As the size and the activity of the military camps increased
throughout the South during 1941, tension between blacks and whites correspondingly mounted.

On every base the white soldiers outnumbered the

blacks, a fact which, when coupled with the Army's policy of strict segregation, predictably led to discriminatory treatment and ill feeling.
Such was the case at Fort Br-c::.gg, just outsid~ Fayetteville, North
Carolina.

The city had mushroomed in size du.ring the prewar months from

17,000, a third of which was black, to 40,000, with approximately
black percentage.

~ne

same

In addition, the number of troops at Fort Bragg bad

increased to 52,000, of whom 6,500 were black.

Within two years a city

of 17,000 had been forced to accommodate a population five times th~t size.
Congestion choked the municipal serYices, housing was at a premiun, and
recreational activities proved woefully inadequate.
The pattern of race relations in Fayetteville had in the pa.st been
fairly peaceable, if segregated.

A ghetto area known as "Little E.a.rlem"

served the blacks of the city as well as those from the base and ~-as the
only area of Fayetteville where blacks were welcome.

In 1940 a local

NAACP branch had begun operations, a development that displeased local
whites.

In fact, many whites in the city were generally so conservative

47
that they regarded Life,·the weekly magazine, as being communist controlled.51
The standard treatment for black soldiers at Fort Bragg proved de-

Many of these men, some of

grading both at the camp and in Fayetteville.
whom were

u.rba._'rl

northerners, raised an increasing cloud of complaints as

they endured this discriminatory treatment.

All American soldiers,

whether black or white, have historically made an avocation out of complaining, but in this case many of the protests were clearly justifiable.
Recreational facilities, always important in an area with thousands
of soldiers, remained inadequate for blacks.

They could not patronize the

theaters or the nicer eating places in town, and the small black district
of Fayetteville furnished the only diversions.
provide even segregated recreation halls.

On base, the Army did not

Also, the black troops inhabited

temporary quarters while the whites lived in more attractive and comfortable
permanent quarters.

The visible differences in living standards made many

of the black troops sullen and defensive.

In addition, friction developed

over the policy of jim crow transportation for the soldiers, especially on
the city buses used to shuttle the men between the post and town.
morale among the blacks, then, proved less than satisfactory.

The

Many of the

soldiers, after having stayed at Fort Bragg only a few weeks, wanted nothing
more than to be transferred to another camp, under the mistaken notion that
other posts would offer better conditions.5 2

5lPittsburgh Courier, August 23, 1941; "Fayetteville, North Carolina,
Army Camp Impact Area," Report 51, Special Services Division, Bureau of Intelligence, Office of War Information, Records of the Office of Government
Reports, Record Group 44, National Archives (hereafter cited as Govem.ment
Reports Reco:rds, RG 44) •

.52Interoffice

memorandum to White, September 2, 1941, in "Ft. Bragg-:Bus Killing," Legal File (LF), N.All.CP Pa:oers.
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The military police supplied the biggest cause of tension between
the blacks and whites.

The MPs reportedly spared nothing to make sure that

blacks stayed "within bounds" on the base and harassed them while in Fayetteville as well.

Black troops not only at Fort Bragg but across the South

were by mid-1941 beginning to resent white MPs and asked for black military police in their areas of camp.

Yet the Army did not employ many black

MPs, and the ones it did use were not allowed to carry firearms--only nightsticks.

This state of affairs embittered blacks.5 3
The tensions erupted at about 1:00 a.m. on August 6, as a group of

black soldiers stood waiting at a bus stop in Fayetteville for their jim
crow bus to take them back to camp.

Some were drunk.

When the bus arrived

around 1:15 the soldiers began to clamber boisterously aboard, apparently
insulting the bus driver in the process.

The driver, refusing to move until

MPs accompanied him to the base, got off and called the police.
minutes a contingent of MPs arrived.
tered the bus, a scuffle erupted.
and began firing wildly.

Within ten

As four white military policemen en-

Someone grabbed a revolver from an MP

Another MP returned the fire, and within two or

three minutes two men were dead and five otmrs wounded.

Private Ned Tur-

man, black, and Sergeant Elwyn Hargrave, white, lay dead; the wounded included two other MPs and three blacks.54
While the deaths of the two men were tragic and unnecessary, the
larger significance of this incident lay in its aftermath.

Immediately upon

SJibid.

5½ayetteville

Observer, August 6, 1941; Pittsburgh Courier, August
16, 1941; Lee, Emnloyment of Negro Troops, 351; Maj. James W. McNeer to
Commanding Officer, Ft. Bragg, August 6, 1941, in "Ft. Bragg Incident,"
CASW Records, RG 107.
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hearing of the shootings, Fort Bragg Provost Marshal Major James W. McNeer, ordered all black soldiers who were not in their barracks rounded up
and taken to the post stockade.

The official explanation stated that the

persons responsible for the deaths bad to be found, the necessity of which
"was not realized by the soldiers at the time and, unfortunately, has been
largely represented as a measure involving racial considerations. 1155
The rounding up of five hundred or more soldiers, many of whom had
later wandered onto the post from a night on the town, did indeed involve
racial considerations.

None of the white MPs were treated in the fashion

the blacks were, and with the exception of one military policeman, a twentyyear-old native southerner alleged to have killed Private Turman, none were
even held for questioning.

•

On the other hand, many blacks reported being

threatened and beaten as they were forced into the stockade where they
remained for five hours.

When they were finally released, feelings toward

the Army in general and the MPs in particular had clearly deteriorated.5 6
After the large contingent of blacks was released, the post commander,
Colonel Charles Elliott, called for a complete investigation.

The young

MP alleged to have killed Turman went before a court-martial and within a
week had been acquitted.

Ballistics showed that the MP 1 s revolver was not

the one that killed the black soldier.

As a result, no one was ever con-

victed for either of the deaths.
In the meantime the NAACP sent Curtiss Todd, a Raleigh lawyer, to
Fayetteville where he circulated among the soldiers and found a feeling

55Fayetteville Observer, August 6, 1941; Henry L. Stimson to Roy Wilkins, November 10, 1941, in "ft. :Bragg--Bus Killing, 11 LF, NAACP Papers.
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5 Pittsburgh Courier, August 23, 1941.
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of gene:ral hatred tqward the Army's discriminato:cy- practices in recreation,
transportation, and housing, and a complete distrust of the military police.

In addition, the Army Inspector General's Office sent General Benjamin O.
Davis as a special investigator; after questioning 128 witnesses, he found
the same bitterness among the troops.5 7
In spite of this, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson told the NAACP
that "a noteworthy feature of the investigating officers' report is the
finding that, in no respect did the incident itself, or its after-effects,
acquire any semblance of a conflict of racial sentiments; and that the
occurrence did not arise from, or cause any tendency toward racial discrimination.1158

Someone in the War Department must have been agitated,

though, because the post provost marshal was quickly replaced, and the
commander, Colonel Elliott, was i~ October transferred to Mississippi
State College as an ROTC instructor.
thereafter.

He resigned from the Army shortly

Perhaps the most telling change at Fort Bragg came when

William Hastie announced in mid-September that the military police would
soon contain a large number of blacks and tmt they would be invested with
the same authority as their white counterparts.

The Fort Bragg incident,.

as the first major disturbance in the amed forces during the war years,
cast an ominous shadow over the future of military race relations even
as it showed the War Department's reluctance to flout local patterns

5 7Fa.yetteville Observer, August 7, 1941; Pittsburgh Courier,
August 30, 1941; September 6, 1941; Stimson to Wilkins, November 10,
1941; Curtiss Todd to White, August 14, 1941, in "Ft. :Sragg--Bus Killing,"
LF, NAACP Papers.
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of segregation by making substantial changes in policy toward black
troops. 59
Only a few days after the Fort Bragg episode another incident
occurred near Gurdon, Arkansas.

While the incident in Fayetteville

affected only soldiers, the Arkansas trouble broke out between civilian
whites and black soldiers.

During August 1941 the Second Army war maneu-

vers had gotten underway, and units from several areas were ordered to
Louisiana to participate, including the 94th Engineer :Battalion, a black
unit formed earlier in the year at Fort Custer, Michigan.

The majority

of the men were Chicago and Detroit natives.
By August the 94th had already experienced southern racial p:.ttems
in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

During the course of its stay there, it had

received less-than-cordial treatment, especially from highway patrolmen.
This initiation set the troops to grumbling.

In July the 94th moved back

to Fort Custer and then to Camp Joseph T. Robinson near Little Rock.

While

there, the presence of the black soldiers provoked yet another incident
when on August 9 a white policeman and a black sergeant got into a fight
that received considerable publicity and heightened local tension.

The

neA-t day the unit moved to a bivouac about one hundred miles southwest of
Little Rock, between the towns of Gurdon and Prescott.

On August 11 two

or three hundred men went to Gurdon on passes, and the greeting accorded
them again proved less than enthusiastic.

In fact, some of the local whites

went into near-hysterics at the presence of these men and demanded that

5 91ee, Employment of Negro Troops, 352; Pittsburgh Courier, September 27, 1941; October 18, 1941; November 8, 1941.
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they be moved as far from there as possible.

60

This hostility angered the soldiers, and when word came from their
superiors that they were to be out of town by 10:00 p.m., they became
vociferous.

As they began leaving town, they cuxsed the townspeople and

blocked traffic.

Apparently the rumor that one of their number had been

beaten and thrown in jail also aggravated their hostile disposition.
The following night a group of state police harassed the bivouac
area, injuring no one but making threats and causing a general worsening
of relations.

The white hostility prompted some of the men to ask for

ammunition to defend themselves (they were regularly kept without it), a
request that was emphatically denied.

The·white reaction bad so frightened

the 94th 1 s comm.anding officers that they decided to seek yet another
bivouac area in a more isolated location.
On August 14 the bedraggled 94th set out along Highway

to a new camp several miles further from Gurdon.

67 en route

The troop movement pro-

ceeded normally along the side of the road, but around noon a contingent
of state policemen appeared and began ordering the soldiers to get off the
highway.

Someone had apparently called the police complaining that a mob

of blacks was causing trouble along the road.
The state troopers confronted Companies A and C and began pushing
soldiers into a ditch beside the highway.

Lieutenant Donald Curry, white,

commander of Company C, tried to persuade the police to leave, but they
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instead hit him and told him to "get them black bastards off the concrete."

At that, several of the soldiers broke ranks and closed in on

one of the police cars.
difficulty.

Their officers managed to restrain them with

This entire episode took place with two truckloads of white

MPs nearby; they lifted not a finger to keep the civilians from interfering.
The worsted Curry and other officers managed to avoid bloodshed
only by persuading the soldiers to march into the woods and get to their
bivouac as quickly as possible.

By the time the 94th reached the new

campsite its members were totally disheartened.

Matters had seemingly

gone from bad to worse during their stay in the South, with no prospect
of improvement in the foreseeable future.

They were powerless to do any-

thing about it--tbat is, almost po~erless.

That night about sixty of the

men changed into fatigues and went AWOL.
west, but all got out of the South.

Some fled directly north, others

One caught freight trains from Texas

through New Mexico and Arizona to California, then proceeded north and
east to Chicago.
Fort Custer.

Most of these men eventually turned themselves in at
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Public reaction was swift.

The NAACP, exhibiting growing confidence,

asked the War Department to abolish segregation in all military facilities,
to train immediately a large force of black MPs for general service, to
protect black soldiers in southem camps, and to prosecute the ·whites who
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were responsible for the 94th's recent troubles.

At least one black news-

paper went a step further and asked that all black troops be withdrawn from
below the Mason-Dixon Line.

Petitions poured in from across the country,

especially from the Midwest, protesting the treatment accorded the 94th.
One such protest emphasized that it "would seem ironical if our young men
should be called upon and expected to defend what in effect is Hitlerism
62
in the South."
In the meantime the Army had two problems to contend with:

what

to do with the men of the 94th, especially those who had gone AWOL, and
whether to try to prosecute the state policemen who had interfered with
the unit on August 14.

As to the first problem, Lieutenant General Ben

Lear, commander of the Second Army, made his feelings lmown in no uncertain terms.

"The 94th Engineers have disgusted me," he blared.

"You are

the ones who have started all of ·this trouble and have disgraced the Army
and your race.

I have watched you_ since you first started, and I want it

all stopped now, not tomorrow, but today."

The Army relieved the com-

mander of the 94th of his duties because he "was too easy with his men. 063
General Lear also ordered a trial for six of the black AWOL soldiers involved in the incidents of August 11-14, with himself as head of
the investigation.

The NAACP vehemently protested that action and un-

successfully sought to convince Lear that he could not be impartial in
any proceedings concerning the 94th.

Eventually five of the six men stood

6
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trial at Fort Custer in December 1941 and ended up being freed.

This re-

sult was credited in part to the defense counsel, Major Theophilus Mann,
who was the first black to serve in such a capacity in a mixed Army
court. 64
While the status of the men of the 94th remained uncertain, the
problem of state police interfering with the military proved a ticklish
issue.

An Army investigation of the Gurdon incidents, especially the

episode of Augu.st 14, found that the Arkansas State Police had violated
the following federal laws:

illegally invading a military reservation,

opposing by force the authority of the United States, opposing an officer
of the United States, an~ conspiracy to prevent the free exercise of
Constitutional liberties. 65
A squabble soon ensued over whether the War or Justice Department
had jurisdiction in the case.

Exasperated, the NAACP requested that

Roosevelt decide the dispute, with the implication that the association
wanted a prosecution regardless of who got control.
nobody prosecuted.

The result was that

The War Department apparently won the jurisdictional

quarrel but then dropped the whole matter with the explanation that the
state police and other civilians involved were "not within the classes of
persons amenable to trial by court-martial for violation of the Articles
of War. 1166
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The Fort Bragg and 94th Engineers incidents were only two of a
rash of outbreaks involving blacks in the military during 1941.

Others

occurred at Fort Jackson (Columbia), South Carolina, in April; Camp
Wallace (Galveston), Texas; MacDill Field (Tampa), Florida, in July; and
Camp Davis (Wilmington), North Carolina, in September.

Additional minor

incidents erupted in and around camps across the nation. 67
By the summer of 1941 the Amy recognized the dangerous potential
these outbreaks reflected, yet it reacted haltingly.

To its credit the

Army took two important steps after the violence of 1941.

It established

a Corps of Military Police that included black MPs for service in camps
with large numbers of black troops (such as Fort Bragg), and createa the
War Department Special Services Branch to deal with :racial disorders.
Aside from these changes, which were slow in being implemented, there
emerged few other altemtions.

Segregation continued, white MPs still

exercised authority over blacks, civilian-military relations in many areas
of the South worsened, and the possibility of more violence loomed on the
horizon.

Massive policy changes were needed, but the Army evidently re-

garded such a cure as being worse than the ailment.

68

By the end of 1941 it had become clear that the war would have a
considerable impact in unsettling southern race relations.

The signs along

the civilian and military fronts were unmistakable, but because of the
attention placed on the international scene, such omens were either largely
disregarded or ignored altogether.

67 Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 349-51, 355.
68
Ibid., 357-63.
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Blacks bad concluded that the Four Freedoms did not apply to them
and with World War I abuses fresh in many of their minds, they prepared
to confront discrimination.

The NAACP, the black press, and many other

blacks and concerned whites exhibited an increased awareness of the gravity
of the situation, but during 1940 and 1941 it did little good.

The most

obvious manifestation of deteriorating race relations, violence, would
continue to keep blacks down.
astrous for :race relations.

But its effects would shortly prove dis-

CHAPTER III
"NEARER AND NEARER THE PRECIPICE"

In a 1942 report on racial tension, Fisk University sociologist
Charles S. Jolmson observed that "in conflict we have merely a mobilization
for action in defense of the racial philosophies of the respective groups."
Jolmson saw the increasing anxiety to preserve segregation and discrimination among whites and the increasing militancy among blacks to achieve
equal opportunity, a development that threatened to break the already
tenuous peace between the two groups.

The rift between rhetoric and re-

ality in wartime America appeared clearer than ever to blacks, and their
intensified dissatisfaction with the ebb and flow of events elicited a
stiffening of conviction among whites to keep the already confused domestic
situation from working to the blacks' advantage.

1

By 1942 assertiveness among blacks had become obvious enough to
cause concern among whites.

The NAACP preached that "now is the time not

to be silent about the breaches of democracy here in our own land," an idea
effectively echoed by the black press.

In particular the Pittsburgh

Courier's "Double V" campaign became a rallying cry among black citizens,
though many whites condemned its implied divisiveness. 2
As a reflection of the federal government's concem over growing
black militance the Office of War Information (OWI) began collecting

1
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information on factors increasing black-white tension and instituted a
regular monitoring of the black press, all of which constituted an effort
to take the pulse of the nation's thirteen million blacks.

The tone of

such reports clearly indicated that the government held black organizations and the press responsible for current tension. 3
The situation was exacerbated by rumormongering among southern
whites.

In 1942 "Eleanor Clubs" emerged as a topic of conversation.

A

figment of the white imagination, these clubs supposedly reflected the
intent of blacks, encouraged by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, to reverse
the caste system and provide "a white woman in every kitchen by Cr.tXistmas."
Just as contrived were the stories of blacks buying and storing ice picks
and lmives for some future bloodbath.

As soon as southern white men joined

the Army, another rumor insisted, their women would fall prey to great
hordes of lascivious blacks who would then proceed to mongrelize the raceo 4
There was no basis for any of these rumors.

That they spread like

wildfire from Virginia to Texas indicated that whites were once again invoking a siege mentality in response to what they perceived as growing
assertiveness on the part of southern blacks.

Aside from the actions of

a few southern black leaders, this militance derived from a trickle-down
effect from the northem black press, the NAACP, the National Negro Congress, the March on Washington Movement, and northern blacks stationed in

~emorandum, "Report on Recent Factors Increasing Negro-White Tension," Special Services Division to R. Keith Lane, November 2, 1942, in
"Report on Recent Factors Increasing Negro-White Tension," Special Services Division, Bureau of Intelligence, Office of War Inforrra.tion, Government Reports Records, RG 44.
½>ittsburgh Courier, October
96-101.
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southern training camps.

Blacks in the South were growing more militant

and vocal, and they were accepting the Double Victory idea.

Because of

this and growing defensiveness among whites, the rift between the two
groups assumed cavernous proportions.

The danger, however, lay not in

the black population's militancy but in the reactionary tendencies of many
whites.
This defensiveness became more obvious as the number of black
troops stationed in southern camps increased.
was especially strong.

The fear of black officers

These officers contradicted the stereotype, care-

fully nurtured in the South, of black inferiority and incapacity to assume
positions of responsibility.

Repeatedly during 1942 legislators and

governors appealed to the Army in an effort to keep black officers out of
the South.

Typical was a letter sent to Chief of Staff George C. }~rshall

by the Mississippi members of the House of Representatives.

Congressman

John E. Rankin and his_ six colleagues warned that such a practice "would
tend to create friction that might result in riots, and could not redound
to the best interest of the Service."

Senator John D. Bankhead of Alabama

echoed this sentiment when he took the liberty of asking Marshall to withhold not only officers but all black troops from the South.

Apparently

Bankhead was upset at the news that the all-black 92nd Infantry Division
was to be activated at Fort McClellan, near Anniston.

Marshall politely

ignored these and similar requests.5
As the nation entered the war on a full-scale basis following the
Pearl Harbor attack, racial violence assumed a more threatening role in

5John E. Rankin et al., to Cl:1ief of Staff George C. Marshall, .April
30, 1942, AG 291.21, RG 407; Pittsburgh Courier, August 8, 29, 194,2.
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domestic affairs.

Significantly, the first major incident to occur after

the United States' declaration of war erupted in a camp town and involved
soldiers and civilians.

Black soldiers, smarting at the difference

between democratic rhetoric and reality, became the cutting edge of
racial militancy, and the Alexandria, Louisiana, riot of early 1942 reflected this situation in microcosmic form.
Before the war Alexandria was a sleepy town of 25,000.

By 1942,

however, the population had skyrocketed to between 50,000 and 65,000.
Part of the explanation for this growth lay in the fact that the area
bristled with military installations.

Alexandria's rapid growth was not

unique, but few towns of comparable size could boast of serving three
major training camps and three airfields.

Camp Claiborne, with a normal

population of about 50,000, lay seventeen miles south of the city and
was the largest of all the military camps in the vicinity.

Camps Living-

ston and Beauregard were located nine and six miles from town, respectively,
and although smaller than Claiborne, combined with it to form a military
population in excess of 75,000, of whom 16,000 were black.

Three air-

fields, ·Alexandria, Esler, and Pollock, added to the military congestion.

6

Du.ring any given weekend or payday it was not unusual for 30,000
troops to inundate Alexandria.

Traditional southern racial segregation

prevailed--perha.ps even tightened because of the number of black servicemen--

6
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so that the black soldiers were restricted to the Lee Street district.
This area actually amounted to "four indescribably filthy blocks" which
served as the black community's entertainment center.

There were bars,

nightclubs, and houses of questionable repute where thousands of black
servicemen were supposed to have a good time.

If they strayed elsewhere

in the city in search of diversion they faced "as hostile an attitude as

if they were in an enemy country."7
There were problems even in the Lee Street area.

Camp Beauregard

furnished the military police for the city, both white and black, and the
usual practice in the black district was to augment the unamed black MPs
with roving groups of white MPs.

White military police and the local police

force proved notoriously rough on black soldiers and apparently amused
themselves by periodically overriding the authority of the black MPs.
Over-zealous black military policemen sometimes chose to be unnecessarily
harsh with black soldiers to gain a measure of approval from their superiors.

In such an atmosphere trouble proved unavoidable, especially from

blacks who hailed from the North or Midwest and were unaccustomed to the
oppression they found in Alexandria. 8
On Saturday night, January 10, the Lee Street district buzzed with
the usual weekend activity as civilian and military fun-seekers choked
the streets and bars.

Black MPs made themselves conspicuous, and the

atmosphere was one of restrained gaiety.

7Byers, "Negro

During the midst of this revelry

in Military Service,"

63.

8Memorandum, Col. Lathe B. Row to the Inspector General, July 16,

1943,
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a white woman drove along Lee Street and at one point honked the horn and
yelled for a black soldier crossing the thoroughfare to get out of the
way.

The soldier unthinkingly replied, "would you run over a soldier?"

At that the woman got the attention of a white city policeman standing
nearby who proceeded to arrest the soldier.
Resenting what they considered an unnecessary display of force,
several black Gis gathered around the policeman and the soldier, intent
upon rescuing him.

Within minutes a band of sixty white MPs appeared on

the scene, and a free-for-all broke out.

Hand to hand combat sent members

of both sides tumbling to the pavement, but evidently few shots were fired
until a contingent of state policemen and troops from Camp Beauregard
arrived.

Shooting then began in earnest, and amidst the sporadic c:rack

of revolvers and dull report of shotguns came the sound of broken glass
and assorted missiles hitting the street.
The aff:ray lasted two hours and involved 500 bla9k soldiers.

]3y

the time authorities restored order, thirty black servicemen had been injured, three of them critically.

Officials produced no tally regarding

civilian casualties, but evidence suggested that perhaps twenty black
residents of Alexandria were hurt.

A handful of white MPs fell victim

to flying rocks, bottles, and fists, but since the soldiers were unarmed
casualties among the whites proved minimal.

During the riot white police-

men, troopers, and guardsmen entered Lee Street stores and inflicted considerable personal and property damages.
The end of the disturbance came when officers rounded up 3,000
black Gis and took them either to Camps Claiborne or Livingston where
they were placed under confinement and informed that the city was
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indefinitely off limits. 9 A black native of Wisconsin, a member of Claiborne's 91st Engineers :Battalion, capsuled the bittemess felt by the
soldiers.

"You would think Japan had made it to Lee St.," he complained

in a letter three days after the riot.

"I am in the army and cant do

nothing about it," but because of the discrimination he enconntered in
the South his despair led him to conclude that "I would almost rather
desert and be place before a firing squad and shot down before fighting
for America."

If this soldier's grammar left something to be desired,

his message was nonetheless clear.

10

As expected, a flurry of activity ensued in an effort to discover
the causes and nature of the Alexandria riot. · The NAACP affiliate in
New Orleans contacted some of Alexandria's black citizens despite the
~rmy's attempt to keep any information from leaking out.

Headed by James

B. La.Fourche, the NAACP's public relations counsel for the southem regional b:ranches, the New Orleans-based investigation served as the main
source of material for the national office's complaint to the War DeIBrtment.

Unfortunately, La.Fourche's report proved sensational and inaccu-

rate.

The report charged that ten black soldiers had been killed during

the violence, an allegation nowhere else corroborated.

When repeated in

the press and sent to the War Department, the report proved embarrassing
to Walter White and the New York NAACP office.

Furthermore, the report

9Pittsburgh Courier, January 17, 24, 1942; February 7, 1942; Memorandum, Hastie to the Secretary of the Gene:ral Staff, January 19, 1942,
in "Alexandria, Louisiana, Disturbance," CASW Records, RG 107; James B.
La.Fourche to White, January 19, 1942, AG 291.21, RG 407; New Orleans
Ti.mes-Picayune, January 11, 12, 1942; Alexandria Town Talk, January 12,
1942.
10
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contained such overblown statements as "the attack on Pearl Harbor pales
into insignificance when comparison is made."

A copy of the La.Fourche

report also fell into the hands of the Adjutant Genera.l's office, a mishap which did nothing to improve the A:rmy's estimation of the N.AACPo
"This is the kind of 1 mullarkey 1 on which Walter White bases his recurring letters to the Department, necessitating undue procedures by all
concemed, 11 one staff member grumbled. 11
Though the La.Fourche document was in some ways inaccurate and misleading, for the most part its essential points were valid, and Walter
'White's "recurring letters" to the War Departrrent proved almost always
valid--especially in this case.

He insisted on black MPs with full

authority, denounced civilian interference in a matter involving black
soldiers, and demanded an integrated Army.

The NAACP did err occasion-

ally, especially when it had to depend on local info:rmants, but it essentially waged a lonely war against racial injustice.

For the Army to

treat the NAACP's statements offhandedly was as unfair in the short run
as it was tragic in the long run. 12
For its own part the Army sent General Benjamin O. Davis to Alexandria to investigate.

Davis must have realized that he was being used by

the Army in a distinctly self-serving fashion.

To have a black field

grade officer investigating would presumably pacify black Americans and
simultaneously lend an increased measure of credibility to these reports.

11La.Fourche to White, January 19, 1942; Unsigned memorandum from
the Adjutant General's office to General Adams, January 24, 1942, AG
291.21, RG 407; Alexandria Town Talk, January 12, 13, 1942.
12Roy Wilkins to Stimson, January 23, 1942, in ".Alexandria,
Louisiana, Disturbance," C.ASW Records, RG 107.
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Davis and others did make inquiries, but their conclusions proved superficial.

In one passage the investigative officer came to the understated

conclusion that "civilian policemen and one military policeman indulged
in indiscriminate and unnecessary shooting."

Another report came to the

comforting conclusion that insofar as the underlying causes were concerned
there was "nothing • • • subversive about the disorder in Alexandria."
Instead, "it all came about as a result of personal attitudes, vice, and
overpopulation. 1113
The Army court-martialed no one in connection with the riot.

In

fact, very few persons were brought before courts-martial in cases like
this prior to mid-1943, apparently because the War De:p3.rtment feared the
bad publicity that could be generated if it tried black soldiers on the
basis of inconclusive evidence.

At the same time, however, local Army

officials kept Alexandria off limits to blacks until March 10, and in the
meantime civilian officials tried to ban northern ~lack newspapers from
the area because of allegedly infla.mmator.Y remarks concerning the January
riot.

In a denial of responsibility such as the War Deps.rtment customarily

made following incidents like the one in Alexandria, it declared tmt
solving social problems was not among its responsibilities.
task consisted of -training a fighting force.

Instead, its

The NAACP reminded the de-

partment that it was training a citizens' army and not a professional one,

13Pi ttsburgh Courier, January 24, 31, 1942; Memor-c:illdum, Hastie to
the Secretar.Y of the General Staff, January 19, 1942; Memor-cilldum, Thornton
R. Greene to the Officer in Charge [Camp Claiborne?], March 12, 1942,
in "Alexandria, Louisiana, Disturbance," C.ASW Records, RG 107.
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so that social problems by definition were of concern to it.
vation fell on deaf ears. 14

This obser-

The nature of the various investigations, considering both their
source and content, muddied the overall picture.

The

NAACP in effect

blamed the Army for the riot; the Army blamed black soldiers and, in a
leap of logic, the entire black community along with the exigencies of
war.

Neither proved willing to shoulder the blame.

While the agitation

of the NAACP, the militance of the black press, and the unrest among most
black citizens was certainly a factor in establishing a volatile atmosphere, the Army bore the main responsibility for the riot.

By 1942 it rad

become clear that race relations in the 1!lllitary were deteriorating, a
development all the more important since the black American community
looked to the blacks in uniform as the most obvious symbol of their contribution to the war effort.

The War Department by 1942 knew the dangers

of sending segregated units into areas of the South where traditional
discrimination held sway and where whites were anxious about blacks in
uniform challenging the racial mores of the region.

It also knew that

trouble could result when it used.inadequate numbers of black MPs with
inferior authority to police black sections of camp towns and the camps
themselves.

Violence could also result when black soldiers, usually more

assertive in their new positions of official esteem, did not receive the
respect they sought.

In short, though the black press and organizations

like the NAACP sometimes appeared to value victory at home mom than

1
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victory over.the Axis powers, the burden of responsibility fell on the
official representatives of the fight for democracy.

As long as the War

Department remained insensitive to the rift between rhetoric and reality,
racial violence in the service would continue.
And continue it did.

Although no other military-related incidents

the size of the Alexandria riot occurred du.ring 1942, a series of highly
publicized smaller incidents broke out in various parts of the South.
While in themselves not particularly noteworthy, together they fonned a
pattern of increasing militance on the part of black Gis and defensiveness
on the part of whites.
By March 1942 relations between whites and black soldiers in the
Little Rock area had further deteriorated since the previous Augu.st when
the ill-fated 94th Engineers had been dispersed by the highway patrol.
Camp Robinson, located eight miles north of the city, in 1942 served the
92nd Engineers as well as a number of other black and white units.

Since

the events of August 1941, the Army had segregated portions of the city
for troops on pass in an effort to improve relations by keeping the races
apart.

The decision prompted howls of protest from civil rights groups,

but the Army did not rescind the order for a year.

While in effect, the

order evidently produced little in the way of thawing race relations. 15
On March 22, a Sunday, the customary contingent of both black and
white soldiers on pass filtered around their restricted portions of town.
One of the black soldiers, Private Albert Glover of the 92nd Engineers,

l5"Ha.n.dbook of Information, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Arkansas," in
"Complaints etc.--Soldiers, F-M," LF, NAACP Papers; White to Hastie,
November 7, 1942, in "Camp Robinson," CASW Records, RG 107.
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was drunk.

Late in the afternoon a small group of white MPs arrested

him and tried to take him back to ca.mp; Glover resisted their efforts

so they beat him.

This incident attracted considerable attention, and

one of the onlookers was Sergeant Thomas P. Foster, also of the 92nd
Engineers.

Foster bad received instructions from his immediate superiors

before leaving Camp Robinson to oversee any difficulties involving black
Gis.

Acting in this capacity Foster approached the corner where the

authorities had confined Glover while awaiting a patrol car and asked
the MPs why they were allowing the city police to take h.i1Il to jail.
you don't like it," they replied, "you can investigate it."

"If

Foster shot

back, "I am investigating it now; we are instructed by our superior officers to look after our men when they are in Little Rock on pass."
further argument the MPs placed Foster under arrest.

After

This action so en-

raged the sergeant that he jerked loose from their grasp and engaged in
a fight with them.

The scuffle continued for several minutes until an-

other city policeman, Abner J. Hay, decided to intervene.

Either Hay was

physically imposing or the MPs wanted the civilian police to shoulder
some of the responsibility for this incident, because the military police
agreed to let him subdue Foster.

The two men then tumbled to the ground

while an onlooking cohort of Hay's reached in with a billy club and hit
the black man several times, practically knocking him senseless.

Hay

then sp:rang up and, with Foster lying on the ground dazed and bleeding,
emptied his revolver.

Foster succumbed a few hours later at a local

hospital from the result of fourbullet wounds.

1611 Investigation Conducted by

He was unarmed.

16

Mr. Frank H. Patton, Special Assistant
to the Attomey General of the United States, before the Federal Grand Jury
for the :Ea.stem District of A-rkansas, Western Division, Conceming the
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This cold blooded murder was so obvious a breach of justice that
the civil and military authorities immediately ordered the usual investigation--but not until after all black soldiers had been rounded up and
taken back to camp.

This feature of Army justice had become an automatic

procedure; no matter where the fault lay in any racial incident, the Army
assumed blacks were guilty.

Since Hay was not in the military, the Amy

could do little besides ask the Justice Department to intervene.

In the

meantime Little Rock Chief of Police J. A. Pitcock promised to conduct an
internal investigation of Hay's conduct in the Foster shooting, but he
ended up exonerating the policeman of

a:rry

wrongdoing.

Echoing this con-

clusion, the local prosecuting attomey announced that Hay "was clearly
acting in self-defense."
A "Negro Citizens Committee" made up of prominent blacks in the

Little Rock area refused to give up.

Combined with pressure from the War

Department, which wanted to keep local authorities from meddling in military matters, this committee's badgering finally led Attomey General
Francis :Biddle to order a U.S. Grand Jury to investigate the case.

Sam

Rorex, the U.S. District Attorney, and Frank H. Patton, special assistant
to Biddle and former Attorney General of New Mexico, received orders to
head this probe.

Rorex noted that "this killing has been picked up by

Axis propaganda agencies and a distorted account of it broadcast by Ge:rman

radio stations" and that "they emphasized tha. t it happened in the home town
of Gen. MacArthur. 1117

Death of Sergeant Thomas P. Foster, June 10, 1942," AG 291.21, RG 407;
Pittsburgh Courier, March 28, 1942; Arkansas State Press, March 27, 1942.

17Pittsburgh Courier, April 4, 1942; May 16, 1942; Arkansas State
Press, April 10, 24, 1942; May 1, 8, 1942.
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On June 10 the grand jury probe began.

Frank Patton warned the jury,

which included three blacks, th:3.t both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and a corresponding civil rights statute (Section 52, Title 18,
U.S. Code) had been violated.

He then related the facts in the case and

in the process attempted to shame the jurors into returning a true bill.

After two days of hearings, however, the jury failed to return a true bill
by a vote of nineteen to four.

Conflicting testimony, racial prejudice,

and perhaps the timely induction of Hay into the Army on June

uted to the jury's decision.

8 contrib-

Using its last option to prosecute Hay, the

Justice Department tried to get him discharged from the Army, but in a
letter to :Siddle, War Secretary Henry Stimson refused.

"Inasmuch as the

Federal grand jury • • • returned a 'no bill,'" Stimson argued, "and as
it appears there are no charges now pending against this soldier •••
there is no reason why he should be discharged • • • at this time. u 18
An incident at Tuskegee Army Air Field, Alabama, quickly followed

the Foster killing.

This installation bad been completed in July 1941 as

part of the incentives President Roosevelt promised black Americans prior
to the election of

1940. 19 The base, however, was shrouded

from the very beginning.

in controversy

The NAACP contested the creation of an all-black

18Arkansas State Press, June 12, 1942; "Investigation Conceming
Thomas P. Foster, June 10, 1942"; Wendell :Serge to Maj. Gen. J. A. Ulio,
June 17, 1942; Francis :Siddle to Stimson, May 8, 1943, AG 291.21, RG 407;
Stimson to :Siddle, May 25, 1943, AG 2247, RG 407.
19These incentives included training black pilots, inducting the
proper percentage of blacks into the Army, the appointments of Davis as
brigadier general and Hastie as.aivilian aide, training of black officers,
and other steps designed to gamer northern black support for Roosevelt's
reelection bid. Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 75-79.
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pilot training center, arguing that black pilots would be denied valuable
experience in not flying with larger groups.

William Hastie tried to

mollify the association and at the same time extract an explanation from
the Army Air Force, but both attempts failed.

Even thoug--i Tuskegee Field

graduated almost one thousand black pilots, including the members of the
famed 99th Pursuit Squadron under Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., it rene.ined the
subject of heated controversy.
On

20

April 1, 1942, a city policeman arrested a bla~ soldier in the

town of Tuskegee on charges of dru..."lkenness.

Irrrnediately :ive bla~k MPs

dema.~ded that the soldier be tumed over to them.

This led to a verbal

exchange but came to an abrupt halt when one of the MPs :ook the prisoner
at gu...~point.

Within minutes the city police, a deputy s~~riff, two state

troopers, a~d fifteen armed ~itizens oo~verged on the~:;:, beat o~e of
them senseless, a..~d recovered the soldier.

A large gro~; of excited white

and black citizens then gathered, a..~d a general melee was barely avoided.
The local pblice chief considered it miraculous that nc c~e was killed.
Black soldiers found in town were confined to the base for at least
two weeks.

A probe of the incident revealed deep-seated racial prejudices

as well as a worsening of conditions due to the condescending attitude of
the base commander, Colonel Frederick Kimble.

According to published

accounts, there had been "extreme tension" at Tuskegee Field for some months,
but the black press had not exposed the problem because it did not want to
embarmss the darling of all black units, the 99th Pursuit Squadron.

·•·
20
Guzman, Negro Year Book, 35.5-56; White to Hastie, January 17, .1941;
Hastie to White, January 24, 1941; White to Hastie, January 28, 1941, in
"Tuskegee Air :Base," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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Whether tension existed remained a matter of conjecture.

Yet something

evidently rankled the War Department in connection with the April 1 incident because it transferred Colonel Kimble later in the year.

Morale

reportedly improved thereafter. 21
This episode received more publicity than it warranted.

It could

have been a much more serious affray with the likelihood of deaths involved, but no riot occurred.

The incident received front page coverage

because it involved the controversial all-black pilot training center and
because the first groups of black flier trainees were present when it
occurred.

Significantly, the incident was portentous, for such episodes

were repeated time and again all _over the nation--and overseas--during the
war.

Though most of these near-riots received little attention, their

impact on, and evidence of, the deterioration of race relations proved
real enough indeed. 22
As blacks in uniform became a common sight in the South, the color
line assumed an almost sacred position in the white mind.

J

The difficulties

of black MP Charles Reco provided a much-publicized reminder not only of

21 Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 356-57; Pittsburgh Courier, April
25, 1942; January 2, 16, 1943; "Supplemental Report of Liaison Officer,
SOS, on Racial Relations in Alabama to Chief of Labor Relations ~ranch,
Civilian Personnel Division, Services of Supply, September 17, 1942," in
"Monthly Mopac Area Reports: Labor Mobilization and Utilization, Negro
Recruitment," Series 11, WMC Records., RG 211.
22For example, in addition to the military-related incidents described in the text, riots and near-riots occurred in the following locations during 1942, genera.ting little national publicity but, like the
others, causing bitterness between blacks and whites: Fort Dix, New
Jersey, April 9; Nashville, Tennessee, September l; New Orleans, Louisiana,
November 2; Phoenix, Arizona, November 27; Vallejo, Califomia (Ma.re Island
Naval Ammunition Depot), December 26. Pittsburgh Courier, April 18, 1942;
September 19, 1942; November 14, 1942; January 9, 1943; Ulio to T:ruman K.
Gibson, November 27, 1943, in "Phoenix Riots," CASW Records, RG 107.
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how ~lack military policemen were regarded by white civilians but also
of how tightly the color line was dmwn.

This incident added yet another

bruise to the already battered race relations between black and white
southerners.

Private Reco, nonna.lly on duty in Nevada, received in late

July 1942 a furlough to his hometown, ]eaumont, Texas.

Beaumont, situ-

ated between Houston and the Louisiana border, served in 1942 as a center
of petroleum production and had undergone such rapid growth since 1940
that its municipal services bad deteriorated badly.

The city's bus

system, which had to make do with the equipment on hand at the beginning
of the war buildup, proved a constant source of friction.

Altercations

bad broken out over blacks standing in aisles ahead of the jim crow
dividing line because of overcrowded conditions. 23
On the moming of July

27 Private Reco, in civilian clothes, boarded

a city bus near bis home but found the jim crow section full.

The white

section contained only five people, so the soldier sat down in the seat
just ahead of the dividing line.

The eagle-eyed bus driver noticed this

irregularity immediately and ordered Reco either to move back or get off.
The black GI responded by roundly cursing the driver.

The driver then

called the police, and quickly four city officers arrived.

They attempted

to arrest Reco for using abusive language, but the soldier resisted.

After

a brief scuffle in which one of the policemen broke his hand, the officers
managed to get Reco into the squad car.

Once in custody, however, he

continued the struggle and reached for the holstered revolver of one of
the officers.

The policeman turned to Reco, and with the soldier's band

23Houston Informer, August 1, 1942. For stories on bus incidents,
see Beaumont Enterprise, July 1, 3, 1942.

75
grasping the barrel, shot him three times.

Another policeman shot Reco

once more, and the officer with the broken band managed to club him with
his nightstick.

Instead of proceeding to the hospital, the policemen

drove first to the station where they booked the perforated but still
conscious Reco on charges of using abusive language.

later in the day

military authorities removed him to a hospital at Fort Crockett, near
Galveston, where he eventually recovered. 24
An avalanche of protest descended upon Beaumont from the NAACP,

which boasted a chapter in that city as well as in nearby Houston.

The

War Department also protested the action as an unwarranted and reckless
assault upon a soldier.

Beaumont's Chief of Police, Ross Dickey, attempted

to explain away the incident by asserting that "I am not going to have any
of

my

officers cut or beaten by anyone while making an arrest."

Department persisted, however, and on August

14 Attorney

The War

General Francis

Biddle set in motion a federal grand jury hearing on the case to determine
whether Reco's civil rights had been violated. 25 Meanwhile a local grand
jury already in session voluntarily picked up the case.

Beginning the

last few days in July, the jury collected depositions from scores of people,
probably all white, including Chief Dickey and other policemen.
19 the jury failed to return an indictment.

On August

It exonerated all four police-

men involved in the case even though the evidence pointed strongly toward
an infringement upon Reco's rights.

The decision reflected the local

2

4:Beaumont Enterprise, July 28, 1942; August 15, 1942; Houston
Info:rmer, August 1, 1942.
25Beaumont Enterprise, July 28, 1942; August 15, 1942.
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attitude toward blacks, especially those who tried to assume any authority,
26
whether military policemen or not.
After this the federal efforts to secure an indictment expired.
The F.BI obtained evidence, but the long awaited fede:ral g:rand jury never
convened.

Attorney Gene:ral Biddle announced somewhat lamely that the

attempt for a fede:ral case had been dropped because there appeared to be
"no prospect of conviction." 27
As if the Foster, Tuskegee, and Reco incidents bad not been enough,
the final episode of this nature prior to the spring of 1943 provoked the
loudest repercussions and acted as a kind of last warning before the
storm of violence erupted the following year in and around military camps
across the South.

Private Raymond Carr, a black MP from Camp Beauregard,

Louisiana, bad been inducted into the Army in mid-1942.

He hailed from

Louisiana and thus had by necessity become schooled in the ways of souther.n
:race relations.

On the night of October 31, 1942, Carr and another black

MP, Private John Spears, were on duty at the comer of 10th and Washington Streets in Alexandria.

Relations between black soldiers and white

civilians bad been strained since the January riot.

At about 1:00 a.m.

on November 1, a black couple approached Carr and Spears.

The two argued

between themselves and occasionally spoke to the MPs, the woman insisting
that the man had hit her and asking for protection.

The

MPs refused to

get involved since the matter did not lie within their jurisdiction, but
the couple kept following them a:nyway, arguing incessantly.

26
27

Ibid., August 20, 1942.

Ibid., August 25, 1942; Walter White, "Behind the Harlem Riot,"
New Republic, Augu.st 16, 1943, pp. 220-22.
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A few minutes later two Louisiana state policemen arrived and,
hearing the commotion, asked the civilians the nature of their problem.
After unsuccessfully trying to figure out the cause of the squabble, one
of the state troopers, Dalton Mccollum, decided simply to arrest all four
blacks and worry about the difficulty later.

Carr and Spears informed

the troopers that they were not going anywhere until they were properly
relieved of their duties, since they could be court-martialed if they
did.

At that the two troopers put the civilians in their car, deposited

them at the station, picked up two more troopers, and returned to the
scene.

A:rmed to the teeth and in a hostile disposition, the troopers

attempted to arrest the MPs, who had only nightsticks as weapons.

Spears

surrendered readily but Carr fled, heading for a larger group of white
and black MPs stationed nearby.

McCollUIJ! and Trooper R.H. White gave

chase, firing into the air and commanding Carr to stop.

The chase ended

when the state policemen found Carr surrounded by a group of other MPs
while a frantic search for the officer of the day progressed.

McCollum

and Carr confronted each other, Carr took a swing at the trooper, and
Mccollum fired.
line of duty.

Carr died within a few hours, technically killed in the

28

Since Carr had been in unifo:rm and at his post armed with only a
nightstick, and since the pretext for his arrest was blatantly racist,

28Pittsburgh Courier, November 21, 1942; "Report of Investigation
of Staff Judge Advocate, Lieutenant Colonel
Private Raymond Carr Case, Alexandria, Camp
November 1, 1942; Statement of R.H. White,
Alexandria, Louisiana, November 2, 1942, in
~litary Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107.

Julien C. Hyer, JAGD on
:Beauregard, Louisiana,
Department of State Police,
"Violence Against Negro
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it was obvious that McCollum had killed him in cold blood.

The next day

the local Army authorities began to oil the investigative machinery.

One

of their first acts, taking depositions, only clouded the issue since the
troopers and Private Spears came up with widely differing accounts of
what happened.

When Lieutenant Colonel Julien C. Hyer of the Judge Advo-

cate General's office talked with McCollum, he found him to be the "tn:>ical trooper type, a trifle belligerent, sorry-it-had-to-be-him, could-notbe-helped attitude, not-grea tly-concemed."

And when the Amy asked

assistant superintendent of the State Police L.A. Newsome to arrest McCollum until the investigation could be completed, Newsome snapped t1:e.t
he "would not place any state trooper in arrest for shooti11g a nigger. 1129
Rebuffed, the Army asked Louisiana Govemor Sam Houston Jones to
intervene so that a full investigation could be made.
calling a state grand jury into session.

Jones responded by

Meanwhile, Hyer recommended that

the War Department ask the Justice Department to intervene by amendir~
Sections

253

and

254

of the United States Code to include civilian inter-

ference with officers and men of the armed forces on duty.

Hyer also asked

that a plain-clothes Louisiana operative of the War Department be sent to
Alexandria to work up a federal case if the Justice Department amended the
law.

Neither suggestion materialized, so federal prosecution remained

technically impossible.

Attorney General ~iddle offhandedly remarked that

"this is a case for the state to indict for manslaughter or murder and
that it becomes a little silly for the Federal Government to prosecute • • •

29 "Report of Investigation on Raymond Carr Case, November 13, 1942";
Maj. Gen. Richard Donovan to Govemor Sam Houston Jones, November 13, 1942,
in "Violence Against Negro Military Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107.
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on the ground that the man who was killed was deprived of his life without
due process of law."30

In April 1943 the state grand jury investigating the Carr case voted
not to return an indictment.

The Justice Department seemed satisfied with

the result, noting that only one of the eleven jurors resided in Alexandria.

Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General, considered the grand

jury to be "above-the-average," and because this "high type grand jury"
bad "fully and fairly" investigated the incident no further prosecutive
action seemed warranted.

Yet all of the jurors were from Rapides Parish,

of which Alexandria was the largest city.

Berge ap:i;arently thought preju-

dice against black soldiers emanating from the January riot and the Carr
case stopped at the city limits.31
The NAACP availed itself of the opportunity to scorch the Justice
Department's half-hearted attempts to prosecute in the Carr case as well
as in those that bad preceded it.

Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall re-

minded the Department that "Negro soldiers now present in camps in the
South are there solely by reason of the fact that they are under the
jurisdiction of the War Department" and added that none of the 1942 cases
had been prosecuted by federal authorities.

"Failure of the United

States government to protect these soldiers destroys the morale of Negro
soldiers and civilians," Marshall wamed, concluding that "it is difficult
to believe that our democracy has a chance of survival" as long as it

30

"Report of Investigation on Baymond Carr Case, November 13, 1942";
Donovan to Jones, November 13, 1942; Biddle to Stimson, December 12, 1942,
ibid.
3~erge to Marshall, April 23, 1943, in "NAACP (War)--1940-47," ibid.
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continued to take such incidents as the Foster, Reco, and Carr cases so
lightly. 32
While the Justice Department continued to turn a deaf ear to the
intensified protests of civil rights groups, the War Department began to
worry at the thought of open racial violence becoming~ institution in
and around military camps.

Besides the Alexandria riot and the other

incidents already described, various other deaths had resulted from antagonism between white civilians and black servicemen in the South.

In

October a white bus driver shot and killed a black soldier in Mobile, and
in November another black GI died at the hands of a Columbia, South Carolina, policeman.

In mid-1942 the War Department's Intelligence Division

prepared a report on the subject of increasing racial violence within
the service.

Characteristically it discussed the possibility of subver-

sive influence amo~.g blacks but admitted it had found none.

More to the

point the report emphasized that the location of the troops, police methods
(MPs included), and lack of recreational facilities all contributed to the
worsening situation.

It recommended more complete training and supervi-

sion of MPs, closer attention to the relocation of black troops (obviously northemers), more emphasis on respect for the uniform of the armed
forces, and control of the "inflammatory and vituperative articles in
the colored press."33
The report received a cool response from many staff divisions and
from command headquarters.

Some officers complained that it said nothing

3~rshall to Biddle, April 1.5, 1943, in "Violence Against Negro
Military Personnel," ibid.
33Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 361-62.
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substantial.

Others explai.ped that blacks were loyal enough but proved

susceptible to propaganda, in this case meaning the black press.

Still

others were of the opinion that whites in many cases found it "difficult
to alter hereditary feelings and emotions," and no order from on high
could change them.

While the Army adopted portions of the report, they

were never uniformly enforced and some were ignored altogether. 34
At a time when the Axis and Allied forces were locked in a grueling
struggle to the death in which the outcome remained unclear, the War Department obviously relegated domestic :racial disputes to the back burner.
:But the disruptive potential of this violence was not lost on William
Hastie.

Recounting the incidents of the past year, Hastie cautioned

Secretary of War Stimson that "this matter has reached the stage where the
Army can no longer afford to dismiss the situation by saying that these
cases are beyond its jurisdiction."

Suggesting that the Army bad been un-

willing to risk offending white southerners in taking corrective action,
he emphasized that "this continuing wave of violence may lead to rioting
at any time and certainly it is raising havoc with the spirit of Negro
soldiers."

To alleviate the problem would involve providing black MPs

with sideams in places like Alexandria, as had been done at Fort Bragg,
publicly denouncing such incidents as Raymond Carr's death, and giving
federal courts jurisdiction over crimes of violence by civilians against
military personnel on duty. 35

34Ibid., 362.

35Hastie

to Stimson, November 17, 1942, in "Violence Against Negro
Military Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107.
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While the Army bad a serious problem on its bands, very little in
the way of constructive action appeared.

Its mission, it repeated, was

to win a war and not act as a laboratory for social refonn, but not everyone was thoroughly convinced that such an excuse absolved it of responsibility in protecting its men.

The irony of tyranny at home while fight-

ing tyranny abroad grew starkly obvious against a backdrop of international

efforts to protect the Four Freedoms.

The gap between rhetoric and re-

ality, in short, became most distinct in the service.

It would apparently

take more serious and disruptive racial violence to occasion much in the
way of genuine concern in the War Department.
The military; of course, bad no monopoly on discrimination or racial
violence.

In domestic civilian life tension correspondingly heightened as

the pace of the war effort intensified.

Undoubtedly there was an effect

on civilian race relations that was traceable to military difficulties,
especially in areas with military camps or large numbers of soldiers.

In

fact the impact of military violence was felt all over the South, and the
causes and effects of military and civilian outbreaks were intricately
intertwined.

After all, both were based on the same problems and the

same minority· group.

Yet the influence of northern black troops in the

South, their heightened sensitivity to treatment by white civilians, and
the impact of such incidents as the Alexandria riot may have served as
causes of heightened militancy on the part of southern black civilians
and rising tension in general.
Perhaps the most serious problem confronting blacks nationwide was
discrimination in defense employment.

In the South the opening of the

job market to blacks in unprecedented numbers fostered a feeling of
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defensiveness among white workers and corresponding assertiveness among
blacks.

The manpower shortage and expansion of vital war industries pro-

vided jobs in traditional areas for blacks, such as common laborers, but
it also opened up jobs previously unavailable to them--skilled jobs in
steel plants, shipyards, munitions factories and other defense related
positions.

But discrimination continued.

For those black men and women

who got good jobs in the South, others were left to their own devices or
employed in menial oc.oupations. 36
This obvious discrimination did not pass the FEPC unnoticed.

Since

its creation in mid-1941, the committee had plunged into its work with
little fear and little power.
condemned ignored it.

It proved ineffectual because those it

Yet it busily pressed on, holding hearings in vari-

ous parts of the nation to uncover flagrant abuses of Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802.

In late 1941 and early 1942 the FEPC conducted such

. hearings in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York.

In June 1942 the roving

hearings went to Binningham where acts of discrimination against blacks
in southem defense industries received a thorough, if largely nnpopular,
airing. 37
At the outset Mark Ethridge, a member of the FEPC, attempted to
assuage tender feelings about mcial integration by observing that "where
we get into the field of ·emotional tension is where somebody mentions
social equality, the abolition of Jim Crowism or segregation."

The

36Lester B. Granger, "Barriers to Negro War Employment," Annals of
the American Academ.y of Political and Social Science, 223 (September 1942),
72-80.

37Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 27.
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members of the committee might have personal ideas on the subject, he
conceded, but flatly declared that "the committee has taken no position
on the question of segregation of industrial workers."

All the FEPC

wanted, Ethridge conclude~ was to utilize all the manpower available
regardless of race, creed, color or national origin. 38
From June 18 through June 20 the FEPC heard complaints of discrimination against a variety of industries with defense contracts, among them
Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company of Mobile, Gulf Shipbuilding
of Chickasaw, Alabama, the Honeycutt Company of Birmingham, Vultee
Aircraft of Nashville, and the defense training programs in Atlanta and
Birmingham. 39 As a result, in January 1943 the committee advised these
concerns to bring their employment policies in line with Executive Order
8802. 40
The hearings gmphica.lly illustrated the plight of southem black
workers but gave only ~ne dimension of the growing problems of regional
race relations.

They presented what amounted to a superficial look at

one segment of the non-farm black population and did not shed much light
on the problems faced by many other black southemers.

The most telling

3811 supplemental Report of Liaison Officer on Racial Relations in
Alabama, September 17, 1942," 'WMC, RG 211.
39The other large industries accused of discrimiilation were Bell
Aircraft of Atlanta, Delta Shipbuilding of New Orleans, Macvey Shipbuilding and Southeastern Shipbuilding, both of Savannah. Hearings at
Birmingham, Alabama., the United States of America, before the Committee
on Fair Employment Practice of the President of the United States, June
18-20, 1942, Series 19, Records Relating to Hearings, Dec. 1941-Mar.
1946, Records of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice, Record Group
228, National Archives (hereafter cited as FEPC Records, RG 228.
40Rucbames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 49.
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gauge of deteriorating race relations could be found in civilian racial
violence.
Beginning in July 1942 a series of mostly "streamlined" lynchings
occurred, and the composite result heightened tension in Dixie.

They also

foreshadowed the more intense civilian violence of the summer of 1943, much
in the same way as the military violence of

serious outbreaks.

1942 forewarned of later, more

Together, the civilian and military violence formed a

picture of weakening tolerance by whites toward what they perceived as
dangerous encroachments on the color line.
During the early moming darkness of Sunday, July

19, .1942, a black

man named William Vinson allegedly stole into the trailer home of a white
woman near the Red River Ordnance Depot on the outskirts of Texarkana,
Texas, and attempted to rape her.

The woman's screams brought rescuers,

and Vinson later found himself in the "negro ward" of the city hospital
after having been shot in the stomach while resisting arrest.

The local

police proved lax in providing a guard for him.
Shortly after midnight on July 20 a mob of about fifty whites
stormed the hospital and easily abducted the wounded prisoner.

Someone

tied a rope around his neck and the other end to the rear bumper of an
automobile.

The car's occupants then dragged the soon lifeless body

through the streets to the Texarkana Cotton-Oil Corporation plant where
the mob then finished its grisly work by banging the corpse from the winch
of a loading platfom.41

41New York Times, July 13, 1942, p. 17; Memorandum, Berge to J. Edgar
Hoover, July 24, 1942; Press release, Department of Justice, July 24, 1942,
in Civil Rights Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (hereafter

cited as Justice Department Records). The records of the Justice Department
for the World War II years are in the department's possession at its headquarters in Washington, D. C.
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The Vinson incident was one of the few traditional, or blatant,
lynchings of the war era.

Occasionally a complete disregard for secrecy

characterized a mob that did its best to make a lynching a public spectacle.

Brazen murder, however, did not make the task of the Justice De-

partment a:ny easier in finding witnesses or members of the mob.

Apparently

local feeling held that Vinson got what he deserved, so the city police
made no effort to find the lynchers though they probably knew their identity.

Mayor William V. Brown spoke for many Texarkana whites when he

blared, "when rapes stop then lynchings will stop.
fire you will not be bumed."
the FBI to Texarkana.

If you don't play with

Accordingly, the Justice Department ordered

The Bureau predictably found a conspiracy of silence,

and after much fuming and fidgeting finally gave up all hope of prosecuting
under the federal civil rights statute.42
Perhaps Vinson's death at the hands of a mob, tragic though it was,
would not have aro~sed much feeling nationwide bad it been an isolated
incident, but in October came three more deaths by lynching.

The resulting

indignation exhibited by black Americans showed a further loss of intermcial cormmmication as both groups developed decidedly unfavorable perceptions of each other.

The violence showed that blacks in southem

society faced the dismal prospect of being forcibly held behind the color
line because the society as a whole proved unable to cope with adversity
or massive change, and that society's reaction was to lash out at the most
accessible symbol of its woes.

42Berge to Hoover, July 24, 1942; Berge to Steve M.

King, February

27, 1943, Justice Department Records; William V. Brown to the Reverend
Ross D. Brown, August 12, 1942, in "Willie Vinson, Texarkana, Texas,"
GOF, NAACP Papers.
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On

October 12 two fourteen-year-old black boys died at the hands

of a small mob of whites hear Shubuta, Mississippi, located northeast of
laurel.

The two boys, Charles Lang and Ernest Green, startled a thirteen-

year-old white girl while playing near a bridge.

The girl was on her way

home from school and, while the boys and girl knew each other, it is unclear why the boys accosted her.

Even assuming that the idea was rape

or assault, neither Lang nor Green touched her.
up the incident and the girl ran away.
arrested and jailed the boys.

A passing motorist broke

Shortly afterward the police

That night four or five white men "over-

powered" the jailer, whisked the two .boys from their cell, and drove them
to the scene of the alleged crime.

There they hanged Lang and Green from

the bridge, mutilating the bodies in the process.

That particular bridge

had become noteworthy as the scene of four previous lynchings.43
Reaction was swift.

The NAACP sent Madison S. Jones to the area to

question local black citizens, but no one talked.
reprisals from whites kept mouths closed.

The implied threat of

The International Labor De-

fense, a communist inspired organization that had helped defend the Scottsboro boys in the 193Os, asked Mississippi's progressive Governor Paul B.
Jolmson for immediate action in the case.

Johnson responded by sending

an investigator to Shubuta, chastising the local sheriff, and making a
public statement condemning the violence, saying, "every man who helped
lynch those Negroes is guilty of murder, and I want the public to know
that the Governor of Mississippi condemns the act and will exert every

4 3Pittsburgh Courier, October 24, 1942; White to Biddle and Victor
Rotnem, November 9, 1942, in "Mississippi Lynchings," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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effort to see that the violated laws of Mississippi are vindicated."

The

Pittsburgh Courier and the liberal New York publication PM collaborated
in sending a white correspondent, Victor H. Bernstein, to the area.44
On

top of that the FBI put in an appearance.

The conspiracy of

silence transcended racial lines, so agents collected nothing substantial.
Local whites displayed a certain amount of resentment toward all the outsiders who converged on Shubuta and its environs, since the lynching case
was "a local affair."

Said one ruffled citizen, "we got our pride, you

know ... 45
While the investigations continued and the protests swamped the
President, the Justice Department, and Governor Jolmson, another lynching
occurred near Laurel--only thirty miles from Shubuta.

In May a black man,

Howard Wash, allegedly had beaten to death his employer, Clint Welborn,
a white dairy farmer living in Jones County.

Immediately some 75 to 100

white citizens signed a petition asking circuit Judge F. Burkitt Collins
to call a special session of circuit court to try Wash, but Collins refused so the trial had to wait until October.
that feelings ran high over the alleged murder.
the trial for October

15.

On

The petition indicated
Judge Collins scheduled

the 11th a small group headed by a local

deputy sheriff tried to get Wash released to their custody.
The trial began in laurel on schedule, and Wash was found guilty.
Unexpectedly the jury divided over the sentence, life imprisonment or

44wlute to Biddle and Rotnem, November 9, 1942; Paul B. Johnson to
Vito Marcantonio, October 14, 1942; Marcantonio to Wilkins, October 15,
1942, in "Mississippi Lynchings," GOF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier,
October 31, 1942; Jackson Advocate, October 17, 1942; Memphis Commercial
Appeal, October 14, 1942.
45Pittsburgh Courier, October 24, 31, 1942.
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death.

Under state law a split like this automatically resulted in a

life sentence, and when the news hit the streets on Friday, October 16,
the reaction proved unsettling.

Having decided that the jury had not

meted out the proper punishment for a black man guilty of murdering a
white, some citizens took matters into their own hands.
About 10:00 p.m. on October 16 a group of fifty whites gathered at
Ford I s Store outside Shady Grove, near Laurel.

This was the area where

Clint Welbom had lived, and at least one relative of the dead man was a
member of the group.

The whites formulated a plan of action and drove

into Laurel to the county jail where Wash was incarce:rated.

By about

11:JO they had surrounded the jail, and the mob had grown to about a
hundred.

The county sheriff, J. Press Reddoch, arrived shortly thereafter,

and members of the throng tried to get Reddoch's keys to the jail.

The

sheriff, worried about his job, told the mob he would lose it if he tumed
over the keys.

Several of the men continued to threaten him, however,

saying that they had put him in office in the first place so he should do
as they asked.

Reddoch refused but then fled to call Judge Collins, tell-

ing the jailer as he left not to band over the keys.

The mob then broke

out a window and about fifteen people got inside where they confronted
jailer Luther Holder.

All Holder bad to do to escape was lock himself

behind a steel door leading to the cells, but instead he meekly gave them
the keys.

Members of the mob then spirited Wash to a waiting car, and the

procession motored to an isolated bridge several miles from town near
Shady Grove.

At about 1:00 a.m., October

17, the mob slid the noose

around Wash's neck and heaved his body over the side.46

46Toxey Hall to Berge, November 10, 1942, Justice Department Records;
Affidavit of Allen Welborn Pryor, undated, in "Mississippi L;vnchin&'."S."
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The next day Laurel was swamped by members of the Govemor's staff,
state police, and state guardsmen, with FBI agents and Justice Department
investigators on the way.

Govemor Johnson, shocked at three lynchings

within a week in his state, reiterated his stand by declaring that "I am
opposed to mob violence and will do everything in my power to see that the
lynchers are prosecuted."

The Justice Department had the same thing in

mind, and Attorney General :Biddle promised "relentless prosecution" if a
case developed. 47
into session.

Judge Collins quickly called a special county grand ju.r.r

From the 17th to the 19th the jury presumably considered

returning an indictment, but it issued a report which contained no mention
of the incident. 48
While the Justice Department considered its next step the forces of
civil rights rose up in arms.

One group, the National Negro Council, asked

President Roosevelt to proclaim martial law in Mississippi, pointing out
that 10 percent of the na_,tion's population should be adequately protected
from violence by a federal anti-lynching law.

The New Republic editorial-

ized that since whites had begun to lose economic control over blacks because of the manpower shortage and efforts to eliminate discrimination in
employment, they were attempting "control over the Negro by violence. 11
The only remedy, it asserted, was for the federal government to stop

GOF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, October 24, 1942; New York Times,
April 21, 1943, p. 52; Jackson Advocate, October 24, 1942; Memphis
Commercial Appeal, October 18, 1942.
47Pittsburgh Courier, October
24, 1942.

24,

1942; Jackson Advocate, October

48
New York Times, October 20, 1942, p. 10; Memphis Commercial
Anpeal, October 20, 1942.
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"dodging the issue" and take "a strong and bona-fide approach to the problem."

Lester :B. Granger, executive secretary of the Urban League, com-

plained to Governor Johnson that people of both mces were "revolted over
this mob reversion from civilized standards" and assured him that "Axis
propagandists are making as profitable use of this happening as they have
made of other instances of racial conflict."

The

persistent.NAACP advised

the White House that "three lynchings within five days in Mississippi are
as mu.ch sabotage of our nation's war effort as a bomb in an airplane
factory or a shipyard."

Only swift action by the government, warned the

association, could relieve the plight of black southerners and boost their
sagging morale •. And Vito Marcantonio, New York's radical gadfly, created
the "National Emergency Committee to Stop Lynching," inviting a host of
organizations to join.49
These and other expressions of outmge, together with the Justice
Department's surprising fortitude, carried the Wash case to new levels of
importance.

Following several weeks of FBI probes a break ca.me.

Allen

Welborn Pryor, a cousin of Clint Welborn and a member of the mob that
lynched Wash, confessed to his part in the crime to two FBI special investigators.

Although insisting that he bad not touched Wash nor taken an active

part in killing him, Pryor revealed the names of other conspirators in the
crime and gave incriminating details.

On December 11, Francis :Biddle

49New York Times, October 20, 1942, p. 10; "Ba.ck to Lynching,"
New Republic, November 2, 1942, pp. 560-61; "The Mississippi Condemnation,"
Opportunity, 20 (November 1942), 322; Press release, October 19, 1942, in
"Mississippi Lynchings"; Marcantonio to Arthur B. Spingarn, October 19,
1942, in "National Emergency Committee--Vito Marcantonio, Chairman," GOF,
NAACP Papers.
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called a federal grand ju.cy into session to begin hearings in early
January 1943 at Jackson.SO
The prosecution, assisted by special counsel fmm Biddle's office,
hoped to bring an indictment on two counts:

conspiracy to induce the police

to aid in depriving Wash of legal protection, and conspiracy to deprive
Wash of his life without due process of law.

Their hopes materialized

when on January 12, 1943, the grand jury indicted four whites on the first
count and these four and jailer Luther Holder on the second count.

The

five men were only a fmction of the hundred-member mob, but the Justice
Department proved satisfied anyway since the indictments paved the way for
the first federal court case since 1903 in which whites were charged with
lynching a black man.51
In early April the defendants were armigned in federal court at
Hattiesburg, and the trial began on April 19.

Judge Sidney Mize received

not guilty pleas from all five men on trial, and amidst extreme tension
the story unfolded. 52
damaging evidence.

The prosecution relied on the presentation of highly

The defense chose the old ploy of bawling over states'

rights, and in one instance the chief defense attorney wailed that "the
people of this great Southland. are on trial • • • •

It is just another

50Biddle to Roosevelt, December 11, 1942, Justice Department
Records; Pryor affidavit, undated, NAACP Papers.
51Rotnem to Frank Coleman, January 7, 1943, Justice Department
Records; Transcripts of indictments, U.S. v. Shotts, January 7, 1943, in
"Wash, Howard, re: Lynching of," LF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier,
January 23, 1943.
52rt is-unclear why Allen W. Pryor confessed, allowing the F.BI to
develop a case against him and the others and then pleaded not guilty in
federal court.
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effort ••• to see how much further we of the South will pe:cnit invasion of states' rights."53
For some reason, presumably lack of evidence, the charges against
two of the men were dropped, so when Judge Mize sent the jury to its deliberations on April 23 the fates of Luther Holder, Barney Jones, and Allen
Pryor were at stake.

The next day the verdict came in--not guilty.

In

spite of ironclad evidence and irrefutable testimony the question of
states' rights clearly affected the jury's decision.5 4
If the Wash case had provided the Justice Department with a :rare
opportunity to test the Fourteenth Amendment against lynchers in federal
court, the episode that followed it proved even more promisingo

Yet the

lynching of Robert Hall epitomized both the reaction of local whites to
perceived or real black advancement and the frustration of federal authorities.

In early January 1943 Robert Hall, a black mechanic in Newton,

Georgia (near Albany), fell from the grace of the local law.

Claud Screws,

Sheriff of Baker County, personified the legal system in the predominantly
rural area.

Hall procured a pistol, an act considered dangerous by whites,

and Screws commandeered it.

But Hall committed a further breach of racial

etiquette when on January 19 he went before the Baker County grand jury
and got his pistol returned by court order.

Screws apparently decided to

teach Hall a lesson, providing an example for other blacks in the vicinity.
On the night of January 29, Screws manufactured a warrent for Hall's arrest,

53Pittsburgh Courier. April 17,
Times, April 21, 1943, p. 52.

24, 1943; May 1, 1943; New York

5~ew York Times, April 24, 1943, p. 28; April 25, 1943, p. 37;
Pittsburgh Courier, May 1, 1943.
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charging him with stealing a truck tire.

Screws• two companions, police-

man Frank Jones and special deputy Jim Bob Kelley, got Ball out of bed on
this pretext and arrested him.

At the courthouse Screws began to beat Ball

over the bead, and even as be slumped to the ground all three men continued
to beat him.

After fracturing his skull, the whites dragged_ the near

lifeless body from a pool of blood up the stairs and through the courthouse to the jail.

Screws phoned for an ambulance to take the victim to

Albany, but Hall died en route to the hospital.55
On February 12, after a Baker County grand jury failed to return

an indictment, the Justice Department requested an FBI investigation.
Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge outlined the facts in the case
to Francis Biddle and added that from the condition of the body Jones and
Kelley may have tied Hall to the back of their car when they arrested him
and dragged him the four miles into town.

Berge recommended a federal

grand jury investigation to be undertaken in tandem with the Wash triai. 56
On April 10 a federal grand jury in Macon indicted Claud Screws and
his two companions, Jones and Kelley, on charges of violating Sections
51, 52, and 88 of the U.

s.

Code.

Again, the essential violation was the

deprivation of life without due process of law.

Since there was no federal

lynch law, the Justice Department stretched civil rights statutes derived
from the Fourteenth Amendment over a wide variety of criminal acts.

The

5 5Alba.ny Herald, April 11, 1943; Pittsburgh Courier, February 13,

20, 1943; "Summary of Facts," unidentified report on Robert Hall case,
Justice Department Records; Francis Biddle, "Democracy and Racial Minorities," Common Ground, 4 (Winter 1944), 9.
56Pittsburgh Courier, November 6, 1943; Berge to Wilkins, February
25, 1943, in "Ball, Robert--Lyncbing," GOF, NAACP Papers; Memorandum,
Berge to Biddle, March 20, 1943, Justice Department Records.
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Department's chief of the Civil Rights Section, Victor W. Rotnem, alluded
to perhaps the main reason for so vigorous a prosecution in cases such as
this when he said that the Hall incident "is being promptly prosecuted and
so neither Nazi nor Japanese propagandists have had opportunity to make
international capital of this unfortunate incident. 0 57
In October a district court convicted Screws, Jones, and Kelley,
and the three immediately appealed the decision.

The prosecution welcomed

the appeal, for having dropped further prosecution in the Wash case it
wanted this one to reach the highest court.

Assistant Attorney General

Tom C. Clark even recommended a direct appeal to the Supreme Court for
expediency's sake.

Instead, the case next appeared before the Fifth U.S.

Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans.

At issue was whether or not the

federal government had jurisdiction in the case.

The defense argued that

the trial should take place solely within the state court system.

The

prosecution, of course, argued that Screws and his cohorts acted "under
color of law" in depriving Hall of constitutionally guaranteed rights, so
the case belonged in the federal courts.

Here, as in the Wash case, the

Justice Department wanted to test the federal civil rights statutes before
the Supreme Court.
could be set.

On

If they withstood the test, a significant precedent
January 14, 1944, the circuit court of appeals upheld the

convictions, setting in motion the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 58

57Pittsburgh Courier, April 17, 1943; Albany Herald, April 11, 1943.
Prosecutions under the federal peonage statute, 14 Stat. 546, were also
justified by the propaganda threat. Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery:
Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Urbana, 1972), 179.

58Pittsburgh

Courier, April 17, 1943; November 6, 1943; December 25,
1943; January 22, 1944; "Memorandum for the Solicitor General," from Tom
C. Clark, September 9, 1943, Justice Department Records, Screws v. U.S.,
140 F 2d 662 (1944).
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As the appeal pended, Screws posted $7,500 bond, left his cohorts
in jail, and returned to Baker County where he ran for and won renomination as sheriff.

Having been renominated he was virtually assured of

victory in the general election.

This action by the voters of :Baker

County served as a measure of indignant independence against the encroachment of the federal goveD'.llllent.59
On May 7, 1945, in a five to four vote, the Supreme Court reversed
the convictions and remanded the case to the Georgia state courts.

In

the majority opinion Justice William O. Douglas commented that the real
problem was one of jurisdiction, noting that "the administration of criminal
justice rests with the States except as Congress ••• has created offenses against the United States." District Court Judge Bascom J. Deaver,
moreover, bad not properly instructed the jury in the October 1943 case.
In the dissenting opinion Justice Frank Murphy complained that "Robert Hall
has been deprived not only of the right to be tried by a court mther than
by ordeal.

He bas been deprived of the right of life its elf."

The ver-

dict should be upheld, he observed, if for no other reason than the fact
that "not even the semblance of due process has been accorded him. 1160
After this decision the whole case fell apart.

A retrial in Novem-

ber 1945 resulted in Screws, Jones, and Kelley being acquitted of Ball's
death, which had occurred almost three years before.

The Justice Depart-

ment must have been deflated, for tbe civil rights statutes bad failed the
test.

The death of Robert Hall remained unavenged, and though Hall's

5 9Pi ttsburgh Courier, March 18, 1944.
60
Screws v. U.S., 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945).
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widow might not have understood the legal jargon and jockeying that surrounded her husband's name, she understood all too clear~y that the men
who killed him returned to Baker County as heroes for winning over out-

. t erf erence. 61
s1"de in
Together with the rise of violence involving military personnel,

---

the rash of lynchings du.ring the last half of 1942 and early 1943 clearly
showed the further deterioration of southern race relations.

No matter

where the fault lay the increasing incidence of violence by whites against
blac~s belied whatever attempts people made to soft-pedal the issue.
Northern violence, such as the Sojourner Truth housing riots in Detroit
and higlµ.y publicized examples of discrimination in employment, such as
the labor-related dispute at the Sun Shipbuilding plant in Chester, Pennsylvania, proved that racial oppression did not stop at the Ma.son-Dixon
Line.

Yet southerners knew that the situation was worsening, and concemed

blacks and whites knew action bad to be ta.ken to avoid a bloodbath.
On October

20, 1942, only three days after the Howard Wash lynch-

ing, a group of southern black leaders met secretly in Durham, North Carolina.

These men knew that blacks as the minority would always be the

losers if relations remained strained or worsened.

The conference con-

sisted chiefly of prominent black educators, labor leaders, and representatives. of southern civil rights groups who hoped to find answers to prevent
the violence from escalating.

Philip :B. Young, editor of the Norfolk

Journal and Guide, served as chairman.

The group produced a statement

61Pittsbu.rgh Courier, November 10, 17, 1945; The other southern
lynching of 1943 occurred on June 16 when four masked men took Cellos
Harrison from his Marianna., Florida, jail cell and clubbed him to death.
Guzman, Negro Year :Book, 302-11.
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known as the Articles of Cooperation which articulated the views of the
men regarding such sensitive issues as political and civil rights, industry and labor, education, agriculture, military service, and social welfare.

Essentially conservative in tone, the statement nonetheless recog-

nized that blacks in the South should be afforded the basic rights to
which they aspired.

"The war has sharpened the issue of Negro-white rela-

tions in the United States, and particularly in the South," it declared.
J...n airing of blacks' views on the problems confronting racial hannony,

therefore, was both timely and necessary.

"The correction of these prob-

lems," the group concluded, proved "not only a moral matter, but a practical necessity in winning the war.and in winning the peace.

Herein rests

the chance to reveal our greatest weakness or our greatest strength."

62

The Durham conference probably reflected the southern black point
of view as well as

a:ny

other wartime meeting.

While not overbearing in

tone, the conference's statement remained insistent in voicing alam and
calling for immediate steps to ease the tension.

The Articles of Coopera-

tion did not bear the militant tones of the NAACP or the northem black
press.

Bather, it sought.fimly to suggest that black advancement should

be met with understanding by whites, and the gap between doctrine and
practice in fighting against oppression should be closed.

In short, it

was not a militant document, but it did carry an air of urgency in the
wake of racial outbreaks throughout the region.
Shortly thereafter a more spectacular, if largely symbolic, event
occurred which further pointed up the effects of worsening race relations.

62

Johnson, To Stem This Tide, 131-39; New York Times, November 7,

1942, p. 13.
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On January 31, 1943, William H. Hastie resigned as civilian aide to the
Secretary of War in protest against the military's casual disregard for
his office and treatment of black servicemen.

The immediate cause of his

resignation was the revelation by the Army Air Force in December 1942 that
it intended to set up a segregated officer training school at Jefferson
Barracks, Missouri.

Hastie had worked hard for the elimination of segre-

gation in officer training programs, and the military had begun to respond.
With this announcement, all the more difficult to swallow since he had
been kept in the dark throughout the pla.nn:i.ng stage, it appeared that
the military was retrogressing.
The Jefferson Barracks controversy was only the latest in a series
of problems Hastie had encountered.

He grew tired of being ignored since

his office had been created for the specific purpose of reviewing all
military actions regarding blacks.

He had fought against the creation

of the all-black Tuskegee pilot training base and for improvements in Army
camps where blacks were victimized by racism.
worthless in the end.

Yet his efforts appeared

His resignation made him a martyr in the eyes of

many blacks who sympathized with him and knew painfully well of his torment.

Truman K. Gibson, Jr., an assistant under Hastie, replaced him as

civilian aide.

As a result of the publicity generated by Hastie's resigna-

tion, the Amy Air Force quietly dropped the Jefferson Barracks plan.
Otherwise the military establishment generally shrugged off Hastie's

6

complaints or made token changes. 3

63chicago Defender, February 6, 1943; Lee, Employment of Negro
Troops, 162-78.
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As these events transpired during the first months of 1943, white
southern moderates and liberals attempted to come to grips with racial
problems.

These men, active in their quest for civil rights and noted

for their moderation, personified a slender tie across the color line.
By 1943 they perceived the gravity of the racial situation and sought to
educate the public on the causes and consequences of this critical atmosphere.

Their rationale, however, differed from that of their black

counterparts.

In an early 1943 Atlantic Monthly article, the moderate Richmond
journalist Virginius Dabney warned that a small group of "Negro agitators"
and another equally small contingent of "white rabble-rousers 11 were pushing
the country closer to an interracial explosion "which may make the riots
of the First World War and its aftemath seem mild by comparisono"

Part

of the problem lay in extremism on both sides, and he cautioned extremist
civil rights groups that "only impractical idealists will contend that
deep-rooted feelings and attitudes, acquired over centuries of usage, can
be suddenly done away with."

The solution could wait if "the disturbil"ig

elements on both sides of the color line can somehow be muzzled for the
duration [of the war], and if the slow but certain processes of evolutionary progress can function. 1164
Jolm Temple Graves of the Bi:rmingham Age-Herald proved even more
pointed in his analysis, attributing much of the problem to sensationalistic black northem leaders.

"They make it plain that they intended to use

the war for settling the whole, complicated, infinitely delicate :racial

64virginius Dabney, "Nearer and Nearer the Precipice," Atlantic
Monthly, 171 (January 1943), 94, 100.
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problem," he complained.

Under the circumstances, this made as much sense

to Graves as if they had said that "because America's house was on fire
America must take the occasion for renovating the kitchen or putting
Venetian blinds in the pa.rlor. 1165
The eminent sociologist Howard W. Odum, however, placed the problem
in a clear and balanced perspective in an analysis of racial tension when
he

observed that "even though there would be no inclination on the pa.rt

of many southerners to deny the great distance between what the South was
doing and what needed to be done, nevertheless the psychology of the sudden
impact of criticism and accusation, when the South bad thought it was going
forward, was the key to the speed and intensity of reaction."

66

These southern spokesmen expressed explicitly and implicitly the
lack of understanding between blacks and whites.

Both sides knew the size

and scope of the problem but differed as to its explanation or how to

approach it.

Some, like Dabney and Graves, retreated from fo:rmer convic-

tions by chastising proponents of immediate change as a threat to the
nation's war effort.

They failed, as had others, to see that by primarily

blaming blacks for the violence and the potential disruption of the war
effort they were only looking at half the question, because southern
whites represented a basic part of the problemo
Their alaxm over worsening race relations was genuine, so on April

8, 1943, 115 white leaders met in Atlanta to consider both these general
issues and the Durham Conference's Articles of Cooperation.

65Graves,
66

The

Fighting South, 120-21.

Odum, Bace and Rumors of Race, 16-17.

Ralph McGill,
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~ditor of the Atlanta Constitution, chaired the session which issued a
statement agreeing with the articles but reiterated that the solution
"will be follll.d in evolutionary methods and not in ill-founded revolutionary movements which promise immediate solutions."

They obviously wanted

a solution of southern problems generated and carried out by southerners
without a:ny outside interference. 67
The Durham and Atlanta conferences brought the ticklish race problem into the open.

While the viewpoints varied, both conferences recog-

nized the ominous racial situation and offered suggestions.

These meet-

ings convened in direct response to the violence which had escalated since
1940 and which, if ignored, could seriously damage the war effort as well
as the livelihood of southerners.

later in the year members of the two

groups would meet together, and the result would be the creation of the
Southern Regional Council in early 1944.
Yet time was running short.

Such incidents as the Alexandria riot

and the Mississippi lynchings had by the spring of 1943 painted a graphic
picture of frightening proportions.

Steps by the War Department, Justice

Department, civil rights organizations, and interested _parties failed to
stop increasing racial violence.

Violence involving military personnel,

lynchings, rural tension, friction in public t:cansportation, Negrophobic
southem politics, the breakdown of local law enforcement, and the spectacular displays of an increasingly powerful NAACP and like-minded groups all
contributed to a tension-ridden atmosphere by mid-1943.

Race relations

steadily deteriorated during 1942 and the first few months of 1943 to the

67 Jobnson, To Stem This Tide, 140-42.
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point that general and widespread violence, earlier of no concern,became
a real and disturbing fact.

The United States was moving, in the words

of Virginius Dabney, "nearer and nearer the precipice."

CHA.Pl1ER IV

"S:HX;REGA.TION ALWAYS MEANS DISCRIMINATION"
By the spring of 1943 the United States reached a decisive juncture
in its pursuit of victory.

The Japanese offensive had been checked and

with the defeat of the Imperial Navy at the Battle of Midway and the recapture of Guadalcanal Island the war outlook brightened.

At the same

time the Allies had soundly defeated the "Desert Fox,'' Erwin Rommel, in
North Africa.
of Sicily.

Heartened, the nation awaited the next move--the invasion

Concurrently, the "arsenal of democracy" worked furiously to

supply its men overseas, _and by mid-1943 war production for the first
time ran efficiently.

In the midst of this din the nation's race relations

reached the precipice.

From May through August, cities, towns, and mili-

tary installations in the South and across the country suffered from
:racial explosions.

Racial violence reached the point that, for the first

time, it threatened to disrupt the war effort, though the signs of its
coming had been clear enough since 1940.
tions came on May

25

The first of these conflagra-

in a choked war production center, Mobile, Alabama.

Jolm Dos Passos, the well-known literary figure whose radicalism
mellowed during the war, passed through Mobile in March
graphic description.

1943, providing a

"The mouldering old Gulf seaport with its ancient

dusty elegance of tall shuttered windows under mansard roofs and iron lace
overgrown with vines, and scaling colormades shaded by great trees, looks
trampled and battered like a city that's been taken by storm." 1

1

Jolm Dos Passos, State of the Nation (Boston, 1944),
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storm
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had mged since 1940 in the form of tremendous population growth.

In April

1940 metropolitan Mobile contained 114,906 people, 42,518 (37 percent) of
whom were black; by the end of 1943 the population soared to 201,369, of
whom 57,372 (29 percent) were black.

This represented an overall growth

of 60.9 percent, a rate unmatched by a:ny other metropolitan district in

.
2
the na t ion.
As a measure of the federal government's alarm over Mobile's condition, the new Committee for Congested Production Areas declared the city
a member of its "most critical" list, a dubious distinction it shared with
sixty-seven other cities.

The committee, established on April 7, 1943,

consisted of, among others, members of the Bureau of the Budget, War and
Navy Departments, War Production :Soard, and War Manpower Commission.

Cre-

ated to coordinate the activities of various federal agencies in congested
areas and in so doing to alleviate the most pressing difficulties, the
committee must have developed a collective headache when it looked closely
at Mobile's problems. 3

In the first place, the city had drawn "primitive, illiterate backwoods people" from surrounding rural counties.

These individuals, facing

a mode of life quite different from the one they had been mised in, became

2u. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Wartime
Changes in Population and Family Characteristics, Mobile Congested Production Area: March, 1944," Population--Special Reports, Series CA-2,
No. 1 (Washington, 1944), 2. ·
311 1ist of Areas Certified by Federal Agencies as Critically Congested," Series 14, Records Relating to Undesignated Congested Production
Areas, 1943-44, Congested Production Areas Records, RG 212; U.S., Congress, House, Hearings before the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, on H. R. 3986, H. R. 4004, and H. R. 4005: :Sills to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment :Because of Race, Creed, Color, National Origin
or Ancestry, vol. 1, 78th Cong., 2d sess., facing p. 134.
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"hostile, defiant, suspicious and terrified."

Of the "undisciplined

hordes" that inundated the city du.ring the first two years of the war,
most swarmed in from southem Alabama, western Florida, and southeastern
Mississippi.

The thousands of blacks who made up a goodly proportion of

this growth hailed from the same areas as well as from Louisiana and
Tennessee. 4
Additionally, wartime production within Mobile's boundaries bad
ballooned to sizeable proportions.

From

1940 to 1944 defense contracts

in these industries totaled almost $397 million, 99 percent of which went
for shipbuilding and repair.

The largest single beneficiary, the Alabama

Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company (ADDSCO), saw its employment rolls rise
from less than 2,000 to about 30,000 by mid-1943.

Similarly, the smaller

Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation increased its employment from 240 to 11,600,
and a variety of light industrial plants that produced fabricated steel,
ammunition, and lumber produqts grew proportionately.

The

percentage of

those employees who were black, however, varied from 8 percent to 21 percent, with an average of only 16 percent, despite the government's efforts
to utilize all sources of manpower.

ADDSCO counted about 7,000 blacks

on its rolls but, as in most other area industries, virtually all served
in unskilled positions such as janitors and helpers.

Finally, a new Army

Air Force installation, Brookley Field, added to the congestion since it

4Agnes Meyer, Joumey Through Chaos (New York, 1944), 202-3, 210;
Charles s. Johnson and Clifton R. Jones, "Memorandum on Negro Internal
:Migration, 1940-1943," Johnson Papers, Box 376; unidentified memorandum
in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series 28, Office Files of Wilfred C.
Leland, Jr., Consultant, Oct. 1943-Aug. 1945, FEPC Records, RG 228.
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represented a source of employment for 16,000 persons by mid-1943.5
This tremendous growth, generated mainly by the expansion of warrelated activities, created severe difficulties in Mobile (Figu.re 1).
At large industrial plants like ADDSCO, the amount of labor turnover sometimes reached the alarming figure of 2 percent or more weekly.

In such

instances the workers filtered in and out of town, creating confusion in
housing, transportation, and manpower allocation.
Mobile's most critical problems.

Housing proved one of

One government report complained that

living conditions "have not been conducive to efficient operations.

Work-

men sleep in automobiles, trailers or crowded rooms," and the rthot bed"
system, whereby different people slept in the same bed at different shifts,
proved common.

The bus system and other transportation modes carried

thousands more than they were designed for, and about 20 percent of the
autos used by workmen in war plants lay idle because of their inability
to get tires.

Recreation facilities became increasingly crowded, and

many workers and their families clogged the streets in search of diversions.

The fuel problem at times grew so acute t:tat some war workers

applied for releases from their jobs because of it.
remained a matter of concern.

The disease rate

The number of hospital beds in late 1942

averaged only 1. 7 per thousand when the war standard was 4.0, and a shortage of physicians and other medical personnel also prevailed.

The water

511 Mobile Area, Alabama, February 18, 1944," in "Negro Problems-Mobile," Series 28, FEPC Records, RG 228; "Survey of the Mobile Employment
Stabilization Plan, July 26, 1943," in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports, Labor
Mobilization and Utilization Employment Siabilization--Alabama," Series
11, WMC Records, RG 211; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statist.ics, Employment and Outlook Bmnch, Impact of the War on the Mobile
Area, Industrial Area Study No. 22 (Washington, 1944), 1-2, 27.
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supply, sewer system, and condition of streets languished under the heavy
burdens imposed by the war.

The police force consisted of only 125 men

to serve a population that had skyrocketed by 61 percent.

In short, con-

ditions proved pitifully inadequate, with many of the most essential services crumbling under the weight of the war boom. 6
Amidst this situation the city's black population attempted to eke
out an existence.
in 1943.

Blacks composed about 30 percent of Mobile's population

The working force within this group bad been pulled out of the

depression (in a manner of speaking) by the war boom.

While jobs existed,

however, most blacks found themselves in unskilled or semi-skilled positions, since whites feared black economic advancement and the loss of
their cheap labor force.

The policy of hiring blacks for menial jobs

proved widespread in most of Mobile's war industries, a problem the FEPC
and War Manpower Commission (WMC) sought to correct with mixed results.
Living conditions, bad enough for whites, were worse for blacks.

Housing

was at a premium since the city bad not built enough low-cost housing to
accommodate the influx of working class citizens, and the available housing in

1943 sometimes appeared unfit for human habitation. As usual,

black residents were restricted to certain portions of the city, in this
case the traditional areas north and south of the downtown district.

6

"La.bor Market Developments Report for the Mobile Area, State of
Alabama, October 28, 1942," in "Labor Demand and Supply Reports, Mobile,"
Series 12, Reports, Analyses, Compilations, State and Area Reports and
Analysis Divisions, 1943-1945, WMC Records, RG 211; "Developing Situation--War Production Area, Mobile, Alabama, October 21, 1942"; "Mobile
Area, Alabama, February 19, 1944," in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series
28, FEPC Records, RG 228.

110
Transportation and other public facilities remained inadequate for
the large number of blacks, and segregation ordinances prohibited them from
even standing in aisles ahead of the jim crow dividing line when the buses
became crowded.

In fact, the bus system in Mobile had been a sore spot

since the war began.

In Augu.st 1942 Private Henry Williams, a black sol-

dier from Brookley Field, got into a verbal altercation with a bus driver,
whereupon the driver shot and killed him.

Acts of beating and abusing

blacks became so common aboard buses that in late 1942 the city forced
the drivers to dispense with carrying firearms as bad been their recent
practice.

Anti-black sentiment bad grown during the war, especially since

the influx of rural whites brought more provincial attitudes to the area.
Congestion forced the two groups to coexist in closer proximity to each
other, so heightened tension automatically resulted.
Though seen by many blacks as highly beneficial, the city's NAACP
chapter also increased friction.

Founded in 1925, the Mobile branch by

1940 had developed into a highly visible symbol of black pride.

John

LeFlore, a singularly fortitudinous individual who served as executive
secretary of the branch and as chairman of the Regional Conference of
Southern Branches, provided the driving force of the organization.

He

doubled as a correspondent for the Chicago Defender and the Pittsburgh
Courier and was among a handful of prominent southern black leaders who
widely publicized their drive for the abolition of segregation and discrimination.

LeFlore ceveloped contacts not only with other black organi-

zations but also with members of local offices representing federal
agencies.

He mastered the art of being conciliatory when necessary yet

forceful when provoked in an effort to gain political and economic
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advancement for black Mobilians during what many perceived as a period of
opportunity. 7
One of LeFlore's chief projects was the elimination of job discrimination in local defense industries.
alone.

Yet he did not wage this struggle

The FEPC, the Maritime Commission, and the WMC had paid consider-

able attention to hiring and employment practices in Mobile's largest
industry, ADDSCO, since the June 1942 FEIPC hearings in :Birmingham.

Since

1938 the shipyard's workers had been represented by the CIO's Industrial
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (IUMSWA).

It re-

mained one of the few southern yards where the IOMSWA had won bargaining
rights, and with the CI0 1 s moderate policy toward minorities the labor
situation there seemed more tolerant of blacks.

Very few of the ship-

yard's 7,000 blacks, however, worked in skilled positions; instead, they
served mainly as janitors and helpers, and occasionally in semi-skilled
jobs.

The ADDSCO management implied that a lack of training for blacks

provided the main reason for the dearth of skilled black workmen, but in
fact the yard actively imported white skilled workers from other areas
while the large number of potential black workmen, many of whom were skilled,
languished in menial positions. 8

70 some Problems of the Negro in Mobile, October 9, 1942," Surveys
Division, Bureau of Intelligence, Office of War Infomation, Government
Reports Records, RG 44; Melton A. McLaurin, "Mobile :Blacks and World War
II:· The Development of a Political Consciousness," in Gulf Coast Politics
in the Twentieth Centu , ed. Ted Camgeorge and Thomas J. Gilliam
Pensacola, 1973, 47-50; Pittsburgh Courier, September 12, 1942.

8

Herbert Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro (New York, 1944),
225; Frederic C. Lane, Shi s for Vic to : A His to
of Shi build·
Under
the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II Baltimore, 1951, 252-53•
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On November 19, 1942, as a result of the Birmingham hearings, the
FEPC ordered ADDSCO to upgrade and train black workers.

A])DSCO responded

by increasing the number of blacks on its payroll but did little more.
In the meantime the FEPC officials responsible for working on the problem
of job discrimination in the South monitored the situation.

As 1943

appeared, the manpower shortage in Mobile had grown so acute that the
Maritime Commission, whose responsibility included overseeing the production of ships at yards like ADDSCO, and the WMC joined the FEPC in
urging the upgrading of black workers.

The IUMSWA endorsed this plea,

though the white membership at the yard appeared less than enthusiastic
about the idea. 9
On May

3, 1943, Burton R. Morley, area director for the WMC, wrote

A])DSCO General Manager John Griser about a plan he and members of other
agencies had fo:rmu.lated for training and employing skilled blacks on the
shipways.

The plan called for two ways to be manned exclusively by blacks,

with skilled workers included.

Morley added that the WMC "is not in a

position to urge that you do assign two ways to colored men, but it does
feel that the proposal is a step in the right direction."

He concluded

by asking Griser to confer with him, representatives of the union, and

91a.wrence M. Cramer to Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation, November 19, 1942; "Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," in
"Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co.," Series 25, Central Files of the
FEPC, Aug. 1941-Apr. 1946, FEPC Records, RG 228; Northru.p, Organized
Labor, 225-26; Merl A. Reed, "The FEPC, the Black Worker, and the Southem
Shipyards," South Atlantic Quarterly, 74 (Autumn 1975), 454-55. The
union leadership accepted the use of black skilled workers as a matter
of practicality in employing all available sources of manpower. Many
white union members, however, proved hostile to the prospect and apparently triggered considerable friction within the union's local membership.
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other groups before actually implementing the plan.
Days passed without a response.

10

Irked, Morley wrote Griser again

on May 20, reminding him that "we did ask ths.t you let us know if it were
to be done," and wondered "if the Company has reached a decision in the
matter."

In a curt reply, ADDSCO informed Morley on May 22 that the ship-

yard planned to place black welders with whites on four ways at its Pinto
Island yard beginning May

24.

This contradicted Morley's original pro-

posal, and it involved the risk of reprisals if the white workers objected
to skilled blacks in their midst.

Fu.rthermore, ADDSCO did not announce

the forthcoming change, so when twelve black welders appeared on the
graveyard shift, they came as a complete surprise to the whites. 11
The next morning, May 25, the shift changed, and the welders were
replaced by other blacks.

Word spread across the yard as daylight ex-

posed what had happened, and grumbling began.
erupted.

At about 9:30 a.m. violence

Rather than the black welders themselves being the victims, the

janitors and helpers who ordinarily flocked around the hulls found themselves being beaten and chased.

Since this part of the shipyard lay on an

island, the blacks did not have the opportunity to run away.

Instead, the

drawbridge, tunnel, and ferryboat system connecting the island with the
other part of ADDSCO's operation on the mainland afforded the only means
of escape as 500 to 1,000 whites struck at fleeing blacks with pipes,
tools, and fists.

10
Morley to Griser, May 3, 1943, in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports:
Labor Mobilization and Utilization, Women, Alabama," Series 11, WMC Repords, RG 211.

1~orley to Griser, May 20, 1943; B. C. Knerr to Morley, May 22,
1943, ibid.
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In many cases, such as that of Alice Gamble, workers knew nothing
of the riot until black people began streaming past their work areas.

M:cs.

Gamble stood gawking at the sight when a white man struck her in the back
and warned, "get going, nigger.

This is our shipyard. 11

L. T. Welch,

working in an engine room on one of the hulls, knew nothing until he
clambered to the ground and beard the command, "nigger, jar the ground";
someone smashed a board across his face for good measure.
experienced the full force of the affray.

Zenith Dock

While Dock was busily engaged

in his duties as a chipper, a group of whites pounced on him and beat him
senseless.

A white foreman intervened and saved bis life.

12

Others shared similar vicissitudes as they fled from their attackers.
A good many blacks, seeing wba t was happening, managed to escape wi thou.t
being injured.

Thomas Johnson, for example, saw eight or ten whites

chasing a black man, then another group beating a black woman.

Without

investigating further, he fled with a trail of flying objects close behind.
During the episode about fifty blacks received injuries.

Reports of blacks

being thrown into the Mobile River and drowned circulated widely, but no
one cou.ld substantiate them.

The riot ended only when law enforcement

officials arrived, and ADDSCO sent the black employees home, leaving the
whites in the yard.
As soon as word reached the city and state governments that the
riot bad broken out, members of various groups rapidly converged on the
scene.

Police Chief Dudley McFayden and Sheriff William Holcombe mobilized

their scanty forces to assist the beleaguered blacks in getting out of the
yard.

Apparently the yard police either stood by or participated in

1211 Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228.
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chasing blacks, so they proved worthless in containing the violence.

The

state police sent in about forty officers, but they were inadequate as a
protective force even when coupled with the 140 city and county authorities.

Since the violence endangered government property, Govemor Chauncey

Sparks issued orders to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Joerg of the Alabama
State Guard at 10:30 a.m., and within a short time five companies had
embarked for the area from Andalusia, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa to reinforce the Mobile contingent.
of about 200 men.

This represented an increase in the force

Officials also called in federal troops from Breckley

Field, while the small Coast Guard unit in Mobile began plying the waters
between Pinto Island and town, prepared to board the ferries if trouble
developed. 13
By noon the riot had ended, and over 400 enforcement officers were
on band in the shipyard.
reading:

The troops from :Brookley Field erected signs

"United States troops are here to protect government property

and to see that there is no interference with the war effort."

They re-

mained as conspicuous as possible, even though no blacks dared retum to
the yard.

To keep tempers from flaring anew, an AFL official issued a

statement telling all black AFL-affiliated workers in other parts of the
city to go home for the time being.

The city closed all liquor stores in

Mobile and :Baldwin counties and shut down all bars until the crisis passed.
1311 confidential Survey Report on Manpower Utilization at Alabama
Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corporation, Mobile, Alaooma," in "Manpower
Utilization Report--Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corp., Mobile,
Alabama," Series 21, Regional and State Office Manpower Utilization and
Occupational Analyses, Reports, and Case Histories, 1943-1945, WMC Records,
RG 211; "Report on Riot Duty, Mobile, Alabama, June 10, 1943," in "Report-Riot Duty Mobile, 1942-45," Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal
General, Record Group 389, National Archives (hereafter cited as Provost
Marshal General Records, RG 389); Mobile Register, May 26, 1943.
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Most officials recognized the intensity of local tension and took these
protective steps to avoid a repetition of the Pinto Island riot elsewhere.
Clearly, an affmy not geographically restricted to an island could assume
much more serious proportions.
Govemor Sparks sent two representatives to Mobile with the authority
of the govemor's office to act as coordinators in maintaining stability.
D.R. Dunlap, President of ADDSCO, issued an ameliomtive statement saying
that "armngements have been made to guard the yards with an ample force
and military personnel if necessary.

No further trouble is expected."

Meanwhile, Charles Hansen of the IlJMSWA complained that the riot "was
wholly unnecessary.
the war effort.
the Mikado."

We claim there were some agitators out to sabotage

All I can say is that it was a great day for Hitler and

Finally, two city commissioners issued a fmntic appeal in-

tended to assuage feelings, directing Mobilians to "go about your business
unexcited, remain calm on the home front and refuse to join crowds that
try to congregate about the streets or in public places."
urged the governor to declare martial law but he declined.

Several sources
1

4

Although in the immediate wake of the violence utter confusion
prevailed, by the next day various offices and agencies began to collect
themselves.

At ADDSCO work continued but at a slackened pace, since none

of the yard' s black workers retumed.

In fact, within a few days the

local office of the WMC received applications from about 1,000 black
employees asking for release from their jobs and transfer to other locations.

1
P•.

25.

~obile Register, May 26,

1943; New York Times, May 26, 1943,
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One a:ngry citizen capsuled the mood of many black Mobilians when he complained that "it's pitiful to see what we colored workers have to go
through with in Mobile.

We colored workers are buying bonds, paying

victory tax, income tax, and taking all kinds of chances with our lives";
but, the shipyard worker concluded, violence seemed to be the only reward.15
John LeFlore of the NAACP busied hilnself during the immediate aftermath of the riot by taking depositions from injured blacks and assisting
the efforts of two FEPC field investigators, Clarence Mitchell and Ernest
Trimble.

This inquiry lasted from May 27 through Jv.1ay

31, and during tba t

period the agents held meetings with a variety of prominent black leaders
as well as with victims of the violence.

At the same time Franklin O.

Nichols of the National Urban League undertook his own investigation in
mu.ch the same manner as did the FEPC officials.

He spent a week in Mobile

talking with black citizens and with representatives of management, labor
and the federal agencies involved.

In a summary to the national office

he assigned a large share of the blame for the violence to ADDSCO, noting
that the management should have been aware of heightened tension and acted
accordingly.

Dismissing subversive influence as a cause of the outbreak,

Nichols noted that a conspiracy by some reactionary organization like
the League to Maintain White Supremacy could have been responsible, but

1"Anonymous letter to "News Editor of the Pittsburgh Courier, 11 May
28, 1943, in "Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co.," Series 25, FEPC
Records, RG 228; Press release, May 27, 1943, in "Speeches by Members of
Regional Office Staff and Other Material: Negro Manpower--Inactive File-FEPC, 11 Series 17, Speeches by Members of Regional Office Staff and Other
Materials, WMC Records, RG 211.
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certainly no alien influence was at work.

Other investigations ca.me to
similar conclusions, though the rationales varied somewhat. 16
While inquiries continued the FEPC, Maritime Commission, WMC, and

IUMSWA frantically sought both stability and a solution to the problems

that bad caused the riot. 17

The first action from the WMC's office came

on May 26 when in a less than cordial letter to ADDSCO, :Burton Morley
disclaimed responsibility for the riot.

"Since this office was not con-

sulted at all in regard to the present proposal," he complained, "I
think it only fair to say that the responsibility for its adoption rests
entirely with the Company."

Having absolved himself and the WMC of com-

plicity, Morley proceeded to cooperate with ADDSCO in trying to rectify
the situation.

That same day blacks met under police protection and with

the city's permission in a mass meeting to discuss the prospects of getting
back to work.

Speaking for ADDSCO, C. Y. Hall of the personnel department

assured the workers that the situation bad calmed considerably.

Police

Chief McFayden also spoke, emphasizing that the police would continue to
protect them.

The general consensus reflected a desire to get back to work.

1611 Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228;
Guichard Parris and Lester Brooks, Blacks in the Cit : A Risto of the
National Urban League (Boston, 1971, 298; "Summary of a Report on the
Race Riots in the Alabama. Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company Yards in Mobile,
Alabama," in "Mobile, Alabama, Riot, 1943 (Report)," Papers of the National
Urban League, Series I, Box 34, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as
Urban Leagu.e Papers). The League to Maintain White Supremacy was a :Birmingham- based organization created in 1942 to oppose the equal opportunity
efforts of the FEPC and other federal agencies. Its activities we.re confined to Alabama.
17on May 27 the President issued Executive Order 9346 which created
a new FEPC as an independent agency within the Office of Production Management. Its new head was Monsignor Francis J. Haas. The new committee received its baptism quickly in dealing with the Mobile incident of the 25th.
Rucba.mes, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 56, 58-59.
1

~obile Register, May 27, 28, 1943.

18
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On the 27th when a number of blacks reported for work, several
hundred whites walked out of the yard.

Hostility had apparently not sub-

sided, and likely only the presence of federal and state troops prevented
another outbreak.

Having already lost over 160,000 manhours to the vio-

lence, officials shuddered at the thought .of more disruptions. 19 Accordingly, on May 28 representatives of the WMC, FEPC, Maritime Commission,
and Navy met to discuss a solution that ADDSCO might find acceptable.
This meeting featured a discussion of the riot and its causes and then
some bandying about of ideas to alleviate the problem.

Captain W. K.

Graham of the Maritime Commission commented that in his opinion whites
simply would not accept skilled black workers "even if they are 10 miles
away."

The discussion then degenerated into a squabble over authority

and jurisdiction, so nothing of substance emerged.

20

That afternoon federal officials met with representatives of the
shipyard and union.

Captain Graham, Jolm Griser, and Burton Morley joined

Charles Hansen of the IOMSWA and FEPC investigators Clarence Mitchell and
Ernest Trimble, among others.

Graham, presiding, reviewed the various

suggestions and noted that he personally favored Hansen's proposal to remove the black welders until an educational program for the whites could
be completed.

The FEPC representatives protested that there was no time

for such a program, that .A])DSCO bad had since late 1942 to develop a program, and that the FEPC would insist on immediate upgrading of the blacks.

19Morley to Griser, May 26, 1943, in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports:
Labor Mobilization and Utilization, Women, Alabama," Series 11; Press
release, May 27, 1943, WMC Records, RG 211.
20Mobile Register, May 28, 1943; "Field Investigation Report,
June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228.
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Morley, on the other hand, wanted segregated shipways where blacks would
completely man a certain number of the ways and whites exclusively man the
others.

Griser objected, complaining that such a project was impractical.

Yet, he admitted, if the company pulled the welders off the ways and an
educational program were started, the whites who had opposed the promotion of blacks would interpret this as a victory.

When skilled workers

were reintroduced in the future, therefore, the same thing that occurred
on May

25

might happen again.

Realizing that the FEPC was not going to retreat from its stance,
Griser then proposed that a mass meeting be held without delay to announce
a plan of segregating the four ways at the north end of the yard.

These

ways lay isolated from the other construction areas, so that if the plan
were implemented skilled black workmen could be employed without risking
further white reprisals.

This in effect represented a compromise posi-

tion, for it would not constitute integration.

Griser asked the FEPC to

"close its eyes" to this technicality, for skilled blacks would still be
used in ship construction in accordance with FEPC wishes.

To underscore

the necessity of prompt action, G:rabam stressed that the White House "did
not want any back-tracking" on the issue of skilled blacks on the ways
and wanted the matter cleared up as soon as possible.

After more dis-

cussion involving technicalities, the committee drafted a proposal embodying the four-shipway solution for Washington's approval.

The meeting then

adjoumed, having lasted six hours. 21

21~fobile Register, May 28, 1943; "Field Investigation Report, June
8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228; "Report on the Situation at Alabama Drydock and Shipbuilding Company," in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports: Labor
Mobilization and Utilization, Women, Alabama," Series 11, WMC Records,
RG 211; Reed, "Black Worker and Southern Shipyards," 456-57.
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On

May 29 the FEPC investigators met with R. :B. Chandler of the

Mobile Register and received from him a pledge of full cooperation.

In

fact, Chandler had, since the 26th, run editorials that castigated the
rioters, implored the rumormongers to stop aiding Hitler, and criticized
local judges for not fining more heavily a variety of persons charged with
misdemeanors in connection with the riot or with failing to obey the "move
on"

ordinance recently passed by the city to avoid loitering near the

shipyard.
court.

22

For this last act a judge cited Chandler for contempt of
It was Chandler's bard-bitting editorials that helped bring many

people back to their senses, especially when on May 29 he offered $1,000
to anyone who could prove that a:ny deaths had occurred during the riot.
"Rumors and lies, spread by idle tongues and empty heads, continue to whiz
over the telephone wires, across the back fences and up and down the
streets," he charged.

His paper was putting up the money as a reward "to

a:nyone who can present proof.

o

•

that a single person was killed in the

racial conflict," and he stood confident "that this reward will never be
collected because the rumors • • • have been thoroughly investiga.tedo 1123
The next day, May 30, the mass meeting at ADDSCO took place.

Some

300 or 400 workers heard pleas and assurances from Colonel Joerg of the
State Guard, Franklin Nichols of the Urban League, John LeFlore of the
NAACP, Charles Hansen of the union, and Clarence Mitchell of the FEPC,

2211 Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228;
Mobile Register, May 26-31, 1943. Chandler refused to apologize to Judge
Tisdale J. Touart, so in mid-June Touart fined him $10 and sentenced him
to six hours in jail as a mild rebuke.
2

~obile Register, May 29, 1943; June 8, 1943; Pittsburgh Courier,
June 19, 1943.
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among others.

A show of hands revealed that most workers wanted to get

back to their jobs. 24
The text of the segregation agreement, however, was not made public
either to the workers or to anyone else while officials awaited approval
from Washington.

This caused considerable acrimony among the shipyard's

management, WMC, and the Maritime Commission, the last of which for some
reason remained adamant about maintaining secrecy.
came.

On June 2 approval

In a confidential telegiaII1 to John Griser, FEPC chairman Francis J.

Haas agreed to the proposal to segregate four shipways as "a practical
settlement of the existing situation."

Haas couched the approval in terms

which made it clear that the FEPC expected A.DDSCO to employ blacks in all
skilled positions and not simply stop at the minimum requirements.
the proposal even then remained shrouded in secrecy.

l3u.t

Some authorities

charged that ADDSCO did not want the workers to know that the agreement
bad not kept the full spirit of the FEPC's original wishes, while the WMC
complained that Captain Graham wanted the agreement kept secret until the
workers had somehow been informed.

Of course, the latter had become rest-

less since everyone knew an agreement had been reached but no one gave
out details. 25
In a June

4 press

release the War Manpower Commission unexpectedly

disclosed the outlines of the agreement which naturally came over the
wires to Mobile and ended up in the Register.

ADDSCO officials, incensed

2~ltimore Afro-American, June .5, 1943; "Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228.
2511 Report on the Situation at Alabama Drydock and Shipbuilding Company," WMC Records, RG 211; Haas to Griser, June 2, 1943, in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series 28, FEPC Records, RG 228; New York Times, June 13,
1943, p. 34.
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at this move, issued a bulletin that same day which, incredibly, forbade
employees, whether on or off the job, from reading any newspaper except
the company's publication, Fore and Aft.

"You are paid by the United

States to bend every effort to win the war and there is no excuse whatever for defrauding the government in this manner," the bulletin charged.
This outrageous order naturally heightened interest in discovering the
details of the proposal to solve the yard's racial problems.

Finally,

on June 8 the Office of War Information (OWI) released the full text of
the ADDSCO-FEPC agreement, but instead of renewing tension the shipyard's workers promptly accepted the proposal and returned to their
. b

JOS.

26

In the meantime city and state officials and the White House were
inundated with protests.

Everyone, it seems, proved ready to wag an

accusing finger, but no one accepted the responsibility.

Mobile police

eventually booked three whites on felony charges, two for assault with
intent to murder and the other for complicity in inciting the riot.

Aside

from this and the fining of a few others, Mobile's law officers failed to
take responsibility for seeking out the guilty and meting out punishment.

In a variety of official and unofficial investigations, the blame was
directed at ADDSCO, the FEPC, the union, subversive influence, or congested conditions.

Assigning blame, however, did not alter the fact that

a race riot bad occurred or that segregation had been approved by the

26Tennie Dejarnette to Morley, June 4, 1943; Undated memorandum by
Harvey Allen, in "Speeches by Members of Regional Office Staff and Other
Material: Negro Manpower--Inactive File--FEPC," Series 17, WMC Records,
RG 211; New York Times, June 13, 1943, Po 34; Mobile Register, June 8,

1943.
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federal agency created in part to oversee equal employment opportunities
for blacks. 27
John LeFlore led the protesters in a telegram to Francis J. Haas.
"Your letter June seventh keenly disappoints in that you indicate approval
of plan meaning little or nothing toward providing equal opportunity," he
complained, adding sarcastically that acceptance of the proposal "obviously shows a different policy than the ••• Committee when composed of
former members."

The NAACP called on Haas and WMC head Paul V. McNutt

to revoke the agreement, maintaining that any such compromise "would be
disastrous at this stage of the war."

The Pittsburgh Courier, upset over

the dangerous precedent that the FEPC had set, charged that the "four
jim-crow" shipways constituted a surrender "to the Nazi racial theory
and another defeat for the principle embodied in the Declaration of Inde-

pendence."

The segregation proposal limited the number of skilled posi-

tions to approximately two hundred, as well as the type of skilled work
required, chiefly welding and shipfitting, because only bare hull construction was slated for the all-black ways.
construction would be done elsewhere.

Interior and superstructure

"Here is proof," reproved the

Courier, "that segregation ALWAYS means discrimination. 1128
Haas replied to this storm of criticism by meekly observing that
"the committee cannot give its approval to the complete segregation of

27Mobile Register, May 28, 1943; Pittsburgh Courier, June 19, 1943;
July 31, 1943; Birmingham World, June 8, 1943.
28

LeFlore to Haas, June 11, 1943, in "Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co.," Series 25; G. F. Floyd to John A. Davi_s, February 10, 1944,
in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series 28, FEPC Records, RG 228; "Along the
NAACP Battlefront, 11 Crisis, 50 (July 1943), 212; Pittsburgh Courier,
June 19, 1943.
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Negroes• four ways and does not consider that as a precedent."

The

fact remained, however, that despite an overall increase in the number of
skilled blacks from none to about two hundred, the foremost federal agency
in the realm of equal job opportunities had approved a proposal which did
not square with its enunciated aims.

The FEPC had simply bowed to local

pressure and in so doing lost a measure of respectability. 29
On June .5 Govemor Sparks relieved the seven state guard companies,

and five days later, over the objections of Jolm LeFlore, the federal
troops moved back to Brookley Field.

As far as the state was concemed,

the danger had passed, and the shipyard's activities retumed to normal.
The term "normal," however, meant the bustle and congestion of an essentially abnormal era.

Within three weeks after the May 2.5 disturbance, ADDSCO

was clamoring for 5,200 additional workers in an area unable to serve those
who had already migmted to the city. 30
ADDSCO had the last word on the segregation proposal.

The north

end of the shipyard, where blacks had been relegated in the controversial
decision of May 28, never contained four full ways.

In early 1944 the

FEPC leamed that the "four shipways" consisted in reality of two full
ways and two half ways.

Because of the difficulties encountered in con-

structing stem sections on the half ways and full hulls on the others,

29statement by Haas, July 8, 1943,
Regional Office Staff and Other Material:
FEPC," Series 17, 'WMC Records, RG 211.

in "Speeches by Members of

Negro Manpower--Inactive File--

30"Report on Riot Duty, Mobile, Alabama, June 10, 1943," Provost
Marshal General Records, RG 389; Boyte Austin Presnell, "The Impact of
World War II on Race Relations in Mobile, Alabama, 1940-1948" (M.A. Thesis,
Atlanta University, 1972), 14; LeFlore to Brig. Gen. James A. Mollison,
June 10, 1943, in Papers of the Mobile Branch, NAACP, University of South
Alabama Library, Mobile; "Estimate of In-Migration into the Mobile, Alabama Labor Market Area During the Six Months Beginning June 1, 1943," in
"In-Migration--Alabama, Mobile," Series 12, WMC Records, RG 211.
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construction moved slowly.

Griser placed the blame for this problem on

the black workers and not on the shipway arrangement.
do little about the situation.

Yet the FEPC could

The black press, disgusted at the news,

accused AI>DSCO of reneging on its agreement, but the complaints fell on
deaf ears. 31
An ironic footnote to the Mobile story occurred du.ring the last

week in May 1944, a full year after the riot.

Elack workers established

an ADDSCO record when they completed the tanker S.S. Tu.le Can..yon in 79
days, and in disgust a number of white workers quit their jobs.

Rumors

of another riot floated across the area since blacks had bettered the
white record, and AJ)DSCO alerted Erookley Field and state forces in the
fear that one might materialize.
shipyard.

It did not, but tension lingered in the

Mobile bad not seen the end of interracial violence. 32

As events were to prove, the Mobile riot began the storm of outbreaks that enveloped the South and much of the rest of the nation during
the summer of 1943.

The foreboding clouds bad begun to build up in 1940,

and the next two years witnessed isolated yet significant incidents.

Con-

ditions in Mobile were replicated in dozens of other production centers,
and by May, though few saw it coming, widespread and destructive discord
proved inevitable on both the civilian and military scenes.

Elacks bad

not only begun to achieve a modicum of economic advancement but they bad

3111 confidential Survey Report on Manpower Utilization at Alabama
Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corporation, Mobile, Alabama," \a/MC Records, RG
211; "The Industrial Front: Employment," Monthl} Summary of Events and
Trends in Race Relations, 1 (February-March 1944, 3-4; Davis to Malcolm
Ross, February 18, 1944, in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series 28, FEPC
Records, RG 228.

32chicago Defender, June 19, 1944.
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also grown more assertive in their demands for equal opportunity and,
whether southern or northern, had actively pointed up the difference
between the nation's enunciated aims of liberating the oppressed overseas
while tolerating racial oppression at home.

The Mobile riot sparked a

violent period in which whites would attempt to disabuse southern blacks
of any notions concerning equality.

The spectre of a nation torn by in-

ternal strife came close to reality as the summer progressed and as the
experience of Mobile was repeated in more destructive fashion in both
large and small cities.
The Mobile riot illustrated not only white intolerance but also
the fumbling actions of the federal government in trying to keep control
of a volatile situation.

The FEPC, WMC, and others lacked the fortitude

necessary to effect permanent gains for blacks, apparently out of fear
that such changes might spark violence of catastrophic proportions.

In-

stead, the federal agencies involved seemed to prefer temporary solutions
as a way of ridding themselves of complex problems.

Admittedly, the FEPC

did not possess the clout it needed to enforce permanent solutions, but
it, along with other governmental representatives, surrendered to segregation and in effect subverted the quality of human life to the production
of war goods.

Perhaps the situation was really too critical to try to

effect permanent changes for southern blacks, but, more to the point, the
FEPC and the others failed to press for even moderate advances when the
opportunity to do so appeared.
The chief question in the wake of the Mobile riot was not why it
occurred, but why it was not more destructive and why the incident was
not duplicated again and again in the city during the vra.r.

Perhaps the
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physical restriction of Pinto Island prevented the violence from spilling
into other sections.

Violence did continue in Mobile, producing the

Brookley Field riot of 1944.

Yet in the final analysis the situation

could have been much worse.

Conditions prevailing in Mobile could have

spawned a series of incidents that might have disrupted the city from

mid-1943 to the end of the war.

That this did not occur was largely due

to the strong and effective leadership of men like R. B. Chandler, who
risked being sent to jail in order to help stifle dangerous rumors, militate for strong legal action, and defuse a volatile situation.

Other

areas, however, took up where Mobile left off during the long summer of

1943.

CHAPI'ER V

"THERE EXISTS A DANGER"

In the immediate aftermath of the Mobile riot a number of racial
clashes occurred in and aronnd military camps in the South and across
the nation.

These incidents reflected the same causal patterns as

civilian violence in that they occurred largely in response to extremely
tense conditions created by the war effort.

The summer of 1943 provided

/'

the most intense violence of the war era in both the civilian and military
spheres, as each fed on the other to form a general situation of crumbling
race relations.

Civilian violence emanated from the determination of

southern whites to reverse the advancement of blacks and to stop the
growth of black assertiveness which had become increasingly evident and

In military violence, however, another

presumably dangerous since 1940.

aspect of the same general problem emerged.

Black soldiers, especially

those stationed in the South, reached the brink of impatience in response
to steadily worsening conditions.

As the cutting edge of racial mili-

tance, they led the assault against the "savage ideal."

Military racial

violence during mid-1943, then, proved to be another outgrowth of the
overall tension which threatened to disrupt the American war effort.
Military violence emerged from a variety of causes, not the least
of which was the War Department's "hydra-headed racism" that sprang from
ignorance of and insensitivity toward the special problems black Gis
faced.

On

the one hand, it assumed black inferiority, at least in

soldiering, responsibility, discipline, and command.

This produced a

general assessment that since blacks did not make good soldiers they
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should not be utilized as combat troops, but inst~ad, most should serve
in non-combatant roles.

On

the other band, the War Department expected

blacks to perform equally with whites and at the same time to accept implicit and explicit discrimination.

For blacks to perfonn on the same

level with whites, therefore, demanded that they ignore prejudice, racism,
inferior training, hostile white officers, stationing in southern camps
where traditional racial mores held sway, and the Anny's attitude that
blacks could not succeed because of their inferiority.

Although the War

Department realized the need for black manpower, it minimized the role of
black troops, and the black soldiers knew it.

In their estimation, each

instance of white civilian violence attracted little more than passing
glances from the Anny, despite the efforts of William Hastie, Truman
Gibson, Benjamin O. Davis, and a handful of others to make black soldiers
believe they constituted an important element in the war effort.

When

mutinies began to erupt in 1943, however, the Anny reacted with great
alacrity to such an internal threat, and invariably placed the blame for
such incidents solely on blacks' shoulders.

By 1943 black Gis increas-

ingly took matters into their own bands, and while they intended their
protests to show their dissatisfaction with discrimination, in the estimation of the War Department it only reinforced the negative view of black
troops.
Revenge against racism formed :part of the explanation for the mutinies of the war era but not all of it.

In some cases blacks reacted

with violence almost as if it constituted the only recourse; in reality,
more peaceable measures might have effected changes.
of the mutinies cannot be absolved of responsibility.

The perpetrators
Yet the War
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Department chose to stereotype black soldiers as troublemakers and in the
process did the vast majority of them an injustice.

Desperation among

~7

many blacks in the military seemed to provide the key to explaining the

upsurge of mutinous conduct during and after mid-1943.

Such incidents as •

the Raymond Carr and Thomas Foster shootings, the Fayetteville and Alexandria riots, and the innumerable acts of degradation against blacks· propelled many to resort to violence in utter desperation.

For them violence

did not embody radicalism; it represented a struggle for self-respect and
even survival.

Whites, however, including many in the War Dep:i.rtment, saw

such violence as a distinct threat to the war effort.

Southern whites,

moreover, believed that mutinies endangered not only the war effort but
also the color line, contra.dieting the ingrained notion of black passivity
and inferiority.

Once again, two sepa:rate and alien perceptions of the

same problem prevailed along racial lines.
The disorders of mid-1943 and afterward differed from those of the
preceding war years.

As the nation's race relations deteriorated, mili-

tary violence proved more likely to involve larger numbers of men.

It

also tended to occur more in the camps themselves than in nearby towns.
The violence and its afte:rmath reflected not only the breaking point of
black Gis toward the southern racial system but also the end of the War
Department's passivity as it watched military violence escalate.

Courts-

martial resulted though they bad been used rarely for such incidents
earlier in the war.

The most important and telling difference, however,

was that black soldiers were more likely to be the aggressors; in many
cases they reached the point where violent outbursts seemed the only
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recourse against real or perceived oppressive conditions. 1
Black aggression in military violence during the twentieth century
had few precedents.

Until recently the Brownsville raid of August 1906

appeared to be a matter of black military aggression against the racial
oppression forced upon them by white Texans.

Even though recent scholar-

ship on the subject has absolved the 25th Infantry Regiment (Colored)
of complicity in the raid, the conditions it underwent at Fort Brown
proved similar to the situation in southem camps during World War II.
The Houston affray of August 1917 proved a clearer example of black military violence against blatantly oppressive conditions.

Men of the 24th

Infantry Regiment (Colored) descended upon downtown Houston in retaliation against a series of incidents that had driven them to despair.

Even-

tually sixty-three men faced court-martial, and the War Department executed thirteen of them on the basis of a controversial trial and review. 2
The same t:ragic situation recurred during World War II from the .,
spring and summer of 1943 through 1944.

These incidents did not command

i

V

the publicity given the Brownsville and Houston episodes, because the
nation's eyes were riveted on the international scene; no isolated incident emerged to attract people's undivided attention.

During mid-1943,

scores of military-related racial incidents erupted from the Atlantic to
the Pacific, most of them in the South.

From May through July the riots

in Camp Van Dom, Camp Stewart, and near Camp McCain g:raphically illus-

trated the despair black Gis displayed.

1

Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 366.

2

See Weaver, The Erownsville Raid, and Haynes, A Night of Violence.

I!
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The military violence of the preceding years, the Gurdon incident,
the Alexandria riot, and the Raymond Carr case, had aroused considerable
attention.

Unfortunately, the War Department expressed little interest.

Concerned whites and blacks saw the dangers that lay ahead, and no one
was in so unique a position to perceive these dangers as the former
civilian aide to the Secretary of War, William H. Hastie.

On

May 29,

1943, Hastie reported to the National Lawyers Guild that "civilian violence against the Negro in unifom is a recurrent phenomenon.

It may well

be the greatest single factor now operating to make 13,000,000 Negroes
bitter and resentful."

Hastie also pointed out that the Army "is ag-

gressively engaged in teaching our soldiers how to treat people abroad-the people of India, the South Sea Islanders, the Arabs, every one but

'I

their own fellow American soldiers," and he warned that "there is no
reason to believe that the 1943 record will be any better. 113
Hastie's report presaged the resumption of violence in the military
by only one day, for on May 30 discord erupted at Camp Van Dom, Mississippi.

The camp lay near the small town of Centreville in the extreme

southwestern section of the state, cradled to the west and south by
Louisiana.

Designed to house and train a division, about 6,500 black

troops formed part of Van Dom's complement.

Among the black uni ts was

the 364th Infantry Regiment, activated in March 1941.

The regiment had a

history of trouble, beginning with its initial training at Fort Jackson,
South Carolina.

Though its members were chafing to go overseas, the 364th

'
3wnliam H. Hastie, "A Report on Civilian Violence Against Negro
Soldiers, Submitted to the National Executive Eoard of the National Lawyers
Guild, May 29, 1943," in "Judge Hastie," LF, NAACP Papers.
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bounced around the country.

While stationed at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana,

in May 1942, local officials charged three of its members with raping a

white woman.

/

A court-martial convicted them and sentenced them to death.

Although the sentences were later commuted, the storm of protest surrounding the case and the corresponding publicity inflamed the feelings
of many 364th soldiers.

In November 1942, while at Papago Parle in Phoenix,

Arizona, soldiers of the 364th got into a fight with a group of black MPs,
resulting in three deaths and fifteen injuries.
ceived a new commander and executive officer.

The regiment then re-

In May 1943, in a move that

the men of the 364th considered as punishment for their past record, the
Amy sent the llllit to Camp Van Dorn for retraining in preparation for
overseas duty.

Ey this time the unit had developed a negative attitude,

and the War Department correctly regarded it as a problem outfit. 4
The 364th arrived at Camp Van Dorn in two separate contingents, the
first on May 26, the second on the 28th.
disdain upon their new assignment.

Immediately the men looked with

Centreville contained only 1,200 people,

and the nearest cities were forty or fifty miles away.

The area lacked

adequate recreational facilities, and prevailing segregation patterns
both on and off base consigned blacks to the worst areas.
troops began to arrive, trouble developed.

As soon as the

Some of the men reportedly

bragged about how they were going to "take over" the camp, Centreville,

4John Ray Skates, Jr., "World War II and its Effects, 1940-1948, •(~)
of Mississi i, vol. 2, ed. Richard Aubrey McLemore
,__./
(Hattiesburg, 1973, 122; Motley, Invisible Soldier, 60; Capt. Elmer P.
Gibson to Truman K. Gibson, Jr., July 14, 1943, in "Camp Van Dorn, Miss.,"
CASW Records, RG 107; Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 366-67; Pittsburgh
Courier, June 12, 1943; September 5, 1943; October 23, 1943.
in A Histo
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and the whole state.

This kind of talk understandably ala:rmed the in-

habitants of the town as well as other troops at Van Dorn.
On May 27, a day after the arrival of the first contingent, members
of the 364th invaded the jim crow service club and rendered themselves
obnoxious by refusing to

remove their hats, wearing their uniforms in

illegal fashion, swearing, and drinking beer.

The next night a group from

the 364th broke into the post exchange and ransacked it, causing several
hnndred dollars damage.

The exchange had been temporarily closed because

of previous interracial difficulties, and the troops apparently retaliated by breaking in.

On the night of May 29, members of the 364th drifted

through Centreville cursing the townspeople, and MPs escorted them back
to camp.

From an administrative point of view, these incidents reflected

the reprehensible actions of a group of misfits, while from the soldiers'
point of view they served notice that blacks would no longer accept suffocating degradation as long as they were in uniform.

They apparently

thought that the only way to get the attention of higher-ups was to act in
a boisterous manner.5
The breaking point for the 364th came on Sunday, May 30.

late

that afternoon a group of about seven soldiers from that unit went AWOL.
The men were walking along Highway
MPs drove by in a jeep.

24 toward Centreville when two white

Sergeant Charles Hix, one of the MPs, upbraided

the blacks for their sloppy attire, ordering several of them to put on
their ties and otherwise straighten up; he then ordered Private William

5Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 368; Memorandum, Maj. Gen. Virgil
L. Peterson to the Deputy Chief of Staff, June 8, 1943, in "Violence
Against Negro Military Personnel," CA.SW Records, RG 107.
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Walker to roll down his sleeves and button them, but Walker re.fused, saying "I don't think I have to."
Walker refused to comply.

Hix repeated his order, and once again

The MP then reached for his billy club and

started to get out of the jeep, later recalling that "I was either going
to make him straighten his unifo:rm or arrest him."

Walker realized that

he was in for a beating, so he punched Hix in the mouth and grappled
with him in the jeep.

The other MP alighted from the jeep but was re-

strained from aiding Hix by the other blacks who asked him to let them
fight it out.

Hix, receiving the worst end of the fight, admonished the

other MP to "shoot this damned nigger," but he did not intervene.
About one hundred yards down the road, Sheriff Richard Whitaker,
Chief of Police R. J. Knighton, and a deputy sat in their car talking.
They noticed the scuffle and decided to investigate.
remarked that "it looks like some drunk, I guesso"

Whitaker offhandedly
When they arrived on

the scene, Knighton drew his gun and ordered Walker to get out of the jeepo
He complied but then started toward Whitaker who waited until the soldier
was two or three steps away and then shot him.

After loading the dead man

into the jeep and transferring him back to camp, Hix reportedly_bragged,
"I just got me another nigger and now I reckon I get my transfer."
other MP replied, "you ought to get a gold medal for that."
As word spread around camp, tempers began to flare.

The

6
The J64th's

commander, Colonel John F. Goodman, quickly realized the gravity of the
situation, especially in light of past events.

He immediately ordered

6
Testimony of R. Whitaker, R. J. Knighton, Sgt. Charles E. Hix,
Pvt. Leslie H. Milburne, Pvt. Arthur L. Owens, and Pvt. Morgan Franklin,
June 1, 1943, in "Violence Against Negro Military Personnel," CASW Records,

RG 107.
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all company commanders to keep a close rein on their respective units
and then went to the barracks of Company A, Walker's unit.

He found the

company in an uproar, with men milling around and threatening to break
into the supply room.

Goodman ordered the firing pins removed from all

rifles in the supply room and a strengthened guard stationed there.
While he tried to calm the men of Company A, a group from Company C
stormed the supply room before the firing pins could be removed.

\.

These

men, along with several hundred others, gathered and threatened a gerleral
outbreak.

A detachment of black MPs arrived and were ordered to fire

into the crowd in an attempt to stand them off.

Only one man was woundedo

Good.man and the regimental chaplain, Captain Elmer Gibson, rushed to the
scene and through their presence averted open rebellion.

Goodman's high

reputation among the men proved itself, and his pleas calmed them down.
The soldiers returned to their barracks and were confined to the campo 7
Thoroughly alamed, whites armed in preparation for a bloodbath,
while the Inspector General of the Anny, Virgil L. Peterson, ordered a
complete investigation.

The War Department recognized this instance of

I,/

black aggression as a dangerous development, so it determined to take more
severe action than it had in earlier incidents.
progressed, white Mississippians complained.

While the investigation

The townspeople of Centreville

agreed that the 364th and perhaps all black soldiers should be removed from
the South without delay.

The War Department assured Senator James O. Fast-

land that the situation was under control and that "the worst possible
solution of this problem would be to transfer this organization to another

7Peterson to Deputy Chief of Staff, June ~.8, 1943, ibid.
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station" as the senator requested.

The 364th would not cause further

trouble since "a t:raining progmm is being prescribed for this organization which will keep the men exceedingly busy."

A white citizen of Drew,

Mississippi, complained to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that "the negro
soldiers stationed in Mississippi have been raping our women and murder-·
ing our men" and that "the only safe course for us to pursue is to secede

again from the United States and join Mexico."

This individual concluded

by advising Hull that "when the North gets ready for another Civil War-give the negro the vote in the South. 118

t·•:'

On June 8 the Inspector General in a memo:randum to the Deputy
Chief of Staff revealed the results of the investigation.
the 364th was technically a mutiny.

The

action of

This brought the incident clearly

within the jurisdiction of the War Department, unlike previous incidents
of white civilian aggression against black soldiers.

Yet General Peterson

assumed in his recommendations that the blacks gene:rated the Camp Van Dom
discord by themselves, ignoring injustices by whites.

Eecause of this

assumption and the fact that Peterson could punish no one outside the
military establishment, he made the unusual recommendation that the 364th
be placed "in such a disciplinary state that it will make known the remaining ringleaders and trouble-makers within the unit."

Such action, he

concluded "will bring home to other colored organizations where unrest is
prevalent and mutinous conduct is smouldering that the Army is prepared
to take vigorous disciplinary action to suppress such cond.uct. 119

8
Ibid.; Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney to James O. Eastland, June 9,
1943; R.R. Green to Cordell Hull, June 10; 1943, AG 291.2, RG 407;
Pittsburgh Courier, July 10, 1943.
9Peterson to Deputy Chief of Staff, June 8, 1943, CASW Records,
RG 107.
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Hearing of this report, Truman Gibson, the acting qivilian aide to
the Secretary of War, lodged a complaint with the department.

Gibson

naturally sided with the Inspector General in his condemnation of the
364th 1 s mutinous action and in the punishment meted out, but he strongly
disagreed with the implication tmt blacks in the Army were generally
mutinous and unruly.

"Despite the very high regard and respect I have

for the Inspector General," Gibson observed, "I wish to respectfully
disagree with his sentiments, particularly because they represent, perhaps, the majority opinion in the Army."

Harsh and repressive measures

constituted no solution to a very complicated problem.

"Such an approach

assumes that Negroes are primarily to blame for all disturbances," an attitude that Gibson did not share.

Black troops were on the one hand being

trained as combat soldiers, he declared, while on the other hand "they
are generally told to 'remain in their places' in the South.
bas a meaning bitterly clear to most Negroes."

This warning

Blacks would no sooner

accept discriminatory treatment than would any other group.

10

As soon as the men of the 364th realized their punishment would

- ,?

keep them in Mississippi, their foul disposition turned even more hostile.
On

the night of June 3, men from this unit and others broke up a dance at

the service club by refusing to pay admission, overwhelming the club
assistants, and pouring in through doors and windows.

Black MPs and a

white detachment from the 99th Infantry Division cleared out the mob which
numbered about 2,000.

Upon hearing of this incident, the War DeIS,rtment

restricted the 364th to Camp Van Dom and in early 1944 transferred the

15,

1°i1emorandum, Truman K. Gibson to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Jnne
1943, ibid.
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unit to the Aleutian Islands where it performed garrison duties for the
rest of the war.
The Camp Van Dom mutiny and the other actions by members of the
364th reflected indefensible terrorization and misconduct and did nothing
to improve the public or the Army's estimation of blacks as soldiers.
This unit had a history of troublemaking before it came to Mississippi,
and while the Amy_clearly made a mistake in assigning the unit to a deep
South post, the actions of the regiment reflected more than a protest
against discrimination and racism.

The regiment's impatience with second-

class treatment while serving in the armed forces of the "arsenal of
democracy" certainly affected their thoughts and actions.

Yet the 364th's

conduct perhaps reflected an adolescent state of mind, a general disregard
of the law, and even a concerted effort to get out of the Amy by breaking
military regulations whenever possible.

A few habitual law-breakers with-

in the unit could have affected the actions of other men, or the 364th's
actions may have emanated from a consuming hatred of some of its white
officers, who in tum might have tried to make life miserable for their
men.

Fortunately, the 364th represented the exception rather than the

rule among black units.

Yet its conduct tainted others with the reputa-

tion of misfits and malcontents.

Regrettably, the 364th reinforced the

War Department's low estimation of black soldiers.

Such an attitude died

bard, for it bad been the conventional wisdom since the American Revolution.

What a recent work on World War I concluded about that era certainly

carried over to World War II, that the official judgement of black
soldiers was founded on "the ambivalence of racism, the double-barreled
desire to use the black man like an inferior yet have him perform like
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an equal; to deal with him according to a double standard but judge him
·-,
/

by a single standard. 1111
While the investigation of the Camp Van Dorn mutiny continued,
other violent incident occurred at Camp Stewart, Georgia.
increased there for several months.

an..'...

Tension had

Located forty-three miles from

Savannah, Stewart lay in an isolated area.

The closest town, Hinesville,

proved too small to provide the usual services to military personnel, so
Savannah represented the only place of diversion.

The city, a congested

production center, had mushroomed in size, partially because of the proximity of Camp Stewart and its complement of nearly 50,000, but also because
of two shipyards, the Savannah Army Air :Base, and Parris Island, a Marine
training center.

On weekends shipyard workers, marines, airmen, sailors,

and soldiers all converged on the town, creating a tense atmosphere.
Black military personnel faced a number of difficulties that were
outgrowths of the separate and unequal practices applied in Savannah and
in the rest of the South.

Black troops formed 40 percent of the Camp

1✓

.

Stewart population, but the facilities and t:ransportation provided for
them proved woefully inadequate.
whites to every one for blacks.

For example, there were six buses for

In addition, the ticket counters in

Hinesville and Savannah were segregated, and this aggravated the situation
since one man worked both windows and invariably served whites first.
One sergeant was docked five days• leave for being six hours late in-reporting back to camp for this very reasono

Also, the recreational facili-

ties for blacks in Savannah proved inadequate.

11

The black USO in that city

Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 369-70; :Barbeau and Henri,
Unknown Soldiers, xv.
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had a maximum capacity of fifty, while the white USO was a spacious twostory building.

On base conditions were congested for the fourteen black

anti-aircraft battalions, and in some cases the situation worsened when
white officers made ill-advised decisions based on racism.

In one case

a white lieutenant decided to ban five leading black newspapers from Camp
Stewart, an act that was so obviously discriminatory that the War Department quickly rescinded the order.

Complaints by blacks at Stewart,
✓-

especially northerners, referred to harsh and discriminatory treatment

at the hands of white MPs and generally degrading experiences both at the
base and in Savannah.

12

Complaints from blacks stationed at Camp Stewart had dribbled in
to the War Department since 1941-, but in early 1943 the department began
receiving an alanning number of letters protesting conditions there.

Mem-

bers of the 369th Coast Artillery, a New York outfit, began a letterwriting and petition campaign to get the attention of the War Department
and, they hoped, to elicit enough concern so that they might be transferred out of the South.

The 369th had seen service in Hawaii and on the

Canadian border, but when confronted with southern racial etiquette, its
members responded negatively.

One such letter sought to

11

denounce and

condemn the atrocious treatment accorded the men of the 369th Coast
Artillery in Camp Stewart."

Its author complained that "these fine Negro

young men, all originally from New Yo:ck City, are not at all accustomed
to the perverted and ignorant perspective of the South in regard to

12

Lee, Employment of Negro Troops,
tary Service," 55, 64.

"'ill'

370-71; :Byers, "Negro in Mili-
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colored people and therefore should certainly not to be subjected to it."
An immediate investigation into the situation at Camp Stewart, then,

"would be a sensible and very timely recourse. 1113
The letter campaign attracted the War Department's attention but
failed to get the soldiers out of the South.

On the basis of the letters

and various other complaints, the department sent General Benjamin O.
Davis and Lieutenant Colonel Davis G. Arnold to Camp Stewart where they
conducted an investigation from May 17 through May 21.

The inspectors
V

found dissatisfaction rampant among the black Gis and especially within
the 369th and the 100th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.

These men, as

well as members of other units, were well educated and intelligent.

They

looked with disfavor upon the racial separation of base facilities and
upon the oppressive discrimination practiced in transportation, recreation, housing, police treatment (including MPs), and other aspects of
Savannah's racial customs.

In fact, they proved so boisterous in pre-

senting their grievances to General Davis that he bad to upbraid them for
speaking rudely to an officer and remind them of the conduct expected of
them as soldiers.
Davis and Arnold reported their findings to Inspector General Peterson, who in a subsequent memorandum outlined several recommendations designed to help rectify the situation.

In particular Peterson advised

close observation of the 369th and 100th since these units appeared to be
the most disaffected.

He also recommended an increased effort to obtain

l3Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 370; Kenneth Ancrum to the Adjutant General, May 16, 1943; Unidentified memorandum, May 15, 1943, AG
291.2, RG 407.
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additional entertainment and recreational facilities in Savannah, the
staggering of pass privileges to black personnel in an effort to avoid
"excessive overcrowding" of the buses between camp and town and the jim
crow facilities in Savannah, greater use of black MPs with limited authority
at crucial locations on and off base, close coordination between the Service Command and Training Center to defuse potentially explosive situations, and "the institution of measures to ascertain the names of leaders
inciting unrest so that they may be known and appropriate disposition may
be made of them."

These recommendations reflected once again the Army's

attempt simply to keep the lid on a volatile situation in the hope that
it would calm down by itself.

It did not.

1

4

Only five days after the Inspector General made his recommendations,
violence broke over Camp Stewart like a thunderclap.
June

On the night of

9 a rumor floated around the black area that white soldiers had raped

and killed a black woman after murdering her husband; one version cited
military policemen as the murderers.

This report brought resentment to

the boiling point not only because of long-standing problems but also because of two recent incidents of white civilian violence against black
soldiers.

At about 8:30 p.m. a mob began to form in the black area of

camp, and one hundred black Gis a:r:med with rifles turned deaf ears to
their officers' pleas

to disband.

Someone fired a wild shot.

Officers

then called MPs into the area, and shortly thereafter the mob broke up.
Within a short while a second mob fomed, breaking ipto gun racks and

1½,ee, Employment of Negro Troops, 371-72; Memorandum, Peterson
to the Chief of Staff, June 4, 1943, in 11 Violence Against Negro Military
Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107.
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supply rooms to obtain rifles and submachine guns.

Other black soldiers

joined the mob, intent on venting their pent-up hostility while still
others took to the woods for safety or remained in their barracks.

The

men continued to mill around until about ten o'clock when more wild shots
precipitated a pitched battle between black soldiers from the 458th Antiaircraft Artillery and white MPs.

Du.ring the riot four MPs received

womids, one of them serious, and an approaching civilian was injured.
Ju.st before midnight a small group of white MPs tried to cross a parade
ground and were fired upon.
killed.

One of the MPs, Private Ronie Lindsey, was

Finally, at about 12:30 a.m. two white battalions in half-tracks

moved into the area, and the shooting ceased.

Shortly afterward the

blacks leamed that the :rumor of :rape and murder that had sparked the
violence was false. 15
Without delay the War Department lamiched an inquiry, professing
surprise that the mutiny had occurred.

A board of officers convened, in-

cluding Lieutenant Colonel DeMaurice Moses, a black who commanded one of
the Ca.mp Stewart battalions.

'v

The board fomid that the disturbance re-

flected pent-up emotions and resentments.

The black soldiers, the board

leamed, were convinced they wer~ not receiving fair treatment at camp or
in neighboring towns, and many feared for their safety.

Some of the men

had simply decided to fight out of desperation without regard for the
consequences of such mutinous conduct.

Incredibly, despite its findings

and those of the earlier Da.vis-Amold report, the board disregarded the
real issues in its conclusion when it fell back on old explanations.

It

l5Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 372; Savannah Tribune, June 17,
1943; Pittsburgh Courier, June 19, 1943.
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ascribed part of the problem to the stationing of northern blacks in
southern areas and to the "average negro soldier's meager education,
superstition, imagination and excitability" which led to "a mass state
of mind."

The board then recommended disciplinary action against those

who could be identified as having ta.ken :pa.rt in the mutiny, special training for MPs, an educational program to teach black soldiers the "dangers
of rumor mongering, acceptance of rumors as truth, avoidance of 'chip
on shoulders' attitude," and the disbandment of the 458th, with its men
distributed to other units.

Of course these recommendations did not

really get to the crux of the matter since white civilian intimidation,
the double standard used by the Army toward black Gls, and its insistence
that northern blacks acclimate themselves to deep-South racial customs
were not recognized as factors that helped create the disturbance.

In

the end the Army did not disband the 458th, although courts-martial did
ensue.

By the middle of July, eight black soldiers had been convicted

in connection with the disturbance.

16

Civil rights groups knew that mutinies might occur in southern
camps if conditions did not improve.

The NAACP, as a matter of course,

sent an investigator to Camp Stewart, probably hoping to get the eight
blacks being held for court-martial released or the charges against them
reduced.

The findings came as no surprise.

Such unfavorable conditions

as what the association termed "Nazi-racial attitudes" among whites, the
transportation system, bigoted white MPs and the lack of black military

16

Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 372-73; Pittsburgh Courier, June
19, 1943; Memorandum, Lt. Col. Robert E. Kinter to Gibson, July 7, 1943,
in "Violence Against Negro Military Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107.
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police with full authority, recreational facilities, and numerous cases
of individual insults and violence against blacks proved prevalent.

To

the NAACP and most blacks it seemed highly unjustified for the Army to
punish black soldiers who revolted against conditions the War Dera,rtment
blithely ignored.

The NAACP did not believe that the Army was really sur-

prised at Camp Stewart's violence or that the mutiny came about because
of the soldiers' alleged "superstition, imagination and excitability."
The NAACP forwarded its report to the Amy in hopes of intervention, but
nothing came of it except Secretary of War Stimson's pledge to look into
the matter. 17
Perhaps the boldest act of mutinous conduct on the part of black
soldiers during mid-1943 involved neither death nor combat between whites·
and blacks.

Yet the Camp McCain mutiny of July 5, 1943, showed clearly

the breaking point of both black toleration and War Dep:1.rtment inaction.
The background of this episode reflected a common set of experiences by
black soldiers stationed in the South, because the basic problems were
similar to those that led to the explosions at Camp Van Dorn, Camp Stewart,
and elsewhere.
Camp McCain

lay eight miles south of Grenada, Mississippi, in the

north-central part of the state.

The

closest cities were Greenwood,

thirty-five miles southwest, and Starkville, eighty miles southeast.
Grenada proved too small to furnish sufficient recreation or entertainment
for an installation housing as many as 50,000 troops.

Local whites were

1711Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis, 50 (July 1943), 213-14;
Pittsburgh Courier, July 17, 1943.

148
antagonistic, even hostile, toward black Gis from the ca.mp whether in the
neighboring villages like Duck Hill or larger towns like Starkville.
/

The area had been the scene of a lynching within recent memory, and relations worsened with each act of individual violence against blacks as the

In an area where white troops were considered "outsiders,"
18
the experience of black soldiers proved to be unpleasant indeed.

war progressed.

/

/

On Saturday, July 3, four black soldiers from Ca.mp McCain--Sergeant V ~/
Harry Jones, Sergeant Aaron Taylor, Private George Starks, and a Private

Edwards (or Edmonds)--all of Company L, 470th Quartermaster Truck Regiment,
received over.night passes and went to Starkville.

After enjoying them-

selves Saturday and Sunday morning, they walked over to the bus te:rminal
shortly after noon to get tickets back to camp.
a woman.

Each was accompanied by

While waiting for the bus the soldiers engaged in some horse-

play, and Sergeant Jones accidentally knocked a pop bottle from a sill
and broke it.

The ticket agent inquired as to which of the "niggers"

broke the bottle; Jones banded the man a nickel in payment.

The agent

then tu.med to one of the other soldiers and, saying "you are a smart
nigger aren't you," slapped him in the face.

As the ticket agent herded

the blacks out of the station, the teminal manager arrived and began
hitting them with his walking stick.

The blacks wandered down the street

where two city policemen accosted them, asking, "where are you niggers
going?"
camp.

They replied that they were trying to find a way to get back to
Then, without provocation, the officers beat the soldiers with

18Skates, "World War II and its Effects," 122, 125; Pittsburgh
Courier, September

11, 1943.
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their nightsticks, took them to jail, and beat them again.
detachment took the men back to camp the next day.

A military

Their officers con~

sidered the two sergeants to be "about the top in the Company," and when
they related their experiences to the company commander, he had no reason
to doubt their truthfulness.

A subsequent Inspector General's inquiry

1
confirmed their story. 9
As soon as the beaten soldiers got back to camp and reported to
their superiors, their friends in Company L inquired about their condition
and after learning of the incident became thoroughly disgusted.

Some

called it "a dirty shame," while others opined that "something ought to
be done about it."

The beaten men, their heads throbbing, simply replied

that "our Company Commander is going to look into it" and either went to
bed or, like Sergeant Jones, sat on the barracks steps and held his aching
head.
Company L had been on the rifle range that afternoon and kept i:ts
firearms overnight for cleaning.

As word of the Starkville incident spread

around the company area, men formed a crowd, and the discussion grew more
heated.

Some decided they would go to Starkville and teach the town a

lesson, but Sergeant Jones tried to talk them out of it, saying "it's

✓

suicide to go over there with a bunch of boys, to go over and try to
raise a disturbance."

Apparently some of the men still entertained the

19Memorandum, Louis R. Iautier to Lt. Col. William L. Dinning,
July 21, 1943; Peterson to the Adjutant General, September 11, 1943, in
"Violence Against Negro Military Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107;
Testimony of Sgt. Harry P. Jones, August 23, 1943, U.S., v. Pvt. Roy
Brookshire et al., Case 239977, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), Record Group 153, National Archives (hereafter cited
as JAG Records, RG 153).
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thought, however, because one of them procured a truck for that purpose
but later returned it.

After dark the situation seemed to grow more calm,

but underneath tempers raged.

Shortly before bed check about twenty fully

anned men from Company L decided to walk to the village of Duck Hill,
about a quarter of a mile from camp, to vent their emotions there rather
than travel the eighty miles to Starkville.

Duck Hill had been a sore

spot for the troops a:nyway because of white hostility.
The contingent began marching toward its objective, but almost
immediately several of its members had second thoughts.

Privates James

Harris and Elijah Outlaw in turn warned these men that "if you tum back,
I've got something for you" and patted their rifles ominously.

Two or

three of the men continued to ride herd on the others in this fashion,
and shortly before midnight on July
of Duck Hill.
yards

5

the group approached the outskirts

They stationed themselves on a railroad track about 300

from the town and began firing.

The shooting lasted for ten

minutes and several buildings were riddled while the residents trembled.
No one was injured, largely due to the fact that nobody ventured from his
house to investigate the source of the shooting.
tu.med back toward camp.

Satisfied, the blacks

The firing had been clearly audible from McCain,

and when the group returned, officials interrogated some of its members

and threw them in the stockadeo

The consequences would be harsh, but

these men had gained a symbolic measure of revenge against the local
whites who di.scrimina. ted against them. 20

20Pittsburgh Courier, July 17, 1943; Testimony of Jones, August 23,
1943; Memorandum, Capt. Julian E. Weisler, JAGD, to Commanding General,
Third Army, August 30, 1943, U.S. v. :Brookshire, JAG Records, RG 153.
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On August 23 a court-martial convened at Camp McCain to try thirteen men accused of having taken :i;art in the Duck Hill raid.
L. Nolan, Trial Judge Advocate, presided.

Captain James

Before the arraignment the de-

fense counsel, Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Horger, asked the court to
sever the cases of seven of the men because of differing elements in their
defense.

Nolan granted the request, so six were arraigned for violation

of the 89th Article of War, which prohibited rioting; the other seven
apparently never came to trial.

Arraigned were Privates Roy Brookshire,

Thomas Decker, James Harris, Elijah Outlaw, LaRue Steele, and Thomas Webb,
all of Company L, 470th

~

Truck Regiment.

Before the trial the prosecu-

tion managed to obtain confessions from five of the six who admitted they
had been members of the mob, though some denied firi,ig.

Brookshire denied

ta.king part in the incident, but others implicated him.

In a change of

tactics each of the six, after having been arraigned, pleaded not guilty
and tried to uphold a conspiracy of silence among themselves.

The prose-

cution, however, asked that the confessions be admitted as evidence, and,
over the defense's objections, Nolan agreed.
the case for the defendants.

This proved to be the end of

A summary of the incident, the confessions,

and other incriminating evidence constituted a strong case against the men,
so the prosecutor did not have to rely on the defend.ants for testimony.
The court found all six guilty as charged.

All were dishonorably

discharged, forfeited all pay, and sentenced _ to hard labor.

Brookshire,

Decker, and Webb received ten years imprisonment, while Harris, Outlaw,
and Steele received fifteen years.

Although some protested being forced

to participate in the mutiny, either the court could.not determine who
went voluntarily and who was coerced, or it did not care.

The Judge

152
Advocate General's office in Washington approved the disposition of the
cases, and the men were sent to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
serve complete te:rms.

Some did not

21

The Camp Van Dorn, Camp Stewart, and Camp McCain incidents were

✓

only three of a number of major and minor clashes involving military personnel during the spring and summer of 1943.

Damaging racial incidents

occurred during this period at, among other places, Camp Breckinridge,
Kentucky; Camp Claiborne, Louisiana; Camp Forrest, Tennessee; Camp Phillips~
Kansas; Camp San Luis Obispo, California; Camp Shenango, Pennsylvania;
Fort Bliss, Texas; Lake Charles, Louisiana; MacDill Field, Florida; March

incidents and simultaneous civilian violence indicated that race relations
especially in the South, had been strained by the pressures of waro
During and after this series of racial clashes, the War Department

decided that to avoid even more widespread violence something would have
to be done, and quickly.

The department expressed a genuine fear that

civilian and military incidents would interfere with training and war
production and at the same time provide damaging propaganda to the enemy.
The Army still tended to place the blame for racial violence on such timeworn factors as inadequate recreational facilities, inadequate command,
and outside interference, the first two of which contained some validity.
But it ignored the fundamental cause of the violence--a racism that

21weisler to Commanding General, August 30, 1943; Findings of Board
of Review, Judge Advocate General's Office, September 15, 1943; Memorandum
by Col. George A. Hadd, September 20, 1943, U.S. v. Brookshire, JAG
Records, RG 153.
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treated black soldiers by a double standard.

In a constructive move, the

Army Service Forces, which had the basic responsibility for posts and
camps, placed the continuous examination of policy toward black soldiers
at the top of its priorities.

Also, the Inspector General's office in

m.id-1943 began a series of surveys on conditions in camps with large
numbers of blacks.
During the last few days of August and the first week in September,

Colonel La.the B. Row surveyed conditions at Fort Bragg, Fort Benning,
Camp Shelby, and Camp Van Dorn; all had experienced racial disorders.
Row conducted interviews with the commanding officers, provost marshals,
chaplains, and other officers at each camp and administered questionnaires to a random sampling of black officers and men.
himself with certain potential trouble spots:

He familiarized

transportation, recreation

facilities, security of arms and ammunition, the use of white officers in
black units, the frequency and effect of racial slurs and insults toward
blacks, and relations with military police.

Only 21 percent of black

soldiers considered MPs fair in their treatment of them, while the corresponding figure among whites was

46 percent. Row found that "there

exists a danger of racial disturbances in the general vicinities" of all
four posts, that white officers in black units should be relieved as soon
as black officers were trained to replace them, and tt·"the influence
of Negro newspapers continues to be one of the greatest deterrents to
the development of harmonious relations between white and black personnel."
He requested that something be done to rectify the acrimonious relationsltj.p between black soldiers and white MPs at each of the camps.

22

22Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 377-78; Memorandum, Col. Lathe
B. Row to the Inspector General, October 13~ 19L3; Memorandum. Gibson
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The Inspector General's office digested this and similar reports
and produced a series of overall recommendations designed to correct a
variety of race-related problems.

These included tighter discipline

over black troops, utilization of more black MPs, expanded recreation
and entertainment facilities, equal treatment of black officers, and
increased use of courts-martial to stop fomentation of racial violence.

In addition, the recommendations advised furnishing black newspapers ~~th
official press releases, exercising censorship on them if racial outbreaks
threatened to occur, providing better lodging for black troops in camp
towns, and curiously, greater control of venereal disease among blacks.
All nine recommendations bad come before the War Department in the past,
mostly from William Hastie, but the Army at last appeared to take the
situation more seriously.

While not calling for any fundamental changes,

the recommendations in effect tried to put clamps on the lid rather than
check carefullY: to see what was boiling and how to reduce the temperature.23
Shortly thereafter the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies,
headed by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, attempted to transform some of these recommendations into reality.

McCloy wanted to show

that the Army was ahead of the rest of the nation in dealing with racial
matters, though he admitted the need for considerable improvement in a
variety of areas.

In reality the Army still practiced segregation,

assumed that blacks were the perpetrators of racial incidents, and tried

to Brig. Gen. :B. 0. Davis, June 30, 1943, in "Reports--Racial Tension,"
CASW Records, RG 107.
23Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 378-79.
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either to suffocate them through tighter control or gain their respect
through highly visible but peripheral changes in racial policy.

Among

its first actions, the McCloy Committee urged Chief of Staff George C.
Marshall to circulate a memorandum stating official Army policy concerning racial matters.

Marshall issued the statement on July 13, 1943, and

he forcibly asserted that command responsibilities included the fair treatment of all troops and that disaffection among blacks must be curbed.
"Adequate facilities and accommodations will be provided negro troops,"
he disclosed, but in physically improving the situation, officers needed
to recall that "under no circumstances can there be a command attitude
which makes allowances for the improper conduct of either white or negro
soldiers."

Marshall concluded by reiterating that maintenance of disci-

pline and order among troops and with civilians remained a top priority.
"Mutinous conduct will be dealt with as such and violations of the prin. ciples of military discipline will not be countenanced in any element of
the Army," he warned.

Specific recommendations did not accompany the

directive. 24

In addition to Marshall's letter, the McCloy Committee executed
other plans.

The Bureau of Public Relations, as a result of the committee's

advice, began issuing regular press releases to black newspapers that
dealt with the participa.tion of black Gls in the war effort.

The bureau

gradually became the object of regular visits by black reporters.

The

Office of War Information, which conducted weekly surveys of the black

2

4:rbid., 380-81; Memorandum, Gen. George C. Marshall to Commanding
Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces,
July 13, 1943, AG 291.2, RG 407.

press, found this tactical move gained black support when the number of
articles unfavorable to the military declined while those favorable increased.

The black newspapers proved to be "hungry for news of Negro

soldiers" and used "almost every item which the bureau could supply."
Articles critical of the War Department, of course, did not disappear,
but this trend seemed heartening.
The McCloy Committee also persuaded the Special Service Division
of the Anny to p~oduce a closely edited film entitled The Negro Soldier.
After the film was completed in the fall of 1943, an editorial board composed of blacks and whites deleted the potentially offensive and "just
plain corny" sections, and it proved to be a considerable success when
released.

Less than 3 percent of the black soldiers and

whites objected to it.

5

percent of the

At about the same time the committee sponsored the

publication of Command of Negro Troops, a handbook containing the recommendations and findings of previous surveys with specific instructions
of action for officers in certain situations.
either partially or totally disregarded it.

Many

officers, however,

The Army instituted another

committee suggestion when it created tea.ms of investigating officers
whose primary function lay in conducting periodic inspections of military
camps and making recommendations designed to improve race relations.

2

5

The Army's reiteration and clarification of its segregation policy,
issued on July 8, 1944, proved the most noteworthy of the committee's
actions.

Mainly because the order was never enforced, most people did

not realize that the Anny had a policy prohibiting segregation of some

25Lee, Employment of Negro Troops,

383-97,

401.
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facilities on the basis of race.

But the July memorandum spelled out the

anti-segregation order with such forthrightness that it temporarily became
the hottest item in the black press.

It specifically forbade segregation

in post exchanges, transportation owned or operated by the mili tarj, and
theaters, and warned that "effective compliance with War Department policies enunciated herein will be obtained through inspection by responsible
commanders and inspectors general."

If inspection revealed discri:D.ination

caused by segregation, "the commanding geneml of the service will initiate action to insure full coopliance with the announced policy."

·J.:ne

order "did not immediately affect all of the enumerated services at all
posts."

In fact, enforcement proved less than uniform, and especially

in the South, segregation of facilities continued if only by custo~.

The

black press, hungry for good news, bailed it as a milestone and de~oted

·t. 26
consi d erabl e coverage t o 1
If blacks welcomed the anti-segregation order, many southern whites
condemned it as a flagrant effort on the part of outside forces to obliterate the color line.

Alabama's Governor Chauncey Sparks and Senator John

:Bankhead, along with Congressman Joh_~ E. Rankin of Mississippi, led the
blast against the order.

Sparks moaned that "it breaks down an essential

principle of race relations in the South and grievously handicaps those of
us in leadership positions who are trying to bring about a better relationship between the two races."

Rankin, dubbed by the black press as the

leader of the "white trash bloc" in Congress, predicted that the order

26 Toid., 397-99; Memorandum, Maj. Gen. J. A. Ulio to Commanding
Generals, Army Air Forces, All Service Commands, Military Districts of
Washington, September 1, 1944, in "War Memorandum #97 Banning Ars:zy Post
Jim Crow," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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would precipitate widespread violence.

In addition, Congressman A.

Leonard Allen of Louisiana informed Henry Stimson that the order "is a
blow at the Southland and it is a slap at every white man from Dixie
wearing the uniform."

Finally, a private citizen from New Orleans ex-

plained that "every true friend of the Negro and their more sensible
leaders know that such actions as this only serve to retard sincere
efforts that are being made in his behalf. 1127
Overall, the policy changes generated by the military violence of
1943 and the McCloy Committee lessened tension.

Yet they did not reduce

tension below the danger point, nor did they stop violence.
involving military personnel continued to the end of the war.

Racial clashes
These

changes occurred not only in response to racial violence but also because
1944 was an election year, and the administration counted on the northeI_:1:
black vote.

What occurred, then, amounted to a balance between pacifying -

blacks and care not to alarm southern whites who maintained a strong faith
in the color line and all it represented.

28

_)

The War Department was f creed into making a number of changes in

j j~

its policies toward black soldiers because of the alarming increase of
violence during mid-1943 and also because the nature of the violence
shifted to embody black aggression.

If this shift had not ta.ken place,

perhaps these belated changes would never have emerged.

The Army recog-

nized, finally, that blacks could only tolerate so much maltreatment and

27Pittsburgh Courier, September 2, 1944; A. Leonard Allen to Stimson, September 1, 1944, AG-OSW-291.2, RG 407; T. C. Holmes to Marshall,
September 6, 1944, AG 291.2, RG 407.
28Dalfiume, Desegregation of Armed Forces, 89.
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degradation.

The frequency and intensity of the violence was significant

because prior to 1943 that kind of violence had proven rare.
assumed epidemic proportions.

Then it

The Camp Van Dorn, Camp Stewart, and Camp

McCain mutinies signaled the beginning of a new set of problems for the
War Department, even as they reflected the height of black assertiveness
in the South.

Though such mutinies continued to the end of the war,

white reaction to perceived threats against the solidarity of southern
society became more intense during and after mid-1943.

From then on the
....

crest of black militance would begin to recede, at ·least publicly, while
the weight of the white majority's reaction continued to build.

;

Southern

whites displayed the ultimate in racial provincialism by riding roughshod
over the basic rights of the black soldiers, forcing them to fight back
through mutinies, -and then professing that the violence was their fault.
Part of the problem arose from the fact that members of black Ar.my
units, lilce all others, were young, and younger blacks tended to be outspoken and impatient.

Elacks also equated service in the anned forces

with achieving full citizenship, a notion whites did not accept.

When

the black composition of the Army never reached the prescribed 10 percent,
when the overwhelming majority found itself in service rather than combat
units, when blacks found conditions in the military not unlike civilian
life, they expressed resentment.

In the military blacks underwent dis-

crimination roughly in conformity with their civilian status, and each
instance of assertiveness, which included mutinous conduct, naturally
brought howls of indignation from Washington.

The mutinies of 1943 repre-

sented a dangerous trend that th~ War Department was determined to contain.

Without evoking much sensitivity toward the special difficulties

)
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black Gis faced, the department sought to make a number of changes that
would both help pacify blacks and avert mutinies in the future through
internal preventive security.

Because the War Department could or would

do little to contain white civilian violence against black soldiers, it
tried to make the situation on bases more stable while at the same time
avoiding major alterations in the southern racial system.
blacks continued to erupt throughout

Mutinies by '

1944, however, revealing that most

of the Army's policy changes either proved ineffective or were not enforced.

CHAPl'ER VI

"AN EPIDEMIC OF INTERRACIAL VIOLENCE"
The Mobile riot and racial violence in southern military camps
during the spring of 1943 signaled the beginning of a three-month crisis
in American race relations.

!

It reached its vertex in the eruptions that

occurred in the seven-week period from mid-June to early August.

Major

race riots in Los Angeles, Eeaumont, Detroit, New York, and hundreds of
smaller incidents caused more disruption, confusion; concern, and bitterness than at any other time between World War I and the 1960s.

The

Social Science Institute at Fisk University counted 242 such outbreaks
during 1943, producing what a later observer labeled "an epidemic of
interracial violence. 111

In the course of these incidents the nature of the major riots
completed a metamorphosis from white to black aggression that had been
in the making since World War I.

In 1919 evidence of black assertiveness

emerged in the devastating Chicago riot of July.

In 1935 black Ha.rlemites

rioted against the twin ravages of economic depression and racial discrimination in what proved the first "new style" or "modern" civilian
race riot.

Elacks attacked white-owned property in and around the ghetto,

foreshadowing similar patterns during World War II.
creased in the 1943 Detroit riot, and during

Elack aggression in-

the Harlem riot of that

year it bad become a trend--at least in the North.

Shooting, bunti..ng,

and looting caused property damages to replace the number of deaths as

1Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy," 671.
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the chief indicator of the seriousness of the incident.

The same form of

black aggression would typify race riots in the 1960s.

The change in the/

l

I

nature of :race riots from World War I to World War II, however, proved a / (,,
non-southem phenomenon.

The "southem style" riots of World War I, in

which whites attacked blacks and their property without encountering
significant resistance, carried through the 1940s.

/ "-i()

r ',,

_)

In 1943 the Mobile

and Beaumont riots retained the old characteristics, indicating that
race riots differed in the South.
Reacting to the riots in the spring of 1943 the NAACP held its
":Emergency Conference on the Status of the Negro in the War for Freedom"
in Detroit.

The conference, meeting from June 3 through 6, featured

panels on blacks in the a:rmed forces, the press, radio, motion pictures,
and industry.

Even as these discussions took place, about 25,000 white

workers walked off their jobs at the local Packard plant in opposition
to the promotion of three blacks to skilled positions.

This action came

only a week after the more violent response of Mobile shipyard workers
to black promotion and thus caused grave concern among both civil rights
leaders and labor spokesmen.· While the whites gradually drifted back to
work a few days later, some observers attributed the strike to Axis influence, while one black newspaper editor termed the incident an outgrowth
of "Dixie in Detroit."

Labor competition, :racial attitudes, and the city's

sudden wartime growth, however, provided the main reasons for the Packard
strike.

2

2

Progxam for the Emergency Conference on the Status of the Negro

in the War for Freedom, June 3-6, 1943, in "Emergency Conference Resolu-

tions, Detroit, 1943," GOF, NAACP Papers; "Hate Strikes," Monthly Summary
of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1 (August 1943), 4; Pittsburgh
Courier, June 12, 1943.
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As the Packard strike continued and Detroit's citizens
scapegoats for the,walkout, the second major race riot of the season
erupted.

(".·:· \

Racial tension had bu.il t up in Los Angeles for at least a year. ,--:·:')·-<, .,.

,{,p _-.!~

The servicemen in Army and Navy installations in the area flocked to the
city in search of diversion from military routine or relief from the tension that stemmed from impending shipment to combat areas.

The presence

of a large Mexican-American population served as another source of tension.

As was the case with blacks in the South, Mexican-Americans usually

received the blame for adverse conditions or crime waves in the city.
Since the beginning of the war, the local press had engaged in stereotyping Mexican-American youths in particu] ar as the perpetra. tors of
criminal activities that, by implication, hindered the war effort.

The

Hearst press led this development as its front pages carried sto~~es of
a "Pachuco Gangster" or "Zoot-suit Hoodlums," and this gradually built up
resentment q.mong whites. 3
The "zoot sui t' 1 proved a favorite among underprivileged youths,
perhaps because of the instant recognition that came from wearing such an
outlandish costume.

Its long coat with overly-padded shoulders, pegged

trousers that ballooned at the knee, and stand.am. accoutrements such as
four-foot-long watch chains and wide-brimmed pancake hats provided a
visual stereotype.

Because of unusual press coverage, zoot suiters repre-

sented in many minds a combination of negative aspects long attributed to
Mexican-Americans, specifically the vision of vagrant youths whose

3Guzman, Negro Year ~ook, 236; Carey McWilliams, North from Mexico:
The Spanish-Spea.k.iP..g Peoples of the United States (Philadelphia, 1949),

238.
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livelihood came from criminal actions.

A number of incidents from the

spring of 1942 through early 1943, in which Mexican-American youths served
as the alleged instigators, gave further rise to tensions both in the city
and in neighboring military bases.4
On the night of June 3, zoot suiters and sailors clashed, provoking
five successive nights of rioting against Mexican-Americans.

The press

and local police openly sided with the aggressors, helping produce well
over one hundred injuries during the violence that climaxed on the night

7. Military authorities eventually took responsibility for end-

of Ju.~e

ing the riot and declared the city off limits to all servicemeno

Offi-

cial-pronouncements from state and federal authorities cooled the rioting
fever as the Mexican ambassador to the United States lodged a formal
complaint with Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

Clearly, the riot showed

that racial and ethnic intolerance was not confined to one specific region,
and further indicated that violence was escalating to dangerous propertions.

//

5

,
,.. . \ ,'(! '.
I ft ..,
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In the wake of the Los Angeles riot, racial violence again erupted
in the South,

\

The third major race riot of the year occurred in Beaumont,

Texas, only one week after the California outbreak.

It provided perllaps

the clearest example of a "southem style" riot during the war era.

In

4R.

H. Turner and S. J. Surace, "Zoot-Suiters and Mexicans: Symbols
in Crowd :Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, 62 (July 1956), 14-20;
Ruth D. Tuck, ":Behind the Zoot Suit Riots," Survey Graphic, 32 (August
1943), 315.
5McWilliams, North from Mexico, 244-53; "Zoot Suits and Service
Stripes: Race Tension Behind the Riots," Newsweek, June 21, 1943, P• 36;
Pittsburgh Courier, June 19, 1943.
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terms of the deaths and destruction it created, the Beaumont incident
,,,.-,.

served as the single most severe southern racial outbreak of the war,

:' b..

{-:-.µ\
'.

l' /

and it was the most shocking illustration of southern determination to
protect the color line against real and threatened black encroachments.
In

1943 Beaumont's metropolitan area proved to be the "Number One

Boomtown of Texas."

The city lay eighty miles east of Houston within a

short distance of the Louisiana border.

A number of smaller cities sur-

rounded it, and along with Beaumont ballooned in size during the war to
produce an area that bulged with war production.

In 1940 Beaumont con-

tained 59,000 citizens, of whom about one-third were black; by 1943 the
population stood at over 80,000, with blacks remaining about a third of
the population.

Surrounding towns underwent similar growth:

Orange from

7,500 to 38,000; Port Arthur from 56,000 to 70,500; and Port Neches and
Nederland from 5,500 to 9,100.

As in other areas, these cities bad to

support population increases of as much as 500 percent with prewar services and facilities.
In Beaumont, for example, a Congested Production Areas survey re-

ported that only one house in the entire city was available for rent, while
in Orange and Port Arthur "there was not a single house, apartment, or room

available."

This forced many workers to improvise, sleeping in autos or

in "hot beds" while others commuted from as far away as fifty miles each

day.
over.

Such conditions in turn produced high rates of absenteeism and turnWithin the cities, bus systems staggered along as they tried to

carry wartime popu.lations with inadequate prewar equipment.

Autos proved

scarce, and as a result many people walked to and from their jobs.

Health

facilities in the area proved similarly inadequate, with only one physician
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available for every 5,000 citizens as compared to a wartime standard of
one per 1,700.

This problem was compounded by Beaumont's inability to

dispose properly of its garbage, so that one section of the city experienced the nauseating smell of an exposed dump while flies bad to be
swept out of nearby rooms daily.

The city ad.ministration placed hogs

on the huge piles of waste, but this bad little effect.

Other problems

included shortages of food and ice, recreational facilities, nurseries
for working mothers, and police forces. 6
The area contained a number of war industries, and sbipbu.ildiri.g
was by far the largest.

In Beaumont the Pennsylvania Shipyards employed

about 8,000 people and held govenunent contracts in excess of $100 rilliono
Du.ring 1943 the yard produced eighteen Liberty (CIA) ships, four Navy
minesweepers, and eight oceangoing tugboats.

Neighboring Orange harbored

the larger Consolidated Steel Shipyards, built in 1940 under the auspices
of the Mari~ime Commission as part of the prewar production expa.~sion.
Consolidated held govenunent contracts totaling $240 million, employed
about 20,000 workers, and produced destroyers and destroyer escorts.
Several smaller shipyards dotted the area, along with plants that produced lumber goods, bombs, anmrunition, and petroleum.

The Beaumont area

had been the scene of the spectacular Spindletop oil field of the early
twentieth century, and during World War II the "Little Big Inch" pipeline
that ran from Beaumont to Linden, New Jersey, testified to the area's

611Report on Adequacy of Services and Facilities in the OrangeBeaumont Area, Texas, November 15, 1943," in "Orange-Beaumont, Texas-Report on Conditions"; "Report on Orange, Texas, March 7, 1944," in
"Port Neches, Texas--Report on Conditions," Series 13, Cone-ested Production Areas Records, RG 212; Meyer, Journey Through Chaos, 174-75-
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importance as an oil-producing region (see Figure 2). 7
The city's wartime congestion was not unique--on the contrary, it
proved fairly common in urban centers across the nation.

Yet this East

Texas city underwent a deterioration of race relations so severe that it.
spawned a major riot.

Much of the friction in Beaumont I s interracial

affairs stemmed from the crowded public transportation system.

J

A city

ordinance prohibited blacks from sitting ahead of the jim crow dividing
line, and drivers strictly observed the law.

The Charles J. Reco inci-

dent of July 1942 resulted in part from this situation, and similar
episodes increased as the war continued.

Frequently, when buses became

crowded, blacks stood in the aisles ahead of the dividing line, a situation that many whites did not tolerate.

Beatings and shootings esca-

lated, and with each incident racial tension grew.

To blacks such out-

breaks reflected the narrow-mindedness of whites, while conversely many
whites regarded them as dangerous threats to the separation of the races.

8

On January 24, 1943, in a move that stemmed from the previous incidents
of violence as well as the negative publicity generated by the Reco shooting, the Beaumont bus system inaugurated all-black and all-white coaches
which lessened interracial contact and apparently satisfied all interested
parties, at least for the time being.

With the situation dangerously

71a.ne, Ships for Victory, 34-35; Ray Lacy to James A. Burran,

April 10, 1973; Beaumont Enterprise, November 7, 1943; "Report on Adequacy of Services and Facilities in the Orange-Beaumont Area, November
15, 1943," Congested Production Areas Records, RG 212; Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 6980

8For stories of interracial incidents aboard Beaumont buses,
see the Beaumont Enterprise, July 1, 2, 3, 15, 1942.

168

BEAUMONT

N

l
Figure 2.

APPROXr MATE DOWNTOWN

AREA

Map of Beaumont, Texas.

169
tense, such groups as the Beaumont branch of the NAACP registered no
protest. 9
As the spring of 1943 approached, Beaumont encountered a problem
that, though not racial in nature, heightened overall tension.

In April

a local attomey circulated a petition to force a recall election against
the city's mayor, Leslie Lowry (whom the Army had claimed), the acting .
mayor, George Gary, and five other city officials.

Because of Beaumont's

reputation as a haven for vice, some citizens thought replacement of these
officials would help improve the situation.

Ross Dickey, a former state

policemen who had been chief of police since May 1942, immediately arrested
nearly twenty persons on gambling charges, and the city manager, G. Hughes
Petkovsek, announced that "gambling will never again be tolerated as long
as I am city manager."

This brief flurry of activity failed to produce

the desired results, however, because in May petitions bearing the required

182 signatures were certified and a recall election set for June 19. The
acrimony that accompanied this political feud did nothing to assuage
feelings, and while many war workers may have cared little who governed
the city, the general tension that came from congestion and worsening
race relations was further compounded by the furor surrounding the recall

.
10
e 1 ec t ion.
As the atmosphere in Beaumont grew more volatile, almost any spark
could have ignited it.

An interracial rape on June

5

increased strain to

the breaking point, and the tension and congestion that had built up over

9rbid., January 23, 1943; Beaumont Jou__T'Ilal, January 23, 1943.
10

Beaumont Journal, April 15, 17, 1943; May 6, 1943.
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the months threatened to produce violence.

Shortly before mid.night on

the 4th, a nineteen-year-old white telephone operator left work and began walking home along Laurel Street.

As she approached the intersection

of Laurel and Magnolia, Curtis Thomas, a twenty-four-year-old black exconvict, accosted her.

Apparently Thomas lmew the woman's daily routine

and had carefully planned the crime, for after grabbing her he carried
her to a loading platform at a nearby storage plant where he had laid
out a quilt.

As he reached the platform the woman, who had fainted, re-

gained consciousness and began resisting him.

Thomas then stabbed and

beat her, and then raped his victim three times.

During the assault, he

reportedly said to her, "the army is going to get me, and if I do this,
I' 11 get killed for this and I won't be going to the army. 1111

After the assault Thomas fell asleep, permitting the woman to escape.

She reached her home about 4:00 a.m. on June

called the police.

5,

and her parents

Two squad cars immediately :raced to the scene, and,

as they approached, the lights and noise aroused Thomas.
a dead-end alley where policemen shot him four times.

He fled into

Critically wounded,

he was taken to the "negro ward" of Hotel Dieu ·Hospital.

The next moming's

newspaper reported the incident and made it clear that doctors did not
expect Thomas to survive.

12

11

Ibid., June 5, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 6, 1943; Memorandum, Houston FBI to Frank L. Welch, June 16, 1943, Records of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (hereafter cited
as FBI Records). A Freedom of Information Act request by this writer
yielded a body of previously classified material from the F.BI's files,
which are separate from those of the Justice Department, previously cited.

1 2:aeaumont Journal, Jrme 5, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 6,
1943.
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His condition, however, was irrelevant to some people, and before

light on Sunday, June 6, a mob of about 150 men collected at the ji.w crow
section of the Hotel Dieu.

Only one policeman guarded the dying prisoner.

Lacking a leader, the mob did not enter the building but simply milled
around.

Chief of Police Dickey and other officers sped to the scene,

and while Dickey pleaded with the mob not to lynch Thomas, other policemen
secretly spirited the alleged assailant to the city jail and placed
under heavy guard.

him

Dickey, who did not recognize any members of the

throng, reminded them that Thomas would die at any moment and asked them
to let the law take its course.

He could have had the impending recall

election in the back of his mind as he spoke, for he knew that if mob
action developed many would blame the city administration.

Dickey's

efforts succeeded, for after twenty minutes of admonitions, the mob d.issipated.13
Thomas' death on June 8 probably precluded another lynching attempt.
Feeling against him ran extremely high, especially after he admitted raping
the white woman, and the fact that a riot did not result from this incident proved remarkable indeedo

Yet the Thomas episode pointed out that

many Beaumont whites were ready to take matters into their own hands if a

similar crime occurred againo

The tinder had begun to smoulder, and the

spark that would set it off came a week later. 14
On

Tuesday aftemoon, June 15, the Beaumont police received a tele-

phone call from a twenty-five-year-old white woman stating that a black

l3Beaumont Enterprise, June 7, 1943; Beaumont Journal, June 7, 1943.
14:Beaumont Journal, June 8, 1943.
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man had raped her.

The police sprang into action, knowing that this

incident could prove disastrous.

Within a few minutes members of the

city police, sheriff's force, and Department of Public Safety (DPS) highway patrolmen reached the scene on the outskirts of town.

Blocking off

traffic, they began searching nearby woods with the aid of interested
neighbors, and conducted a preliminary investigation.

According to the

woman's story, a dark-complexioned black man wearing brown pants and a
pink or purple shirt, had approached her about mid-moming and asked for
work; she told the man to weed the garden and later fed him lunch.

As

she put her three small children to bed for their aftemoon nap, the man
entered the room, threatened her with a sharp file, and took her to an
adjacent bedroom where he raped her.

The man then fled into the woods,

and s~e walked half a mile to the nearest telephone and called the police.
After hearing her story officers searched the house for clues but found
none.

They hoped that the manhunt would produce the culprit. 1 5
Y..ixed reactions greeted the news of another interracial rape, the

second such incident within two weeks and this one involving the young
wife of a war worker and mother of small children.

Many whites complained

while others counseled patience and calmness, believing that the police
would surely apprehend the rapist.
afternoon gave way to evening.

An outward calm prevailed as the

The situation at Pennsylvania Shipyards,

however, proved more explosive.
chiefly East Texas and Louisiana.

Many workers ca.me from outlying areas,

The same lower class, rural, or small

l5Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1943; War De:partment memorandum,
Office of the Director of Intelligence Division, Eighth Service Command,
Dallas, Texas, July 1, 1943, FBI Records.
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town whites who had inundated Mobile and its shi"pyard likewise made up
/.-·-.......__,

',

the bulk of Pennsylvania's wom force.
\

·,

They brought provincial racist

'·.

attitudes into a congested area already suffering from a multitude of
difficulties.

Many detested blacks and placed a high reliance on extra-

legal action against threats to the color line.

As outsiders, they felt

little allegiance to Beaumont, and as people whose lives were fraught
with tension, congestion, and confusion, they proved the first to react
to the news that a black man had committed the cardinal sin of interracial rape.

As the night shift began to replace the day workers, con-

versation turned to the aftemoon's crime, and many heard fabricated or
inflammatory versions.
Around nightfall over 2,000 workers angrily dropped their tools
and marched out of the shipyard.

Foremen pleaded with them, but one womer

articulated the mood when he explained that "our duty is for the protection of our homes."

Production halted as the mob began the short walk

downtown to the police station.

As the men marched they att::ra.cted atten-

tion, and others swelled the ranks.
tion, it numbered around 3,000.

As the crowd neared the police sta-

16

B. O. Craft, in charge of the station that night, heard the approaching mob and ran outside.

later related.

"They came out of the shipyards over there," he

"They came right up to the police station and flooded in.

We tried to talk to them and reason with them but they took chargeo"

Pan-

demonium broke out within the station as one officer hurriedly called Chief
Dickey and the off-duty men.

In the meantime the mob surrounded the

16Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1943.
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station which contained the city jail.

Fearing that the crowd might storm

the building, Dickey sent for the woman who had allegedly been raped that
afternoon.

After she arrived and inspected the prisoners she addressed

the mob, saying that her assailant remained at large and urging the members of the crowd to search for him in the woods near her home.

This ploy,

designed to get the crowd to disperse, failed, for at that point a black
trusty returning to the station from an errand was beaten severely before
Dickey could rescue him.

A few minutes later some of the would-be lynch-

ers broke out a wind.ow and tried to snatch a black prisoner, but policemen
pulled the terrified man back to safety. 17
Meanwhile several hundred people broke away from the mob a_nd walked
two blocks to the Jefferson County courthouse where Sheriff W.W. Richardson met them.

They asked if the county jail contained the culprit; to

avoid a confrontation Richardson permitted several men to tour the cells.
Of course no one would have recognized the alleged assailant, but the
group satisfied itself that the man indeed was not there and rejoined the
main part of the crowd.

About midnight the frustrated mob heeded the

admonition of one of its members who shouted, "let's go to nigger town."
Part of the throng, which by this time totaled between 3,000 and 4,000,
headed for a black residential district in the northern section of the
city on Gladys Street.

The remainder ransacked a second black district

on Forsythe Street in the downtown area.
hours and continued until d.awn.

The rioting lasted about six

18

17 Ibid.; Houston Post, June 17, 1943; PM, June 17, 1943.
18Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943; Chicago Defender, June 26,
1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 17, 1943.

175
During the outbreak the small bands of rioters set fires, overturned cars, and looted both houses and stores.

Along Forsythe Street

the mob burned down three funeral homes, a jewelry store, and a pha:cmacy
owned by Sol White, who had distinguished himself among black citizens by
purchasing $11,000 in war bonds.

Several houses in the vicinity caught

fire but were saved either by the BeaUI!lont fire department or the buildings' inhabitants.

In the Gladys Street area the activity proved similar

as burning and looting were rampant.

Autos could be seen speeding through

town filled with stolen goods, oa.ir.:.ly clocks, radios, jewelry, clothing,
liquor, cigarettes, and other property.

In this area rioters caused

extensive damage to a radio shop, two cafes, and a
and houses.

number of other stores

P. G. Thomas, owner of the Dew Drop Inn on Gladys Street,

related that when the rioters approached his business, he retreated to a
back room and peered through a service window as they broke down the front
door and ransacked the building.

He fled out a back door and escaped in-

10

jury.-/

With the night lit only by bun1ing buildings and occasional streetlights, rioters sometimes mistakenly shot other whites.

Fortunately, they

did not bother the firemen who worked feverishly to extinguish bu.ming
buildings and autos in the area.

One fireman, however, expressed his

disgust at the mob as he watched fires being set.

"If we'd start after

the man setting the blaze," he complained, "he'd dodge into the darkness
and we couldn't tell him from anyone else."

If rioters did not harass

19Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 17,
1943; Houston Informer, June-19, 26, 1943; Dallas Moming News, June 17,
1943; Chic~go Defender, June 26, 1943; P. G. Thomas to James A. Bu.rran,
March 1, 1973; Memorandum,J. Edgar Hoover to Wendell :Serge, July 9, 1943,
FBI Records.
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firemen, however, they continued to wreak·havoc with the black population.

All night gangs of whites assaulted blacks, beating and robbing

them.

Many escaped injury by retreating to the innermost areas of the

black sections, but others suffered the full force of the violence.

20

One of the most concentrated outbreaks of violence occurred at the
Greyhound bus station on Pam Street, where fifty-two black draftees
awaited a bus to their homes in Port Arthur.

After mid.night a mob of

over 300 whites fell upon them, crying, "here they are, a whole bunch of
them.

Let's get them."

Only a few of the blacks escaped injury.

Irvin

Collins was severely beaten as he mn from the building and narrowly escaped being shot.

To avoid the mob, he crawled under a nearby house and

remained there until dawn.

Roy Ford escaped further beating as he dashed

out of the lobby and climbed atop the bus stationo
the terror below.

From there he witnessed

Eotha Jones was in a phone booth when the whites attacked

and ran outside only to

mve

a police car shine its spotlight on himo

group of whites beat him thoroughly.

A

Alex Mouton was less fortunate, for

the beating he received caused injuries so severe that he died from them
on October

4. 21

Two other people died du.ring the riot.

Jolm Jolmson, a black man

who womed for the American Ice Company, died after a group of whites shot
him as he left work.

Ellis C. :Brown, a white carpenter, died from head

wounds inflicted by unknown assailantso

Police found him dead near the

shipyard, and speculation pointed to blacks as the murderers.

This may

20
chicago Defender, June 26, 1943; Houston Infonner, June 26, 1943.
21Houston Informer, June 26, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, October 6,
1943; Hoover to Berge, July 9, 1943, FBI Records.
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have been the case, for some blacks took advantage of the white invasion
of the black districts to retaliate.
killed Brown in self-defense.

Equally plausible, blacks may have

Whatever the cause, he remained the only

white person to die during the outbreak.

Many people, ma.inly blacks,

suffered injuries during the rioting though records do not reveal the
exact number.

Hospitals reported eleven persons admitted for severe in-

juries, but they made up only a small portion of the woi.mded.

Many blacks

either treated their own wounds or left the city for aid; some feared for
their lives and others thought they might be arrested.

Considering the

length and intensity of the violence, two hundred injuries would be a
conservative estimate; the toll may have reached foux hi.mdred. 22
Meanwhile, local law enforcement officials faced a desperate situation.

During the period from midnight to daybreak, Chief Dickey could muster

only his own force of under fifty, the 150-member police auxiliary, a handful of state policemen, and the small sheriff's department.

City officials

tried to get additional help by mobilizing the 18th Battalion of the Texas
State Guard, but this unit never made it to the front.

Hav.iP..g never before

been called into an emergency, the two hundred guardsmen spent most of the
night at Beaumont High School, locating and distributing their firearms.
Instead of dispatching his men directly to the riot areas, Major Fred C.
Stone, a local architect who served as the battalion's senior officer,
moved the unit to the lawn of city hall.

There the men pitched pup tents

and unrolled barbed wire along the ground as if they expected an invasion.
The arrival of a Salvation Army mobile canteen provided the highlight of
the operation.

22~
Deaumon t

En·
.
.~erorise,
June 17, 1943.
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Since few guardsmen actively aided in the struggle to restore order,
Dickey simply scattered his officers throughout the black sections and
major intersections.

Although the police arrested so many people that

the city and county jails soon bulged with prisoners, this had little
effect on the riot.

The authorities frantically sought an interim deten-

tion center, and finally commandeered the Harvest Club, a large building
on the county fairgrounds.

In spite of the utter pandemonium that pre-

vailed and the relatively few officers on hand, policemen still managed
to apprehend 225 whites and six blacks.

Most remained at the Harvest Club

while city officials wondered what to do with them. 23
When the riot broke out, city administrators placed a hurried telephone call to the governor's office in Austin, only to find Governor Coke
R. Stevenson on his way to Washington and Lieutenant Governor John Lee
Smith in the Midwest.

In their place the president pro tempore of the

Senate, A. M. Aikin, Jr., served as acting governor; he bad occupied the
office only one day when the riot broke out.

Aikin proved reluctant to

take drastic action and asked city officials to wait and see what the
next few hours would bring.

Meanwhile, he approved of sending extra

state guardsmen to Eeaumont, and within a few hours 1,600 men were on their
,,.ray from Baytown, Conroe, Houston, Nacogdoches, Port Arthur, and elsewhere.

At the same ti.me Aikin ordered large quantities of ammunition sent to
Eeaumont from Orange and Port Arthur.

Neither the 1,600 guardsmen nor

the ammunition arrived in time to quell the disturbance.

Highway patrol-

men and Texas Rangers simultaneously filtered into the city, so that by

23 Ibid., June 17, 22, 1943; Houston Post, June 17, 1943.
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the evening of June 16 over 2,400 law enforcement personnel occupied
Beaumont.

State officials finally contacted Govemor Stevenson, but he

appeared to take the matter casually.
Austin what I would do.

He remarked that "they can do in

I have confidence in the adjutant general and

director of public safety acting wisely in the situation."

The unper-

turbed govemor then continued on to Washington. 24
At daybreak on June 16 the major violence ended.

As state guards-

men and Texas Rangers poured into the city and local officials tried to
maintain order, however, another outbreak threatened.

Around mid-moming

a group of 200 men, mainly shipyard workers, collected in front of the
courthouse and confronted Sheriff Richardson.
county jail contained the assailant.

They insisted that the

The sheriff, however, had been up

all night and appeared on the courthouse steps armed with a pistol and
submachine gun in a decidedly foul humor.
he shouted.
doing."

"I'm damn tired of all this,"

"Break up and go back to building ships like you should be

Someone jeered.

Richardson threatened.

"Let the damn fool that said that step up here,"
"Fact is, I'll take you all on--one at a time.

And let me tell you, I'm going to keep law and order in this county."

Re-

buffed, the mob began walking toward the smouldering Forsythe Street area,
apparently bent on causing trouble.

Texas Rangers sprayed the throng with

tear gas, however, and with that the threatened violence ended. 25

2
4:aeaumont Enterprise, June 16, 17, 1943; Dallas Moming News,
June 17, 1943; "Sen. Aikin has Busy Time Pinch-Hitting for Stevenson
as Martial Law Reigns," State Observer, June 21, 1943, pp. 1, 5.
2
5Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943.
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The Beaumont race riot claimed three lives and hundreds of casualties.

Some of those wounded were white, mainly because of mistaken iden-

tity during the darkness and confusion and partly because of isolated
black retaliation.

Yet the bulk of the injuries involved black people.

There was also the hurried exodus of about 2,500 blacks from the city,
most retuming to hometowns in East Texas and Louisiana.

The riot also

resulted in the partial or total destruction of two hundred buildings
and at least ten autos.
proved considerable.
manhours.

Personal property losses from looting also

And the loss of war production totaled 210,000

26

In the wake of the violence Beaumont stood paralyzed, but city
officials took steps to insure stability.

They cancelled the June 19

"Juneteenth" celebration, a holiday for blacks in Texas which commemorated their emancipation.

The fact that the city recall election also

fell on that day hastened their decision.

Chief Dickey ordered all city

buses off the streets and stopped interstate bus service.

Major General

Richard C. Donovan of the Eighth Service Command proclaimed the city off
limits to military personnel.

An 8:30 p.m. curfew was instituted, and

Dickey closed all bars and liquor stores; other officials closed swimming
pools, parks, baseball games, and other places where people might congregate.

Downtown stores closed their doors for several days to avoid

crowds.

The failure of black employees to go to work immediately following

the riot crippled cafes, hotels, laundries, and other establishments.

26

Beaurnont Enterprise, June 17, 1943; War Department memorandum,
July 1, 1943; Hoover to Berge, July 9, 1943, FBI Records.
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Mail service was similarly disrupted since one-third of Beaumont's mail
carriers were black. 27
The impact of the rioting also affected neighboring towns and cities.
Small disturbances occurred in Kountze, Nome, and Silsbee, and on June 16
officials sent home all black employees of Orange's Consolidated Steel
Shipyards.

State guardsmen protected the yards while Orange officials

closed liquor stores.

In Port Neches a rubber plant sent its 1,200 black

employees home, and Port Arthur and Baytown took similar precautions.
A rumor of rioting in connection with Juneteenth floated across Houston,
prompting that city's mayor to place a full page advertisement in the
Houston Post which urged residents to stop doing "Hitler's woix• Stop
circulating rumors which create tenseness and interfere with war production and attend to your own business. 1128
On the evening of June 16, Acting Gover.nor Aikin reluctantly took
a belated but necessary step when he declared martial law in Beaumont.
From then until June 20 when Aikin lifted the order, control of the city
fell to state Adjutant General Arthur B. Knickerbocker, who sent Lieutenant
Colonel Sidney C. Mason to Beaumont where he assumed direct command. 29
After Aikin imposed martial law, speculation arose over upcoming
investigations.

Chief Dickey and a number of other people were convinced

that Axis sabotage sparked the riot, and he flatly charged that "there is

27 Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 17,
1943; Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1943.
28Memorandum, G. P. Gannon to D. M. Ladd, June 17, 1943, F.BI Records;
Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1943; Houston Post, June 18, 1943.
29Beau.mont .Enterprise, June 17, 1943.
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somebody behind it and if·I could get my hands on him I would wring his
neck."

Much of Dickey's conviction came from an anonymous post card he

received, stating that "you have just been placed on the secret payroll
along with the Mayor of [the] United Patrons of Axis."

The editor of

the Beaumont Enterprise echoed these thoughts when he opined that "there
is a strong suspicion that enemy agents are trying to create racial friction here, that they have been engaged in this kind of subversive work
for months.

Evidently their work is bearing fruit."

These people fully

expected an F.BI investigation to bear out their notions.

Bureau agents

began work in the city on Wednesday, the 16th; for the remainder of the
week they tried to piece the story together.

In a June 28 report to FBI

Director J. Edgar Hoover, however, agents found "no indication" that the
riot was "instigated or inspired by foreign action."

The bureau elected

to forego a complete inquiry on the basis of this report.

Immediately

the Enterprise changed its opinion on the subject, and on July 9 remarked
that "the fault lies at home and not abroad.

The chief offenders are not

foes of this country but its own citizens who may think themselves just
as loyal as anybody else."30
While the FBI survey continued, the state began its own investigation, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Royal G. Phillips of the Department of
Public Safety.

He conducted a military court of inquiry to dispose of the

231 prisoners arrested in connection with the riot.
on June 17 and lasted four days.

The

court got underway

Phillips discovered that about 60 percent

30Ibid., June 17, 18, 1943; July 9, 1943; Dallas Moming News,
June 18, 1943; Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943; Hoover to Berge, July 9,
1943, F.BI Records.
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of the 225 white prisoners were under thirty years of age and that thirtyone of them bad criminal records.

He also kept a close eye on the draft

status of these people, hoping to catch evaders.

When the court finished

the hearing, it detained only twenty-nine of the prisoners for further
action.

Most of these people subsequently faced misdemeanor charges, such

as carrying firearms, public drunkenness, and inciting to mob violenceo
The majority received fines of $25 plus court costs, so the penalty for
rioting essentially carried a $30.20 retribution.

The police caught one

man with a sawed-off shotgun measuring only thirteen and one-half inches
long, a federal offense.

The inquiry charged no one with arson or

murder. 31
On June 22 the NAACP became actively involved when Walter White
asked Houston branch secretary Lulu E. White to employ a white man or a
black person who could pass for white to conduct an inquiry.

The Houston

branch hired Hobart Thomas, a black man who worked for the Houston Informer,
and he interviewed a number of people.

His questioning centered around

the character of the white woman who said a black man raped her, the nature
of the mob and its ringleaders, the broader issues behind the riot, and
public opinion.

Meanwhile, the NAACP discovered that a group of prominent

white Eeaumont businessmen had mised about $3,000 to compensate local
blacks for losses during the riot.

Whether they did this out of compas-

sion or to keep blacks quiet remained unclear.

At any rate several blacks

3¾1emora.ndum, R. J. Abbaticchio to Hoover, September 14, 1943,
FBI Records; Eeaumont Enterprise, June 18, 19, 20, 22, 1943; July 10,
1943; Eeaumont Journal, June 19, 1943. This writer was unable to examine
the report of the military court of inquiry filed by Phillips because,
according to DPS officials, it has disappeared.
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received money, including Mrs. John Johnson, whose husband was killed.
Others included H. N. LeBlanc, who received $301.97 to replace a 1936
Chevrolet that rioters overturned and burned, and L. P. Rideaux, who received $1300 for the loss of his shoe repair shop.

Once the Justice

Department decided against conducting a full-scale investigation, the
N.AACP's inquiry lost its momentum and quickly died out. 32
While the FBI, DPS, and NAACP inquiries continued, the city awaited
June 19 with trepidation.

The cancellation of Juneteenth angered many

local blacks, and the acrimony surrounding the recall election made that
day a test of Beaumont's stability.

It passed with no racial discord,

and residents breathed sighs of relief when the acting governor lifted
martial law the next day.

The incumbent city officials fared worse, how-

ever, because the election toppled seven of them from office.

Many

citizens held them responsible not only for rampant vice but also for the
riot.

Chief of Police Dickey left office in December. 33
There was an ironic footnote to the Beaumont riot, for a medical

examination revealed that the white woman who claimed to have been raped
on June 15 had in fact not been assaulted.

Barker D. Chunn, a Beaumont

physician, examined her immediately after the alleged incident, but
authorities withheld the findings for several days.

Chunn found that she

32walter White to Lulu B. White, June 22, 1943; Lulu White to Walter
White, June 25, 1943; Walter White to Lulu White, July 1, 1943, in ":Beaumont Texas Riots," GOF; R. T. Tatum to Lulu White, September 2, 1943; Lulu
White to Walter White, September 13, 1943; Statements of :Beulah Johnson,
September 3, 1943, H. N. Le:Slanc, September 3, 1943, and L. P. Rideaux,
September 7, 1943, in "Houston," :Branch File (BF), NAACP Papers.
33:seaumont Journal, June 21, 22, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise,
November 28, 1943.
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had neither been sexually assaulted nor engaged in sexual activities in
the period immediately surrounding the alleged rape.

Why she claimed to

have been raped remained a mystery, but in any event the truthfulness of
her accusation made little difference. 34

//: ';:t\

The Beaumont riot was the largest single racial outbreak of the
in the South.

war Z

The fact that it did not receive intense national coverage

was due to the larger Detroit riot, which broke out only a few days after
the Texas violence.

The :Beaumont episode also proved significant because

it reflected familiar southern traits that characterized previous riots.
Interracial competition in housing and labor helped produce tension in a
congested production area.

The violence was ignited by the familiar

\\

claim of interracial rape, and whites reacted by rioting against easily
accessible black residents.
black community.

:Burri..ing, looting, and killing ravaged the

In this way whites demonstrated their fear of black

advancement and isolated but significant breaches of racial etiquette in
a period of instability.

The Mobile and :Beaumont riots shared much in

common, while the Detroit and Harlem riots both typified, in varying degrees, the change from white to black civilian aggression.
black experiences differed from South to North.

Obviously,

Considering the conditions

that caused the :Beaumont riot, the city was fortunate that it did not
suffer repeated violence.

Perhaps conditions improved after 1943, or

perhaps the city became so conscious of racial tension that efforts to
prevent future outbreaks proved successful.

34™, June 18, 1943; Anonymous Jefferson County official to
H. C. Galloway, September 25, 1943, in ":Beaumont Texas Riots," GOF,
NAACP Papers.
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On June 16, as if to accent the nationwide deterioration of race
relations, an outbreak occurred at the Chester, Pennsylvania, Sun Shipbuilding yards.

In the midst of a hotly debated struggle over union

representation, part of which involved black participation, company guards
shot five black workers and killed one of them.

Although yard officials

placed the blame for the incident on the CIO, the company's own guards
proved to be the guilty parties.

This incident, however, paled by com-

parison with the Detroit riot, the single largest outbreak in the nation
iuring the war. 35
Occurring June 20 through 22, the Detroit race riot took thirty.:our lives and did an estimated $2 million in property damage.

The city,

~ome of many major war industries, suffered from extremely congested coniitions, for well over 500,000 people moved there during the period from

1940 to 1943. Elacks in particular found a critical housing shortage;
~ost lived in the thirty-block ghetto known as ~aradise Valley.

The

Sojourner Truth housing riots in 19h2 attested to these difficulties,
while the early June Packard strike provided evidence of worsening rela~ions in the economic sectoro 36
The riot erupted on a Sunday ~hen an interracial fight began near
Belle Isle, a recreation area.

That night rumors flew over the city,

with the versions varying between blacks and whites.

A mob of blacks

~shed to Belle Isle only to find it barricaded, so they resorted to

35"Industrial Violence," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in
:..ace Relations, 1 (August 1943), .5; Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943.

36Guzman, Negro Year Eook, 237; Harvard Sitkoff, "The Detroit
Eace Riot of 1943," Michigan History, 53 (Fall 1969), 187-88.
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throwing rocks at cars and beating white passers-by.
whites attacked blacks along Woodward Avenue.

At the same time

By early the next morning

po:rtions of Paradise Valley were in ruins as blacks continued to attack
the most accessible symbols of oppression, white-owned property, as well
as white citizens who happened by.

Whites simultaneously stepped up

their attacks on blacks, pulling them from streetcars and businesses. 37
The violence, which claimed thirty-four lives, all but nine black,
ended only after federal troops entered Detroit on the night of June 21.
Immediately a nationwide search for scapegoats got underway in an effort
to provide explanations not only for the Detroit outbreak but the Mobile,
Los Angeles, and Beaumont riots as well.

An indignant NAACP offered free

defense counsel for the black people arrested in connection with the riot
and issued a report on the riot to help avert violence in other tension
spots around the country.

At the same time the Michigan state authorities

produced a report that placed primary responsibility for the outbreak on
blacks.

Meanwhile scholars, joll.nlalists, and others puzzled over what

the violence of the summer reflected and portended.

Two sociologists,

Alfred M. Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, quickly wrote a book dealing with
the Detroit episode; they outlined a program for detecting symptoms of
racial unrest and how to cure them.

Other organizations warned of a pos-

sible continuation of the violence.

The Urban League, for example, cau-

tioned that the recent riots "indicate organized subversive design for
hindering war effort by stimulating racial conflict in war industry
centers," noting that Mobile, Los Angeles, Beaumont, and Detroit all

37sitkoff, "Detroit Riot," 189-90.
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contained essential war production plants.

Many others fully expected

trials esa.Iia.ting from the Detroit riot to show Axis influence. 38
Concerned writers joined in deploring violence that was especially
shocking in view of the number of deaths, amount of destruction, and loss
of war production.

Business Week complained about the loss of manhours

in the riot-tom cities, while the Nation observed that "the Axis is losing battles in Europe and the Pacific, but it can console itself with

victories recently won in the United States."

New Republic blamed the

governors of Alabama, California, Michigan, and Texas for exhibiting
shortsightedness in failing to see the clear signs of unrest in their
states.

Liberal columnist Thomas Sancton attributed the recent outbreaks

to "a general shift of the economic and spiritual position of the Negro
group relative to the white group."

John Temple Graves reiterated his

stance on the subject by observing that the immediate causes of the violence lay in "an atmosphere of war tension and high wages in which agitators for making the war an occasion for reforming race relations" and "implacables on the other side" were chafing for trouble.

Virginius Dabney

cautioned that evolutionary processes would provide the only answer to
the nation's racial problems.

"Men of goodwill in all parts of this land,"

he offered, "must counsel together with a view to achieving the most equitable and most speedy adjustments that are possible." 39

38Ibid., 191-96; Pittsburgh Courier, May 13, 1943; July 10, 1943;
"Along the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis, 50 (August 1943), 249; ibid.
(September 1943), 280; Lee and Humphrey, Race Riot; National Urban League,
Racial Conflict--A Home Front Danger:
(New York, 1943), 14.

Lessons of the Detroit Riot

39 "Race Riots Hurt," :Business Week, June 26, 1943, p. 102; "Defeat
at Detroit," Nation, July 3, 1943, p. 4; "The Governors Pass the Buck,"
New Republic, July 12, 1943, pp. 38-39; Thomas Sancton, "The Race Riots,
ibid., July 5, 1943, pp. 9-13; Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943.
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189
Among conservative public officials, interest was high but explanations differed.

In response to a request for information from Walter

Davenport of Collier's, for example, Governor Olin D. Johnson of South
Carolina reported that "we people in South Carolina have always been able
to handle the race question without riots and trouble.

We can solve our

problems without outside interference from Washington or northern agitators."

A similar response came from Alabama's Governor Chauncey Sparks.

"If there be future race rioting, in

my

opinion, it will have its roots

buried in inflammatory Negro newspapers."

He complained that "the atti-

tude of certain ambitious politicians and misguided and emotional missionaries who place shibboleths above reality" represented part of the problem.

Thus, whether the reactions to Detroit's violence came frow liberals

or conservatives, they proved uniformly strong.40
While President Roosevelt appeared nonplussed about the racial situation, other politicians took adv-c::.ntage of the violence to build support
among blacks.

In a July 24 radio broadcast Wendell Willkie joined others

in an "Open Letter to the American People" exposing the _dangers of racial
turmoil.

"This is a time for serious thought and sober words," Willkie

observed, adding that "the situation which flared so tragically in Detroit
has its counterpart in many Americc...-ri cities."

Vice President Henry Wallace

countered that "those who fan the fires of racial clashes for the purpose
of ma.king political capital here at home, are taking the first step toward
Nazism."

400lin D. Johnson to Walter Davenport, July 2, 1943; Chauncey Sparks
to Davenport, June 30, 1943, in "Davenport re: Racial Tensions," GOF,
NAACP Papers.

190

In Congress a tempestuous debate ensued over both the causes of
the racial violence and proposed Congressional action.

Southern conserva-

tive John E. Rankin attributed the Detroit riot to "the crazy policies of
the so-called Fair Employment Practices Committee," and asserted that the
only possibility for racial harmony was "complete segregation."

Convinced

that the Ku Klux Klan lay behind the unrest, Samu.el Dickstein of New York
called for an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee.
Dickstein's fellow New York Congressman, Arthur C. Klein, introduced a
resolution calling for a select committee to probe the violence.

Sena-

tors Styles Bridges and C. Wayland Brooks proposed a companion measure
to.investigate not only the riots but the general status of minority
participation in the defense effort.41
Before the wheels of Congressional action could begin turning, however, the fifth and final major riot of 1943 broke out.

The Harlem riot

of August 1 and 2 epitomized the change from white to black aggression
in civilian American race rioting, and for that reason it was perhaps the/ ; \
I/~
1

most significant of the 1943 disorders.

As the largest and most influen-\_}

tial black community in the nation, Harlem also proved one of tre most
militant.

It bad spawned the Harlem Renaissance, was home to Marcus

Garvey during the 1920s, underwent a black-aggression riot in 1935, and
during the war served as the militant headquarters of black America.
It was significant, then, that such violence broke out there.

41Pittsburgh Courier, July 17, 24, 31, 1943; New York Times,
June 24, 1943, p. 12; U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 78th
Cong., 1st sess., 89, pt. 5, pp. 6343, 7039, 7074; U.S., Congress,
Senate, ibid., 7266.
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The riot that began on the night of August 1 developed out of
complex antecedents.

Certainly the militancy that characterized Harlem

intellectuals proved one of the factors.
remained fresh in many minds.

In addition, the riot of 1935

But in general black Harlemites felt frus-

trated, and this in part led to aggressive behavior.

As one social psy-

chologist who studied the riot later said, "once a framework of frustration has produced a reaction of aggression, the degree of aggression will
depend upon the degree of frustration."

Ha.rlemites felt the frustration

of discriminatory treatment within a wartime experience that proclaimed
democracy as the savior of oppressed peoples overseas.

On that Sunday

night a black MP, Robert Bandy, and a white policeman, James Collins,
argued over the arrest of a black woman in the lobby of a shabby hotel
on West 126th Street.

The argument resulted in the slight wounding of

:Bandy, but in the sweltering heat people in the streets began hearing
rumors that the MP had been killed in front of his mother.

Violence

erupted as ordinary Harlem residents vented their anger against "the
available symbols of the oppressor.
of stores" owned by whites.

the shining plate glass windows

The rioters were not militants; rather they

were "the Bigger Thomases of New Yorlr" who "passed like a cloud of locusts
over the stores of Harlem."

As Ralph Ellison described the scene in

Invisible Man, "suddenly the block leaped alive.

Men who seemed to rise

up out of the sidewalks were rushing into the store fronts above me, their
voices rising excitedly."

From blind fury came a carnival-like atmosphere

of looting and bu.ming that lasted through the night.4 2

42 orlansky, Harlem Riot, 4-6, 12; Pittsburgh Courier, August 7,
1943; New York Times, August 2, 1943, p. l; White, "Behind the Harlem
Riot," 221-22; Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (New York, 1947), 464.
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As the destruction continued, New York Mayor Fiorello La.Guardia
called squads of policemen, firemen, and black Office of Civilian Defense
(OCD) volunteers into the area, and the first of 8,000 New York State
Guardsmen mobilized in area annories.

Ia.Guardia's expeditious action

confined the rioting to one night; it could have lasted much longer.

In

the end five blacks died, an estimated 400 received injuries, police
arrested more than 500, and the rioters destroyed $5 million worth of
propertyo 43
As expected, white reaction to the riot counseled caution.

Even

such liberal periodicals as Commonweal suggested "both to the Negro press
and to such agencies as the NAACP that they reconsider their tactics in
the light of existing circumstances." Curiously, the black reaction proved
confused, perhaps representing the shock that many blacks suffered upon
hearing of the nature of the outbreak.

The usually militant Pittsburgh

Courier, for example, proclaimed that "the prepondering majorities of
law-abiding American colored people are deeply downcast and humiliated
because of the acts of vandalism and disorder committed by their fellowmen a short while ago."

Even Walter Whi.te could not explain the violence

and finally concluded that the riot "was the fury born of repeated, unchecked, unpunished, and often unrebuked shooting, maiming, and insulting of Negro troops, particularly in Southern states. 11 44

4~ew

York Times, August 2, 1943, p. l; August 3, 1943, PPo 1, 10;
Walter White, A Man Called White: The Autobio ra
of Walter White
(Bloomington, 1948, 233-410
44"Assessing the :Blame," Commonweal, August 17, 1943, p. 407;
Pittsburgh Courier, August 14, 1943; White to Henry L. Stimson, August
6, 1943, AG 291.2, RG 407.
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Meanwhile the summer's violence initiated widespread changes that

attempted to bolster race relations.

The black press became less militant]~

as editors recognized the perilous racial situation.

Blacks stood to lose

much of what they had gained, so Double V slogans and vitriolic editorials
decreased.

At the same time interracial committees sprang up across the

nation as citizens recognized that violence could assume epidemic proportions.

By October, Edwin Embree of the Rosenwald Fund reported the estab-

lishment of sixty-three such committees on the local and state levels.
Lester B. Granger of the Urban League caught the tone of a shift in interracial concem by coining the term "victory through unity."

In addition,

a plethora of articles and pamphlets on ways to prevent race riots appeared
to supplement Lee and Humphrey's Race Riot.

Such pieces carried titles

like ''Reducing Bacial Tensions," "How to Prevent Race Riots, 11 and "Race
Riot Prescription. 1145
In Washington a pumber of suggestions emerged.

Some recommended

tbat Roosevelt deliver a fireside chat on the recent violence, but he and
his aides decided against it.

Others suggested tmt the President create

a committee on race relations within the Executive Office, a plan that
received favorable publicity.

Again, Roosevelt killed the idea but did

appoint Jonathan Daniels as a coordinator of government information on the
rioting.

Finally, the administration stifled budding Congressional probes

of the violence, so no official federal action emerged in the wake of the

45Finkle, Forum for Protest, 168; Pittsburgh Courier, October 9,
1943; Lester :B. Granger, "Victory Through Unity," Opportunity, 21 (October
1943), 147-51; Alfred l3aker Lewis, "Reducing Racial Tensions," :ibid.,
156-57, 174; Winifred Raushenbush, "How to Prevent Race Riots," American
Mercury, 57 (September 1943), 302-9; "Race Riot Prescription," Science
News Letter, December 11, 1943, p. 381.
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summer's rioting.

Speculation pointed to the 1944 election as the main

reason why Roosevelt remained passive toward the crisis. 46
A brief flurry of controversy arose when the NAACP charged that
Attorney General Francis Biddle had recommended banning black migration
to certain congested areas as a practical way of helping ease racial
tension.

This charge stemmed from a story the New York Post carried on

August 11 in which Biddle reportedly suggested to Roosevelt that "careful
consideration be given to limiting, and in some instances putting an end
to, Negro migrations into communities which cannot absorb them."

Whether

he actually made such a proposal or not, Biddle quickly denied it, explaining that he ·only meant to point out the housing problems of major
cities like Detroit where racial tension remained high.

Civil rights

groups remained suspicious of Biddle.47

r- .---.,

In the South the most beneficial action ta.ken during the weeks a f t e ~
the riots came with the establishment of the Southern Regional Council (SRC).
This agency was an interracial outgrowth of the all-black Durham Conference
of October 1942 and the all-white Atlanta Conference of April 1943.

Recog-

nizing the need for a broadly based regional organization to foster better
race relations, members of both conferences convened in Richmond on June
16.

The statement the conference produced reflected a search for interracial

stability, for it observed that the major concern confronting the South,

46Da.lfiume,

"Forgotten Years," 105-6; "Federal,State, and City
Action," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1 (August
1943), 15; Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy," 677; idem, "Detroit Riot," 204-5.

47Telegram,

Roy Wilkins to Francis Biddle, August 9, 1943; Statement by NAACP, August 12, 1943, in ":Biddle re: Riots," GOF, NAACP
Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, August 21, 1943.

195
exclusive of the war, "is the problem of two great peoples caught up in
the midst of transition between the powerful heritage of the past and the
mighty pull of the future."

The Richmond Conference laid the groundwork

for the creation of the SRC, which in effect replaced the dying Commission
on Interracial Cooperation.

On August

4,

1943, a select group of the

Richmond conferees met in Atlanta under the chairmanship of Howard W.
Odum, and with that meeting the SRC formally emerged.

It included among

its major commitments in fostering interracial harmony support of a powerful FEPC, abolition of the poll tax, a federal agency to guarantee civil
rights to minorities, and experimental integration of some anned forces
units.

The SRC was not without its critics from both the left and right,

but it would play a valuable role in the future of southern race relations. 48
The violence of the summer of 1943 made plain the conflict between
blacks and whites over the deeper issues of the war era.

In part a loss

of communication fostered heightened discord and gave each racial group a
warped view of each other.

This difference of views permeated the politi-

cal, economic, and military spheres of World War II life.

Given the con-

gestion, high mobility, shortages, and lack of interracial understanding
that caused tensions to rise to the boiling point, it is remarkable that
during mid-1943 even more severe violence did not erupt.

That which did

occur disrupted the war effort, but it could easily have been larger and

4S"The Richmond Statement: Resolution"s of the Collaboration Committee," New South, 19 (January 1964), 16-17; Virginius Dabney, "The South
Marches On," Survey Graphic, 32 (November 1943), 441-43; "Southern Regional
Council," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1
(August 1943), 18-19.

196
more destructive.

Countless other incidents, both large and small,

accompanied the major riots as hardly an urban center in the nation
escaped racial conflict of some magnitude.

Rumors of riots also floated

across the country, and considering the fact that rumors ignited three
of the five major outbreaks of this period, they could have produced
even more grim results.
For years historians, sociologists, and psychologists have to
some degree been preoccupied with the issue of why riots exploded in some
cities when many others produced similar background conditions but did not
suffer these incidents.

Models, theories, and formulas based on demog-

raphy, social indices, politics, economics, and historical antecedents
. .
L.9
·
fl owe d f rem the pens of aca d emicians.

Certainly, an examination of the

Mobile, Los Angeles, Beaumont, Detroit, and Harlem riots provides a common variety of causal factors.

The

failure of interracial communication,

the insensitivity of policy makers toward increasing tension, perceived or
real threats by one group against another, labor and housing conflicts,
and racial traditions manifested themselves in the five cities that underwent riots as well as in others.

But rationalizing about spontaneous,

semi-rational incidents does not provide the full explanation.

Some

places underwent riots because the various ingredients in the overall
formula jelled at precisely the wrong time; a relatively inoffensive incident proved sufficient to ignite violence.
cities during the summer of

Such was the case in five

1943 when the exigencies of war affected

people's sensibilities.

49see,

for example, Grimshaw, P~cial Violence in the United
States, and Short and Wolfgang, Collective Violence.
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The same general causal patterns that prevailed across the nation._
produced different results.

In the South, the violence involved white

aggression against perceived threats to the color line, while in the North
the violence involved black aggression in varying degrees trat stemmed from
years of frustration and oppression.

Scholars have attempted to explain

the changing nature of violence in a variety of ways.

August Meier and

Elliott Rudwick, for example, observed the shift from white to black
aggression during the war as the result of intellectual and demographic
alterations.

Increased white sensitivity to the plight of blacks and

corresponding militancy by blacks brought about by disillusionment with
slow progress. in the struggle for equal rights fanned the intellectual
shift.

The growth of large, semi-autonomous ghettos formed the demo-

graphic shift.

Thus, "even if white mobs were to fo:r:.m, they would be

i.mable to attack and burn down the Negro residential areas."

Similarly,

Morris Janowitz perceived the change from what he termed "communal" to
"commodity" riots during the war as emanating largely from "the role of
the police and law enforcement agencies and.

o

•

the mass media."

Yet

these and other scholars took as their focus the urban ghettos of the
North and assumed that the southern experience was roughly similar.

A

j

transformation did occur in the nature of rioting, but it essentially
proved a sectional one.SO

In explaining the sectional divergence, historical patterns of
race relations emerge as crucial.

✓-

For southern blacks life meant

50August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, ":Black Violence in the 20th
Century: A Study in Rhetoric and Retaliation," in Graham and Gurr, eds.,
Violence in .America, 405-6; Morris Janowitz, "Patterns of Collective
Racial Violence," ibid., 413.
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virtually total segregation in a rigidly enforced caste system.
of this, little interracial understanding existed.

Because

Blacks' wo:r:king, eating,

religious, social, and intellectual lives were restricted and defined.
Attempts to break out of the caste system resulted in violence, thus
helping produce the tradition of violence for which the South became
noted.

The total experience provided southern blacks with a restricted

view a..'t'ld limited goals.

When war came, conditions changed enough so that/.,

blacks in the South became hopeful of permanent advancements.

When they

:reflected this hope through assertiveness, it seemed to whites that the
color line was in peril.

To maintain it, they employed violence.

For northern blacks the situation remained one of discrimination
a~d oppression, but they did not suffer under a rigidly imposed caste
system.

Many attended good schools, read unprejudiced textbooks, rode

integrated buses and trains, and enjoyed many everyday pleasures most
southern blacks did not.

Yet northern blacks faced frustration.

their freedom they remained in second-class positions.

Despite

Their view was

not limited by a visible color line, so they clearly saw that they enjoyed more advantages than their brethren in Dixie yet remained below
whites.

They lived in a superficial nearness to whites and felt tolerated

but never accepted.

The frustration that came from this position crystal-

lized in the Harlem riot.5

1

While wa:rtime conditions proved similar across the country, the
violence differed in nature from North to South and brought different
results.

Blacks everywhere began to abandon overt forms of mili tance · -~\

51orlansky, Harlem Riot, 13.

/

,/
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after the riots of 1943, yet for southern blacks the retreat involved a
bitter recognition of the power of the color line.

As a larger propor-

tion of the population, and as residents of the region only seventyeight years removed from slavery, black southerners witnessed the limitations placed on them enforced through coercion a._~d violence.

Th.-e

Beaumont riot provided the main symbolic act of white enforcement of
the color line.

CHA.PTER VII
FROM WAR TO PEACE?
The "epidemic of interracial violence" of the summer of 1943, both
civilian and military, brought to an end the most intense racial discord
of the war em.

Through the last two years of the conflict, however,

race relations did not measurably improve as violence continued at a
less intense level across the South.

\/

Military mutinies and lynchings

l/

occurred with enough frequency in 1944 and 1945 to demonstrate that race
relations remained tense.

The violence of this period also cast a shadow

of dread over the postwar South.

A new set of factors brought on by the;
I,

end of the conflict and reconversion would prove instrumental in the continuation of violence even as the war came to a close.

There were no

civilian riots during this period, but in the last two years other forms
of racial violence, mutinies and lynchings, continued.
The mutinies generally showed the dissatisfaction of black service-.
men with degrading experiences in the military.

These incidents were in-

variably resistance to white intimidation or violence.

Lynchings con-

tinued to serve notice of white resistance to a softening of the color
line.

'

Such incidents took on new meaning with the end of the war, becaus~
i

they increasingly showed a fierce determination by southern whites to es- / ,·L
tablish prewar race relations--strict adherence to the caste system
swift punishment of those who violated it.

and_j

After the clashes of 1943,

southern blacks, bitter and increasingly alienated, withdrew from efforts
to break down the color line.

Having reached out for the equal opportunity

supposedly guaranteed them, they recoiled from the hostile reaction of a
200
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white majority whose ideas about protecting democracy evidently did not
extend to them.
Lynchings and military violence began early in 1944 though the
military incidents occurred with more frequency and intensity. 1

In

January about thirty black soldiers from Dyersburg Army Air Force Base
became embroiled in a shooting affray in the nearby town of Ripley,
Tennessee.
men wounded.

The exchange left one soldier dead and two civilian policeOn

March 22 a group of black soldiers mutinied at Dale Mabry

Field (Tallahassee), Florida, refusing to obey the commands of their
superiors until their grievances, based on discrimination, were heard.
Five men, all northerners, were convicted in April of inciting a mutiny
and dishonorably discharged with prison sentences ranging from thirteen
to fifteen years.

2

In May another serious riot broke out.

Breckley Field, located in

Mobile, Alabama, served as a repair and modification depot for the Army
Air Force.
ties.

It was the only such installation with deep water port facili-

Built in 1940, Breckley Field housed about 15,000 soldiers and

civilians, complete with the segregation of facilities and services black

1

The lynchings of 1944 began with the drowning death of a young
boy, Willie Howard, near Live Oak, Florida, on January 2. On March 26
an elderly black man, Isaac Simmons, died at the hands of a six-man mob.
On November 23, James Scales, an inmate at a Tennessee reformatory, died
violently after killing the family of the Pikeville institution's superintendent. Guzman, Negro Year Book, 302-11; "Report Concerning the Lynching of James Scales, Thursday, November 23, 1944," by Z. Alexander Looby,
in "Lynching--Tennessee (Scales)"; David Ianier to Spessard Holland,
February 7, 1944, in "Lyncbing--Live Oak, Floricla--Willie Howard," GOF,
NAACP Papers.
2Pittsburgh Courier, January 8, 1944; February 12, 1944; Florence
Mu.rray, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1946-1947 (New York, 1947), 350-51;
Review of proceedings, U.S. v. Pvt. Joseph R. Kent et al., August 14,
1944, in "Court Martial Cases, 1940-1947," CASW Records, RG 107.
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Gis had come to loathe.

Black soldiers at the base were physically

isolated from the whites, for their quarters lay inside a racetrack at
the Mobile County Fairgrounds.

A forbidding barbed wire fence encircled

the area, giving the place the aura of a stockade.

The barracks bad no

glass in the windows; the openings were covered by shutters.
post exchange served the black contingent.

Only one

The main bone of contention

✓-

among the blacks proved, as always, the rough treatment they encountered
at the hands of white MPs.

Even this late in the war the Army apparently

used blacks as military policemen only at bases where trouble bad occurred
or where it was convenient to do so.

]lacks at Brookley complained loudly

about being abused by white MPs and often expressed their desire for black
replacements.

These complaints went unheeded. 3

Conditions in Mobile itseif also left something to be desired.

1c-

counts of discriminatory treatment and abuse at the hands of civilian
policemen in the cit~ had circulated since Brookley opened.

In 1942 a

white bus driver shot Private Henry Williams to death for no apparent reason, an incident that illustrated the raw feelings between white Mobilians
and the black troops.

The

1943 race riot aggravated the racial situation,

and since then the reaction of local whites against black advancement bad
only intensified.

The presence of Brookley Field's black soldiers threat-

ened white control over a supposedly inferior minority group, so that Gis
received the brunt of white Mobile's efforts to preserve the prewar racial

3Presnell, "Impact of World War II in Mobile," 1-2, 38; J. L.
LeFlore to Truman K. Gibson, June 15, 1944, in "Brookley Field," CASW
Records, RG 107.

✓

203

Since the May 1943 riot, complaints and individual incidents of

system.

white abuse of black soldiers continued. 4
For Brookley Field's black servicemen the breaking point came on
May 24, 1944.

Late that night a white civilian, Marshal L. Holt, argued

with a small group of black soldiers just outside the north gate to the
jim crow area of the base.

Holt, it seems, had been in the habit of sell-

ing bootleg gin to the men, and on this particular night while plying his

trade, he made obscene remarks to the female companion of a black soldier.
The soldier beat Holt soundly.

The white man immediately found two white

MPs and told them that a group of black soldiers had beaten and robbed
:him.

The MPs then called for reinforcements, and two more MPs arrived

shortly.

They went to the scene of the alleged beating and found a group

of about forty blacks congregated there waiting for a bus to Mobile.

The

provost marshal at Brookley arrived and immediately ordered the blacks
back to their barracks, apparently so Holt's attackers could be found.
Disgruntled, the blacks moved back to the "colored area" very slowly.
Another directive quickly followed--that all black soldiers en route to
town be returned and confined to the black area of camp.

These orders,

issued in response to what seemed like a rather mild offense, made the
blacks angry.

Once again, reaction to a breach of discipline resulted in,

what appeared to blacks, heavy and unwarranted retribution. 5
As MPs escorted Holt around the camp in an attempt to determine
who thrashed and robbed him, the blacks, knowing that he was lying, grew

½,resnell, "Impact of World War II in Mobile,"

37.

5Pittsburgh Courier, June 3, 1944; Chicago Defender, June 3, 1944.
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even more defensive and sullen.
not help matters.

The contemptuous attitude of the MPs did

Seeing that the blacks were in a hostile mood, the MPs

requested reinforcements, and shortly seven or eight more policemen arrived, armed with submachine guns and shotguns.

A crowd of black Gis

gathered just inside the gate, grumbling that "if you want to play we can
play too."

Within a few minutes the crowd of about seventy-five, mainly

from either the 437th Aviation Squadron or the 4906th AAF Ease Unit,
broke into a gun room and absconded with about thirty-five rifles and
twenty-five machine guns.

Spasmodic shooting then broke out and continued

for two hours. 6
The firing began about midnight, and officers, hearing the reports
of the rifles and quick discharges of the machine guns, headed for the
area.

Captain Robert Ferguson, acting as officer of the day, arrived

first and implored the men to cease firing.
salvo of fire.

His admonitions prompted a

Shortly afterward the commander of the 437th, Captain

Richard Greene, arrived and shouted, "fellows, cut out the firing; I am
coming in."

Again, the mutineers ignored the order.

Greene hoped to

prevent the spread of violence, so he borrowed a machine gun from an MP
and crawled to the 437th's gun room.

There he met Sergeant Wellington D.

Abrams, a black man, and with Captain Ferguson they quickly determined
the number of weapons and quantity of ammunition missing.

Greene decided

to remove the remaining ammunition to a more secure location and sent

611 Report of :Board of Officers Appointed to Investigate the Cause,
Circumstances, Facts Leading to, and Persons Involved, in a Disturbance
and Disorder Occurring On or About 25 May 1944 at :Brookley Field, Alabama, May 25, 1944," AG 291.21, RG 407; "Judge Advocate's Review, August
4, 1944," U.S. v. Pvt. Clarence N. Rogers et al., Case 261221, JAG
Records, RG 153.
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Abrams to find a jeep.

Abrams left, but while he searched for a jeep a

group of MPs confronted him, decided he was one of the insurgents, and
shot him five times.

The black sergeant, critically wounded, later re-

ceived help in getting to the hospital.

Greene and Ferguson continued

to load the 4,000 rounds of ammunition and succeeded in moving it to the
orderly room.

Once there, black soldiers riddled the building trying to

hit Greene, but luckily the shots struck neither the officer nor the
ammunition.
At the same time the 4906th 1 s commander, Lieutenant Howard Wisquist,
attempted to calm his unit by talking to the men.

As soon as he drove

through the gate someone fired at least six shots in his direction,
:arcing him to flee from his car a.Tld jU!!!p through a window into the
~rderly room.

While Wisquist 1 s Qifficu.lties continued, the floodlights

~f the 437th and 4906th areas, hastily repaired after insurgents had
damaged them, flashed on to expose the scramble.

Immediately base offi-

cers conducted a roll call and a preliminary search for weapons.

Briga-

dier General James A. Mollison, head of the Mobile Air Service Command,
arrived and addressed the men.

He reportedly also walked unarmed into the

barracks and persuaded others to surrender their guns.

At any rate the

shooting quickly stopped. 7
The next day a board of officers convened at Brookley Field to
su.rvey the situation and make recommend.ationso

It concluded that a more

711 Report of :Soard of Officers at :Brookley Field, May 25, 1944,"

AG 291.21, RG 407; "Judge Advocate 1 s Review, August 4, 1944," U. s. v.
~ogers, JAG Records, RG 153; Pittsburgh Courier, June 3, 1944; Atlanta
Constitution, May 26, 1944; Mobile Register, May 26, 1944; June 27, 1944.
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widespread disturbance was avoided because "many of the soldiers in the
two organizations are of excellent type and character."

It also concluded

that "there was no act or treatment by military authorities which tended

In other words, the board found itself at a loss

to provoke a mutinyo"

to explain why men with such excellent characters would incite to riot
without a:ny pretext whatever.

8

On June 26 a general court-martial arraigned nine black soldiers,
six from the 437th and three from the 4906th, on charges of violating
three articles of war:

the 66th, wli.ich prohibited joining a mutiny, the

67th, which prohibited failure to suppress a mutiny, and the 89th, which
prohibited rioting.
three chargeso

Fach of the nine soldiers pleaded not guilty to all

Without delay the defense counsel, Lieutenant Colonel

Grant Richards, moved to strike the charges pertaining to the 66th and
67th Articles because they represented, in effect, double jeopardy.

The

soldiers could not have both joined a mutiny and also failed to suppress
the same mutiny.

"To permit both charges to remain," the defense pointed

out, "would place each and all of the accused in double jeopardy for the
same offense."

The trial judge advocate overruled the motions, and the

prosecution's presentation got underway. 9
Lieutenant Colonel William McCaw, former Attorney General of Texas,
served as chief prosecutoro

After providing evidence verifying the length

of the mutiny, the number of firearms used, and the amount of ammunition

8"Report of Board of Officers at Brookley Field, May 25, 1944,"
AG 291.21, RG 407.
911 Judge Advocate's Review, August 4, 1944," U. S. v. Rogers, JAG
Records, RG 153; Mobile Register, June 27, 28, 19440
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expended, McCaw called Captains Ferguson and Greene to the stand, and they
testified to their roles in the incident and who they observed taking part.
In addition, Mccaw called a number of black soldiers who implicated each
of the nine defendants as either actively taking part in the riot or
carrying guns.

The defense sought to discredit portions of this testimony

on the grounds that it was filled with contradictions, but the statements
stood as evidence.

The defense also managed to introduce the testimony

of eight of the nine accused men in an effort to refute the previous
testimony.

The ninth, Private Willie Wright, chose to remain silento

Each of the eight reaffirmed his innocence or pointed to the unfairness
of the cases against them; in their opinion all of the mutineers should
be tried or none at all.

Private Willie Ward, for example, asserted that

someone shoved a machine gun into his bands but that he laid it down, ran
to the orderly room, and thereafter had nothing to do with the violence.
Waro then blurted tmt "I ain't never had any trouble with the MPs--I

. 't never b een 1 ock ed up in
. my 1 1· f e. ,,lO
ain
During these proceedings defense counselor Richards must have realized the hopelessness of the situation, so he submitted two motions designed to get the defendants off with lighter terms.

On the first, he

asked the court to render not guilty verdicts for each of the accused on
the charge of violating the 67th Article of War.

Since the prosecution

bad to prove beyond doubt that the accused failed to exercise their utmost
energies to suppress the riot and since there existed no ironclad proof,

10chicago Defender, July 8, 1944; Mobile Register, June 29, 1944;
Presnell, "Impact of World War II in Mobile," 39-41; Testimony of Pvto
Willie Ward, Jr., U. S. v. Rogers, JAG Records, RG 153.
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no one could say positively that they failed to actively aid in suppressing the mutiny.

The second motion asked that all charges be dropped

against Privates Enos :Bailey and F,dward Reese on the basis of lack of
evidence.

The court denied both motions.

With that the case for the defense collapsed.
dicts came in:

66 and 67.

On June 29 the ver-

the court found all nine men guilty of violating Articles

On the charge of violating Article 89, the court convicted

five of the nine, and the other four were acquitted presumably for lack
of evidence.

The sentences for all nine included dishonorable discharge,

forfeiture of pay, and confinement at hard labor for periods ranging
from sixteen to twenty-five years.

A subsequent review by the judge

advocate at Brookley Field set the place of confinement as the federal
penitentiary in Atlanta.

On August 23, in a routine check by the Judge

Advocate General's office in Washington, the legality of the trial proceedings and disposition of the cases received final approval. 11
While the court-martial progressed, the NAACP, particularly the
Mobile b:ranch, fumed.

John L. LeFlore, cbainnan of the chapter, inun-

dated Truman Gibson at the War Department with letters pointing out some
of the :racial difficulties that bad brought on the mutiny and arguing that
the Army blithely ignored these factors in its investigation of the riot.
"According to information made available to us," LeFlore complained,
"Negro soldiers who feel that as Americans they should be treated decently,
are growing tired of the sort of conditions that the War Department ms

1111 Judge Advocate•s Review, August 4, 1944"; Findings of Board of
Review, Judge Advocate General's Office, August 23, 1944, U.S. v. Rogers,
JAG Records, RG 153; Mobile Register, June 29, 30, 1944.
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permitted to exist at Brookley Field."

He pointed out the segregated and

discriminatory nature of the blacks' existence there, including separate
and unequal facilities and maltreatment by MPs.
Flore's complaints but promised nothing.

Gibson took note of Le-

Not easily rebuffed, LeFlore

insisted that corrective action remained urgent, and he even relayed a
request to Gibson on behalf of some of the soldiers asking that General
Benjamin 0. Davis be sent secretly to Brookley to undertake an investigation.

Gibson, however, deflated black Mobile's expectations when he re-

ported that "General Davis is out of the country so he cannot be sent."
After this, LeFlore•s hopes for an investigation and for the possible release of the nine soldiers on trial evaporated.

12

As summer approached,

the War Department, as part of its overall effort to improve race relatiorl.S, expressed concern about an increase in civilian violence.

With

the lessons of the previous summer in mind, Adjutant General of the Anny
J. A. Ulio issued on June

14

one of the department's cure-all memorandums,

directing commanding generals in the domestic service commands to be wary
of a:n:y unusual strain in civilian race relations.

Specifically, it noted

that agitation among "certain negro and white" groups, "the advent of
warmer weather with consequent increase in outdoor activities," and cutbacks in war production that "may result in disproportionate economic disadvantages to the negro," served as potential causes of racial violence.
To help pacify blacks and whites, the War Department could aid civilian
authorities by acting in close liaison with them.

It could transmit

12 LeFlore to Gibson, June 15, 191.w; Gibson to LeFlore, June 19, 19lt4;
LeFlore to Gibson, June 28, 1944; Gibson to LeFlore, July 22, 1944, in ·
"Brookley Field," CASW Records, RG 107.

210

evidence of souring race relations, provide greater publicity for "outstanding negro performances in both the military services and industry,"
use qualified blacks at all levels, and avail itself more frequently of
the services of Truman Gibson.

These recommendations looked good on

paper, yet whether officers regarded them as top priorities remained a
matter of individual disposition at direct command levels.

The memoran-

dum provided another example of the Army's reliance upon a maze of
directives and orders to clear up incredibly complex problems. 13
Violence increased during the sunnner months of 1944 but not in~-:~-,.the civilian sector as the War Department anticipated.

A rash of military-

related incidents in tlie South and L~ other areas followed closely the
Brookley Field riot.

No matter how many proposed changes in racial

policy the department made, disorder would continue unless the Army enforced those proposals and recognized that violence was symptomatic of
widespread dissatisfaction emanating from congestion and tension as well
as from continued discriminatory treatment.

Such violence had become a

permanent part of the military experience and continued until the end of
the war.
On July 15, 1944, members of two black Camp Van Dom units, the
1697th Engineer Combat :Battalion and the 394th Quartermaster Truck Company, fought a pitched battle that resulted in injuries to three soldiers
and disruption of the base.

The incident grew out of long-standing acri-

mony between the units over the use of the camp's jim crow post exchange.

1¾j. Gen. J. A. Ulio to Commanding Generals, First through Ninth
Service Commands, Military District of Washington, and Chiefs of Technical Services, June 14, 1944, in "Reports--Racial Tension," ibid.
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That this incident involved combat between two black units made it unusual
and showed that hostility between units did not necessarily have to involve
racial problems.

In this case, as in some others, military routine, the

nature of camp life, and a series of minor irritants led to intra.racial
rioting.

A court-martial in mid-August convicted nine black soldiers of

violating the 89th Article of War, but by mid-1945 most had been restored
to active duty. 14
As the summer progressed race relations in soutbem military bases
appeared to regress, for in mid-August violence revisited Camp Claibome,
Louisiana.

Congested by six military installations, the area festered

with racial violence throughout the war, both in the various military
camps and in Alexandria.

Rel.a tions bad not improved since the riot of

January 1942 and the Raymond Carr killing the following November.

The

ADDY'S attempts to calm this situation succeeded in quelling potential
race riots but failed to get at the heart of white civilian-black soldier
difficulties.

One soldier captured the attitudes of many blacks Gis

toward the situation, asserting that his regiment was "never able to
please no one.

It is hell living hell here, but when we seek information,

we are then almost in guard house."

This soldier and his cohorts had

~

reason to complain, for during the first half of 1944, three black soldiers reportedly died at the bands of whites.

In addition, Brigadier Gen-

eral Louis F. Guerre, the new camp commander who had previously served as
the superintendent of the Louisiana State Police, exp:cessed :racist views

14court-martial proceedings, August 11, 1944; "Data for Clemency
Consideration," former Pvt. Johnnie :B. Felton, May 27, 1946, U.S. v. ~
Fred R. Hunter et al., Case 265598, JAG Records, RG 153.
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immediately upon his arrival, and reportedly told a group of officers
that he had been charged with clearing up the racial situation.

Condi-

tions within the camp proved harsh for blacks, for some of the white
officers in command of black troops vented their hostility and frustration on their men, producing a state of distrust.

The situation degener-

ated to the point that the camp's commanding officers deemed it necessary
to station a white unit at a certain spot each night, armed with gas
masks and riot guns, ready for outbreaks between black soldiers and
whites.

Officers also conducted frequent shakedowns to discover hidden

weapons among the blacks, placed a heavy guard at the motor pool, and
assigned extra guards to the black area of camp. 15
On August 8 a black soldier allegedly raped the wife of a white

./

soldier at Claiborne, and six days later a black GI reportedly attacked
an elderly white woman in the vicinity.

Thoroughly aroused, local whites

formed a posse and combed the woods surrounding camp three separate times
between August 8 and August 16, intimidating every black soldier they encountered.

This bullying caused even further deterioration of race rela-

tions, and black troops began to feel as though redress could only come
if they, like the whites, took matters into their own hands.
On

the afternoon of August 16 a rumor spread through the black area

of camp that members of the white posse had attacked and shot four black
soldiers.

Members of the black units milled around and grew increasingly

l5"Privates of J64th" to Pittsburgh Courier, March 6, 1943, in
"Camp Claiborne"; Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, to War Department, .P.ugust 24, 1944, in "Racial Situation--Camp Claiborne, Internal
Sec. Div., 1942-45," CASW Records, RG 107; Pittsburgh Courier, October 7,
1944; Memorandum, Tabitha Petran to Walter White, undated, in "Claiborne,"
GOF, N.A.ACP Papers.
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boisterous.

Sergeant Conway F. Price of the 1327th Engineer General Ser-

. vice Regiment noticed around dusk that men of his unit had somehow procured weapons, but since they appeared calm and orderly, he did not consider the matter serious.
Around 10:00 p.m. the situation got out of hand.

16

The commanding

officer of the 1327th happened upon about two hundred black Gis who had
procured several trucks and decided to drive to the area where they
heard that the four soldiers bad been shot.

The commander told them that

the rumor was untrue and that whites had shot no one.
to believe him.

The troops refused

Recognizing the damage that might result if they left

without supervision, the officer climbed into one of the vehicles and led
them to the scene where they satisfied themselves that no shooting incident had occurred.

The convoy then returned to camp about 11:30 p.m.,

and the men returned the trucks to the motor pool.

Two hours later, how-

ever, men of the 1328th Engineer Regiment commandeered ten vehicles and,
fully armed, clambered aboard in prepa:ration for action.

No disturbance

occurred, and the soldiers soon released the trucks.
Because of the display of arms, regimental commanders began a
check of the various storage rooms.
Truck Company had been ransacked.

The orderly room of the 1355th Dump
While the officers stood there, a mob

of forty to fifty blacks began firing into the building; the officers
escaped injury, but a white enlisted man accompanying them was hit.
The mob ordered one of the officers, Captain James Harper, out of the

16commanding General, Eighth Service Command, to War Department,
.August 25, 1944, in "Racial Situation--Camp Claiborne, Internal Sec. Div.,
1942-45," CASW Records, RG 107.
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building where Private Leroy McGary jabbed him in the stomach with bis
bayoneted rifle and threatened him.
only to be clubbed.

A lieutenant left the orderly room

The group then marched to the hospital where the in-

surgents deposited the lieutenant.

At that point a jeep containing two

white MPs and an officer arrived, but the mob quickly disa:r:med them,
lined them up, and beat them thoroughly.

Two or three other whites who

happened by received similar treatment.

The mob then drifted over to a

dispensary, and amid sporadic shooting and shouting, one of them harangued
the others about all the injustices they suffered while at camp.
officer then demanded that the troops disperse.

A white

Instead, the mob threat-

ened to kill him and beat him so badly that he suffered a concussion. 17
Following this incident, the violence stopped; luckily no one had
been killed.

The black soldiers who participated achieved revenge against

what they perceived as a long and dreary chain of insults by white civilians
and the seeming insensitivity of military authoritieso

Mindful of the

probable consequences, they sought redress in the only way they considered
effective.
The commanding officers at the camp as well as the headquarters of
the Eighth Service Command in Dallas acted quickly.

Coming on the heels

of other mutinous conduct, the Claibome riot served as yet another instance of unruly blacks deliberately violating military discipline.

With-

out delay officials arrested thirty-seven men and confined all but ten
of them at Camp Livingston.

Eventually the War Department brought

17 rbid.; Memorandum, Lt. Morris Weller, September 25, 1944;
Findings of Eoard of Review, Judge Advocate General's Office, November
24, 1944, U.S. v. Pvt. Leroy R. McGary and Pvt. William Smith, Jr.,
Case 265399, JAG Records, RG 153; Alexandria Town Talk, August 17, 18,

191.ih.
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fourteen of them before courts-martial.

In addition, the black soldier

who allegedly attacked two white women in early and mid-August was
arrested and confessed.

18

The trials convened in mid-September at Camp Claiborne.

On

September 16, Private Leroy McGary, ~ho bad acted as one of the ringleaders in the disturbance, stood trial.

Previous convictions led the

Army to regard him as a "bad influence on his associates."

McGary asserted

his innocence, protesting that "I didn't participate in none of that
trouble," but the Army obviously did not believ-e him.

The evidence against

McGary proved incontrovertible, so after the court found him guilty it
sentenced him to death.
Price convened.

A few days later the trial of Sergeant Conway F.

Price took no part in the violence, but the prosecution

charged that he had been negligent in trying to suppress the mutiny.

Price,

whose four-year service record was spotless, told the court that he tried
to find superior officers to issue him instructions, but when this proved
unsuccessful, he returned to his barracks.

The court convicted him and

sentenced him to dishonorable discharge and nine years' imprisonment.
The NAACP filed arguments for both McGary and Price before a Judge Advocate
Genera.l's Board of Review and succeeded in getting McGary's death sentence
reduced to forty years.

Price merited full restoration to duty in

1945.

Thus, the Amy showed through stiff penalties that it would not tolerate
mutiny, but quietly reduced the punishment after making its point. 19

18

Gibson to White, September JO,

1944,

in "Claiborne," GOF, N.AACP

Papers.

191t. Col. Don T. Udall to Commanding General, Camp Claiborne,
September 7, 1944; Testimony of Pvt. Leroy McGary, September 16, 1944;
Findings of Board of Review, Judge Advocate General's Office, November

24,

216
Besides McGary and Price, the court convicted eleven other soldiers and acquitted one.

It dishonorably discharged the eleven and dealt

out sentences ranging from twenty-five years to life imprisonment.

McGary

remained the only defendant who received the death sentence, and Price's
nine-year sentence proved the lightest of the thirteen convicted. 20
The Camp Claiborne episode was the last of the serious military
racial outbreaks of the war.
to plague the South.

Incidents of this nature, however, continued

In September a clash occurred at Camp Livingston,

Louisiana, followed in October by a riot at Camp Patrick Henry, near
Hampton Roads, Virginia.

In

1945 there were a number of racial incidents,

but they increasingly took place between returning black veterans and
white civilians rather than in military camps as had been the case since
mid-1943.

21

In the spring of 1945 the Army again issued dire forecasts of impending racial violence for the summer months.

This time, fortunately,

tensions subsided, and conflict involving the military, or for that
matter civilians, did not emerge as a major problem.

Yet the national

1944; Memorandum by Maj. Gen. Richard Donovan, April 16, 1945, U.S. v.
McGary: and Smith; Testimony of Sgt. Conway F. Price, September 25, 1944;
Memorandum, Lt. David W. Johnston, October 10, 1944; "Memorandum on Behalf of Sergeant Conway F. Price," undated, by Thurgood Marshall and
Edward F. Dudley; Findings of Board of Review, Judge Advocate Genera.l's
Office, February 17, 1945, U.S. v. Sgt. Conway F. Price, Case 266171,
JAG records, RG 153; Dudley to Lt. Col. Fletcher R. Andrews, October 13,
1944; Marshall to Henry L. Stimson, November 3, 1944; Maj. Gen. Ed.ward
F. Witsell to Dudley, October 29, 1945, in "Claiborne," GOF, NAACP
Papers; Murray, Negro Handbook, 1946-1947, PP• 352-53; Pittsburgh
Courier, October 21, 1944.
20Pittsburgh Courier, October 14, 1944.
21 Ibid., April 21, 1945; May 12, 1945; June 30, 1945; July 14,
1945; Murray, Negro Handbook, 1946-1947, p. 349.
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mood proved one of suspenseful waiting. 22
The riots at Brookley Field, Camp Claiborne, and elsewhere ended
the violence that had plagued southern military bases.

,//'

✓,

From the beginning

of the conflict to mid-1943, clashes between black soldiers and southern
whites epitomized the collision of two conflicting views about what the
war meant.

To blacks, it meant taking advantage of the abnormality of

the period to seek political and economic gains and as soldiers to realize
the dignity and respect due them.

For southern whites, the war represented

internal as well as external threats to the solidarity and consistency
of southern life.

Black soldiers threatened the status quo, and in striv-

ing to achieve victory many of the region's whites also tried to maintain

the impregnability of the color line.
of power, they prevailed.

As the majority and as the holders

This conflict helped lead to a change in the

nature of military-related racial violence.

From mid-1943 through 1944

many black troops became more aggressive and thus more prone to mutinous

action.

Blacks saw violence and everyday degradation grow so intolerable

......::.__-

that many of them sought redress in the most radical and direct way possible.

Their actions represented the desperation of a group shocked and

embittered by the treatment accorded them.

Their violent acts, however,

only served to bring more intense hostility from whites, a development
that appeared outrageous to black Gis since whites seemed to them responsible for causing the violence through continual race-baiting and d.iscrimina tion.

Neither the War DeP3,rtment nor most white Americans under-

stood the nature of this vicious cycle.

2~emorandum, Col. E.W. Gruhn to the Adjutant General, April 16,
1945, AG 291.2, RG 407.
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In the wake of the military violence of 1944 and early 1945 the
South and the nation at large began giving increased attention to the end
of the war and some of the domestic problems peace would bring.

Even

though full military production continued furiously as the Allies swept
into Gennany and hopped across the islands of the South and Central Pacific
toward Japan, by D-Da.y in mid-1944 the outcome of the war appeared settled
and its end a matter of time.

The "arsenal of democracy" maintained its

full flow of war goods up to Germany's surrender in May 1945, but, as the
eventual outcome grew more obvious, many people focused on postwar America
and the complex problems of demobilization and reconversion.

While the

conflict lasted over a year longer, domestic America by mid-1944 coula
rest easier knowing that the end was in sight.

People looked forward to

a prosperous, peacetime America, and events during the last two yea~s of
the war focused increasingly on that transition and the problems it contained.
One of the problems that always threatened to become a major d.iffi- / /
V •i
cu.lty in periods of change was race relations. As early as mid-1944
warnings of widespread violence during reconversion emerged from a number
of sources.

An August 1944 University of Denver national opinion poll

revealed that 63 percent of the white people contacted believed that race
relations would prove worse in postwar America while only 37 percent

thought they woitld improve. 23 At about the same time sociologist Charles;
S. Johnson, one of the nation's most informed men on race relations,
wrote a series of articles about the existing and future status of
southern racial discord.

There were precedents for widespread violence

2311 Ra.cial Explosive," Newsweek, August 21, 1944, p. 39.
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after the war if positive programs did not emerge in the era of transition.

"There is fairly widespread agreement that race relations in the

South have deteriorated in character since the beginning of the war," he
observed.

During a ten month period in 1943, he counted 111 racial in-

cidents in the South
the national press."

11

of sufficient importance to be given attention in
While the number decreased during 1944, this vio-

Vt/I

lence reflected social, economic, and political changes which could prove
worthwhile in the long run even if they fostered hostility in the short
rt.m.

Johnson tried to find a silver lining in the racial situation but

admitted that "the whole question of race relations, not only in the
South but in the country as a whole, is being held in a kind of suspension awaiting the end of the war and the unpredictable developments
which will follow."

Careful planning and constructive action could

avert an interracial bloodbath. 24

In the same vein George So Schuyler of the Pittsburgh Courier
warned that "the problem of race relations in the United States is rapidly
approaching the boiling point."

If fundamental changes did not occur,

such as creation of a permanent FEPC, abolition of residential segregation, and desegregation of the anned forces, racial violence would surely
surface at the end of the war.

Open racial conflict in postwar America,

Schuyler cautioned, would doubtless occur if "white demagogues and
timorous or complacent public officials" combined to support a retum
to the prewar system of rigid adherence to the color line.

If white

mobs, "resenting these few Negro gains, decide to take the law into

24Johnson, "Present Status of Race Relations," 27; ide~, "Social
Changes and Their Effects on Race Relations in the South," ibid. (Y.iarch

1945), 344, 348.
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their own hands," the postwar conflict would make that of the war years
"look tame."

Another writer, fearing postwar repression and unemploy-

ment, warned that unless forces of reconciliation between blacks and
whites quickly appeared, "strikes, riots and bloodshed may be expected
to recur. 1125 .
Some periodicals, like A Monthly
Summary
of Events and Trends in
-

\i

l \_

Race Relations, devoted entire issues to the projected postwar racial
situation.

I ~--fu

j;

One article asserted that the immediate postwar months would

prove whether :race relations organizations could cope with the changes
in black-white status that war had wrought.

The article suggested that

expanded activity on the local level might foster better relations.

If

these plans did not materialize, it wamed, "the country may well be blown\\

apart."

Another article in the same issue pointed out tbs. t of the 700,000 \ \ --

black veterans planning to re-enter the domestic economy at a time when
it stood likely to slump, 400,000 planned to return to the South.

This,

of course, would create economic as well as racial difficulties, especially if the veterans brought with them notions of equal opportu.ni ty.

26

(\ }\\ !
\

In the midst of this discussion the nation began confronting the

staggering problems of demobilization and reconversion.

Du.ring the war,

Congress appropriated $433 billion for the nation's victory effort, and
the government quickly became the major buyer in the private production

2

5George s. Schuyler, uThe Negro Problem Reaches a Crisis: More
Race Riots are Coming," American Mercury, 59 (December 1944), 686, 68991; John H. Burma., "Tomorrow's Race Riots," Christian Century, March 21,
1945, pp. 364-65.
26A. A. Li veright, "Reconversion--A Challenge to Race Rel.a tions .·
Committees," Monthl Summa
of Events and Trends in Race Relations, \J
3 (August-September 1945, 18-23; William A. Caudill, "Negro Veterans
--='.o.J_urn " 1·b; d
- · - l,

'
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sector.

With the end of the conflict, though, the government bad to turn

the economy back to an essentially private venture.

Few people in

1945

realized that the rapid deterioration of Soviet-American relations would
stem the overall plan for complete demobilization, but even with the Cold
War, reconversion to a peacetime footing remained an absolute necessity.
From the somewhat abrupt conclusion of the war in September

1945

to th;--;

end of the year federal munitions contracts plummeted from $40 to $13
billion.

In the same period the government released about

servicemen and expected them to re-enter the economy.

5.4

J.

i

million

By the begirJiing

of 1946 over three million people could not find jobs, a problem that
seemed almost calamitous since it followed a period when the unemployment :rate had dropped to the lowest level in years.

Jobs became more

scarce even though many peacetime industries, such as housing and automo-:
biles, absorbed much of the veteran glut, and many housewives quit their
wartime jobs and returned to normal activities.

The Office of War

Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR) summarized the drastic effects of
inflation, unemployment, and related problems by cautioning that "we
cannot afford an economic Pearl Harbor. 1127
The postwar economic situation :rapidly became muddled, and this
had a decided effect on the way people lived.

In the South, economists

exhibited their concern over the situation by meeting at Atlanta in midApril

1945

under the auspices of the Southern Regional Council.

Leading

27 office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, Battle for Produc~ion: Fifth Re ort to the President the Senate and the House of
Representatives, Ja_"YJ.uary 1, 19h6 Washington, 1946 , 4-8, 22. Copy in\,. }j
Papers of the Southern Regional Council, Box 22, Atlanta, Georgia (here- \ \_~-:!
after cited as SRC Papers).
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authorities noted that the region's economy still lagged behind the rest
of the nation.

One-third of the country's workers whose income fell be-

low the national average lived in the South.

The region's taxpayers paid

a lower per capita income tax than the rest of the nation.

The South

contained 42 percent of the nation's housing regarded as "needing major
repairs."

Despite the economic boom the South experienced during the war,

the overall statistics remained disheartening.
taining

15

percent of the nation's land area,

Ten southern states con-

14

percent of its minerals,

10 percent of its industries, and 39 percent of its faDn population still
received only 11 percent of the national income and 20 percent of the
national farm income.
any other area.

By

These states gained less from war contracts than

1943,

for example, the South's manufactures had in-

creased over 1939 by a smaller amount than any other region, 69 percent.
Other sections, by comparison, witnessed jumps of anywhere from 227 percent to 639 percent.

The conferees could only conclude that· while the

South had benefited from the war, the gains appeared extremely modest.
The potential for an economic ups~ing existed, but progress, as always,
would remain slow.
benefit least from

The South's substantial black population stood to
a:ny

such development.

28

Economic recession contributed heavily to southern white alarm
over the position of blacks in the immediate postwar period.

Having

been forced to accept modest advancements for blacks during the international crisis, whites exhibited fears that such political and economic

28Program for "A Conference on the South's Post War Economy,"
April 11-12, 1945, SRC Papers, Box 54.
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gains might lead to pennanent and far-reaching alterations in southern ,.
race relations, even seriously endangering the color line.

During the

confusion that enveloped the end of the war and preliminary reconversion
efforts, southern whites began turning increased attention to this problem, determined to return to the prewar racial status quo.
Congressional debates over the FEPC indicated the lengths to which ✓
much of the southern white majority would go to ensure regional control
of the postwar racial situation.
serious difficulty, and in the

As early as

1945

1944

the FEPC ran into

debates over the next fiscal year's

appropriation southern white concerns over the status of blacks in the
postwar South emerged.

During June

1945

the FEPC appropriation dis-

appeared from the House bill, and in the Senate Dennis Chavez of New
Mexico tried to restore it.

In the end the Senate provided $250,000

for the committee, as compared with a presidential request of $599,000.
The FEPC thus remained alive only in skeleton form for one more year. 29
In the midst of the Senate debate over the FEPC appropriation some
southerners used the occasion to complain not only about the committee
but the dangers of black advancement.

James O. Eastland of Mississippi,

for example, charged that the FEPC "is a part of the Communist program
for racial amalgamation in the United States."

While on the subject of

race relations Eastland enlarged the scope of his discussion, which
amounted to a filibuster.

Tuming to perhaps the most sensitive point

of all, black servicemen, he stated that "the Negro soldier was an utter
and dismal failure in combat in Europe.

When I make that statement, it

29Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 120-29.
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is not from prejudice.
in the galleries)."

I am not prejudiced against the Negro (laughter

Then, echoing a widely-held fear among many southe:rn

whites that represented a major cause of future racial violence, he complained that nby the pending measure we are actually asked to discriminate against the white war veteran, and give the Negro preference over

him."30
Even though the FEPC 1 s death seemed more lamentable to blacks tha.~

it really was given its limited powers, the debates themselves proved
more harmful to race relations since they inflamed sensibilities and
portended continued strained relations.

White reactions to the fili-

bustering by southern senators reflected similar fears of permanent black
advancement in postwar months, while black reaction proved unifoJ:"!"'i 7 y
negative since such statements threatened to erase wartime gains, however
modest they may have been.

One black soldier, in reference to Theodore G.

Bilbo's part in the FEPC debates, clumsily but forcefully.requested that
the senator "recall to his Stupid memories that Gettsburg Address by
lincoln and he Should also try to learn that the Negro is no longer the
ignorant whom his ancestors had to pick their cotton."

Thus the lines of

conflict had been drawn between two racial groups whose ideas toward the
color line stood at opposite poles. 31
\ I

In the wake of the Congressional furor over the FEPC a series of
racial incidents occurred.

They served as warning signs of what upcoming

3°u. S., Congress, Senate, Con.g-ressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st
sess., 91, pt. 5, pp. 6992, 6994-95; New York Times, June JO, 1945, p. 9.
3111 southern Senators Play with Fire," Christian Century, July 11,

1945, p. 805; Pvt. Solomon L. Rhoden to NAACP, July(?], 1945, in
"Soldier Letters re:

:Bilbo a...11d Eastland," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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months held for black southerners, especially veterans.

Economic reces-

sion, continued poor race relations, and a conflict of ideas over the

-\

black position in the postwar South led to a resurgence of violence that

----·-

began in late 1945 and lasted through 1946.
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The upsurge of disorder acted

as a final, bitter blow to southem blacks as the color line emerged triumphant.

The return to the region of about 400,000 black veterans served
I

._J

as the focus of controversy, for to whites they represented the core of
potential trouble, while to blacks they would hopefully act as a vanguard
for permanent gains.

The violence this conflict produced saw southern

blacks returned to "virtually the same position they had been in before
the war.

They were still politically impotent and • • • were totally

segregated by law and custom from the white population. 1132
On August 25, 1945, Eugene Bells fell prey to a small band of whites
near Liberty, Mississippi.

Bells was a sharecropper and veteran who, upon

his return from the service, flaunted his freedom by going to work for
his father-in-law rather than his fonner employer, a white man.

In re-

taliation the white fanner and several companions abducted Bells on the
night of August 25, drove to a swamp, and killed him.

The incident did

not become public knowledge until a year later when one of Bells' friends
mustered the nerve to tell the story.

The NAACP tried to initiate legal

action but failed.3 3
Two months later, on October 11, a white mob lynched Jesse J:. __
Payne near Madison, Florida.

Again, the tragedy involved a black

32charles P. Roland, The Improbable Era: The South Since World
War II (Lexington, 1975), 30-Jl.

33Pittsburgh Courier, June 29, 1946~
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sharecropper who defied his white employer and thus racial etiquette.
The white man, D. L. Goodwin, apparently responded by spreading a story
involving Payne's rape of a five-year-old white girl.

Payne was quickly

indicted for the crime and placed in the county jail, but du.ring the
early morning darkness of October 11 the jailer allowed a mob to kidnap
the prisoner.

The whites drove him to an isolated location and riddled

his body with bullets.

Since the jailer had acted as an accessory to the

lynching, the Justice Department investigated for evidence of a violation
of federal civil liberties.

A conspiracy of silence faced agents, how-

ever, forcing the department to drop the matter.3 4
In

1946 southem race relations remained raw, aggravated by the l/.

/'

return of both black and white veterans, the continued confusion of demobilization and reconversion, and the friction generated by conflicting
ideas along racial lines regarding black status in politics and the
economy.

The beating and blinding of Isaac Woodard in Batesburg, South

Carolina, further reflected the nature of things to come.

Woodard, a

veteran of four years who saw action in the South Pacific, received his
honorable discharge on the moming of February

13, 1946. The same day,

while on his way to New York, the bus on which he rode stopped in ::Batesburg.

Woodard had evidently irritated the driver, who called the police.

Lynwood Shull, the town's police chief, arrived and beat the new veteran

34:rbid., October 20, 1945; November 3, 1945; "Crime and Punishment,"
Monthl S ~ of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 3 (October 1945),
75; ibid. November 1945, 107; J. Tom Watson to Millard F. Caldwell,
October 23, 1945; Theron L. Caudle to J. Edgar Hoover, October 16, 1945;
Turner L. Smith to the files, November 6, 1945, Justice Department Records;
Caudle to Marshall, November 5, 1945; Affidavits of Lucy Payne, Lillie
Mae Payne, and Lucy :Mae Anderson, October 29, 1945, in "Lynching Geneml
(1945), 11 GOF, NAACP Papers.
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so severely that he permanently blinded him and then refused to p~v±de_.,...-him medical treatment for a day following the injury.

Enraged, the NAACP

v

picked up the Woodard case and, though no legal redress came of its action,
the association made a cause celebre of it.

Attempting to show the in- 7

justices being done to black veter-c=.ns in the South, the NAACP worked up
considerable publicity through Woodard's misfortune. 35
The incidents of late 1945 and early 1946 served as both cause and
effect in the general worsening of southem race relations.

Their occur-

rence and the publicity generated by them fostered hostility on both sides
of the color line.

Whites suspected further breaches of racial tradition

while blacks viewed them as additional signs of hypocrisy since the nation
had helped defeat fascism abroad but practiced it toward minoritiesc

These

L~cidents came from conditions in the postwar South that made such delicate issues as black advancement even more sensitive and caused its actual
importance to be blown out of proportion.
From 1944 through 1945 the United States managed to end the bloodi-

.J /

est of all wars but then faced the monumental problems of reconversion.
Serious military clashes came to an end during this period, partly through
overdue War Department policy changes, but more directly because the war

7~

ended.

-JI

At the same time, however, civilian violence began to escalate.

Latent suspicions among blacks and whites toward each other surfaced in
the postwar South and, accompanying the instability that characterized

35"Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (September
ibid. (November_l~46), 341; Affidavit of Isaac Woodard, April
T. Gillis Nutter to Marsbali, November 14, 1947, in "Woodard,
Atlantic Greyhound Bus Company," LF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh
October 5, 1946; November 16, 1946.

1946), 276;
23, 1946;
Isaac v.
Courier,
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periods of change, caused a resurgence of racial violence.

Blacks, who

at first perceived the postwar months as a period of opportlmi ty,

/{\',
1f7'
;

quickly became disillusioned as the violence subverted their hopes. •,
They continued to suffer as

1946 progressed.

•-•-

.. /./

CHAPrER VIII
"TERROR IN TENNESSEE"
On February

25, 1946, a fist fight between two World War II veter-

ans rapidly developed into an incident that became the most significant
racial outbreak of the immediate postwar era.

The Columbia, Tennessee,

race riot reflected the confusion and tension of a period when the nation
stood at midstream in its efforts to reconvert from war to peace.

It also

confirmed fears that black southerners, especially veterans, woul~ attempt
to maintain the modest gains achieved during the war, thus precipitating _
a reaction by elements of the white South.

If the lynchings of late

1945

indicated a general worsening of regional race relations, the Columbia
riot confirmed the trend.

That the riot occurred in an obscure Middle

Tennessee town rather than in a bulging metropolis made the incident in
a sense even more significant.

As Walter White later observed, "the

violent outburst had developed out of circumstances which were so simple
and ordinary that the extent of the damage done was a remarkable barometer of the fear and prejudice which haunted the community."

Such racial

tension, it might be added, plagued the entire Southo 1
Even

though the riot proved small compared with the Beaumont or

Detroit incidents, and although the main violence came only when lawmen
entered the black section of the town, the episode's reverbe:rations lasted
through mid-1947 and involved a number of legal and organizational experiences that ma.de it as significant as those of 1943.

¾nri.te, A Vian Called White, 3100
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What the NAACP called
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"terror in Tennessee" represented in microcosm the continuing struggle
in the South over the color line.

Columbia served as the seat of Maury Connty and lay about forty
miles south of Nashville.

Of the county's 40,000 residents about 12,000

were black, and the city counted 3,000 in its total population of about
8,000.
war.

The county had lost almost 9 percent of its population during the
Dairy farming and other agricultural pursuits dominated the area's

economy, and Columbia was noted as a mule-trading center.

During the war

the Monsanto and Victor Chemical Companies had built plants in nearby
Mt. Pleasant, so for many county residents these factories replaced the
tractor and plow.

l

The plants I workers had organized with an affiliate

J

of the CIO, and the black employees in both businesses had worked for the
abolition of the jim crow pay differential.

:¼t

2

Within Columbia and Maury County race relations exhibited a mix- ·i,r
. tu.re of progressivism and reaction.

On the one band many black residents

v~~-~->

~-· ---i

prospered, either as farmers or through wartime employment.

:Blacks were

also active in county politics, so economically and politically racial

harmony seemed to prevail.

.J _.\ .:

Yet on the other hand two lynchings bad occurred

in the county within the past twenty years, and the black community was in
most ways rigidly segregated.

In fact, blacks inhabited five distinct en~

claves in the city, and the business district carried the unwelcome name
of "Mink Slideo 11

,,,...-

It lay just east of the courthouse square on Eighth

2ivremorandum on Columbia, Tennessee, undated, FBI Records; Dorothy
Sue :Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia, Tennessee, February 25-26, 1946"
(M.A. Thesis, Middle Tennessee State University, 1972), 7; Guzman,
Negro Year :Book, 249; U. S., Bureau of the Census, "Civilian Population
by Counties: November 1, 1943," pp. 3-5.
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Street, between Ma.in a...11d woodland Streets, and consisted of "cafes, drug
stores, barber shops, pool rooms, a lodge ball, funeral establishment,
ice plant, shoe store, pressing establishment, and a church."

The black

residential areas carried such titles as "Macedonia" and "Happy Hollow"
(see Figure 3). 3
In 1946 the tranquility that appeared to characterize Columbia in
fact masked deep-seated racial hostility.

The source of this acrimony lay

in a lack of interracial communication that produced "latent mutual sus-

piciona"

As so often characterized southern race relations, the actions

of one race was seen in a different, and usually negative, connotation by
the other.

Columbia possessed no interracial committee at any level, so

the black and white communities relied on assumptions, rumors, and the
conservative Columbia Daily Eerald in forming their conceptions of each
other.

Most whites clung to the color line in striving to maintain segre-

gated public facilities and in stereotyping blacks as immoral, irresponsible, and inferior beings.

Blacks, on the other hand, read the Chicago

Defender, and their conception of the duplicity of America's war aims grew
increasingly bitter.

One leader in the community, seventy-six-year-old

Julius Blair, boycotted the town's picture show because he could not use
the "white" entrance and urged others to follow suit.

To blacks, Blair's

actions served as a measure of maintaining pride and integrity.
Blair seemed an old, cranky troublemaker.

To whites,

Such mutual distrust heightened

as black and white veterans returned to the town, since both groups brought
with them ideas and attitudes that boded ill for harmonious relations. 4

/
J

~emora.ndum on Columbia, FBI Records; Guzman, Negro Year Book, 248-49.
4"The Social Front: Violence," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends
in Race Relations, 3 (March 1946), 235-36; Ernest F. Smith, "Report on
Investigation Made on February 27-28, 1946, at Columbia, Tennessee, by
Ernest F. Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, with Reference
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Significantly, conflict between two veterans brought Columbia's {~~..-:-./
race relations to the boiling point.

On Monday, February 25, two black

Columbians, Mrs. Gladys Stephenson and her son James, visited the radio
repair shop at the Castner-Knott department store which faced the courthouse square in the central business district.

Mrs. Stephenson had left

the radio there several months before and returned to retrieve it and pay
the repair bill.

A white employee, Will Fleming, informed her that the

radio had been mistakenly sold to someone else.

Irked, the black woman

told others in the store not to deal with Castner-Knott.

Fleming promptly

asked her to leave and then either cursed or struck her.

Defending his

mother, James Stephenson hit Fleming and then the men, both veterans,
moved outside where they pummeled each other.

\ """~__-

Stephenson pushed Fleming

through a plate glass window, causing a severe gash, and this attracted
considerable attention.

At that point two policemen arrived, broke up the

fight, and charged the blacks with disturbing the peace.

Friends took

Fleming to the county hospital where he remained overnight.5
John Fleming, the injured man's father, considered the charge
against the Stephensons entirely too lenient.

Because the Flemings were

a powerful Columbia family, he succeeded in having the blacks charged
with attempted murder.

Meanwhile citizens in the black community learned

of the incident and four black leaders, headed by Julius Blair, raised the
necessary $3500 bond and secured the Stephensons' release.

Rumors flew

to the Disturbance on the Night of February 25th," Jim Nance McCord
Papers, Box 18, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville.
5Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 14-16; Theron L. Caudle to J.
Edgar Hoover, March 4, 1946, FBI Records.
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around the black community that whites would try to lynch them, so friends
took James Stephenson to Nashville and then sent him to a relative's home
in Chicago.

Other blacks, headed by recently retumed veterans, anned

··-[ ..,.f ..

\ -;--..,.,.::;,,

____ . .J

themselves in preparation for the purported lynching attempt. 6
At the same time local whites grew excited as rumors floated across
town that the black coIDililL.-rrity was preparing for a race riot.

About fifty

whites, most of them armed, gathered at the county jail and demanded tmt
Sheriff J. J. Underwood release Stephenson to their custody.

Underwood

responded by arresting two of them, both drunk, and the mob broke upo
Other whites armed themselves while speculation continued over developments in Mink Slide and other black enclaves.

During this period the

police force, which consisted of a chief, J. Walker Griffin, and six
patrolmen, cruised through the town trying to calm tempers and disarm
citizens.

On at least one occasion Chief Griffin drove to Mink Slide and

assured the blacks that nothing would happen to them, a reassurance that
they did not wholeheartedly accept. 7
By nightfall sporadic g,mfire started.
lights in the Mink Slide area.

Snipers shot out the street

Within the black district businessmen and

their friends waited and wondered.

Around 9:00 p.m. Chief Griffin and

three policemen drove to the edge of Mink Slide and began walking down a
street.

Someone ordered them to halt but they continued fon:ard.

In the

darkness several blacks,feeling threatened, fired at the four officers
with shotguns, peppering all of them and seriously injuring one.

Griffin,

6:aeeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 14-19.
7Ibid.; Memorandum, H. H. Clegg to Hoover, April 30, 1946; Caudle
to Hoover, March 4, 1946, FBI Records.
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shocked at this unprovoked attack, limped back to his office, and city
officials hurriedly telephoned Governor Jim Nance McCord.

The governor

immediately dispatched seventy-five state troopers and five h1llldred state
guardsmen from five neighboring cities.

The first of these reinforce-

~ents arrived at 10:00 p.m.
In the meantime both blacks and whites jumped to conclusions.
~

To

blacks it seemed that the whites, including the police, were prepar-

ing to storm Mink Slide in search of James Stephenson and that unless they

offered resistance a full scale riot might level the area.

To whites, the

armed resistance that resulted in injuries to four city police officers
confirmed their worst fears.

The situation had become critical, as black

veterans seemed to advocate open rebellion.

The initiative rested with

the city administration, and its desperate call for help attested to the
confused and dangerous state of affairs.

While blacks considered a riot

imminent, whites thought the riot ha.d already begun.

8

During the night Tennessee's commissioner of public safety, Lynn

3omar, and General Jacob M. Dickinson, head of the state guard, arrived
in Columbia and conferred with Chief Griffin, Sheriff Underwood, and Mayor

Eldridge Denham.

They decided to wait 1llltil dawn to take action.

In the

interim lawmen formed a cordon around Mink Slide; sporadic shooting continued.

Two white civilians received slight injuries, and officers

arrested five armed blacks attempting to escape the area.

The blacks in

Mink Slide could only imagine what would occur at daybreak, for they knew

that troops bad arrived and that something unpleasant loomed ahead.

8Clegg to Hoover, April 30, 1946, FBI Records; :Beeler, "Race Riot
.:.Yl Columbia," 19-21.
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Shortly before 6:00 a.m. on February 26 officers moved into the
area with orders to confiscate weapons and detain resistors.

Apparently

no one considered issuing search warrants, but such a formality would
probably have made little difference in the nature of the operation.

Some

of the law officers proceeded in orderly fashion through the area, but
others seemed to regard their responsibilities as a way of teaching blacks
a lesson.

They kicked down doors, r-c::.nsacked businesses, and fired indis-

criminately into buildingso

Blacks who had barricaded themselves retumed

The defenders injured t~-ee state troopers while the officers

the fire.

shot several blacks.

During the operation the lawmen wrecked portions of

}link Slide in their search for suspected caches of firearms and unruly

blacks.

James Morton's funeral horae, Sol Blair's barber shop, and Julius

Blair's drug store suffered the worst damage.
were leaders in the black community.

All three of these men

At Morton's establishment over-

zealous lawmen thoroughly destroyed the furnishings and ruined five
caskets worth

$1,725. On one of the caskets the letters "KKK" had been

cru.dely lettered with plaster of pa.tis powder.

The barber shop was

thoroughly perforated with bullet holes, and the drug store suffered
similar damage.

Property damages eventually totaled between $30,000 and

$50,000. 9
As the invasion continued officers took about thirty blacks into
custody.

Lawmen found several blacks in a back room of :Blair's barber

shop and arrested them on charges of attempted murder.

Some received

9Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 24-26; Clegg to Hoover, April JO,
1946; "Inspection of Property ~'""e--Mink Slide Area," undated, F.BI
Records; Smith, "Report on Investigation," McCord Papers; Pittsburgh
Courier, April 20, 1946.
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injuries as officers apprehended them and marched them to the county jail.
Authorities found about twenty gun.so

As this early morning operation con-

cluded, Lym1 Bomar drove through the stricken area in a sound truck, imploring the blacks to go home and stop causing trouble, assuring them
that no further violence would occur.

At one point Bomar revealed his

condescending attitude by saying, "let me see you smile.

Come on, smileo 11

Not surprisingly, those within earshot failed to see the humor in the
situation and did not appreciate his assumption that smiling faces would
. . 10
en d the cr1s1s0
Shortly after the initial operation Bomar, Dickinson, Underwood,
and U.S. District Attorney Paul Fo :Bumpus conferred and agreed that another search of the area was needed.

After getting permission from the

governor and attorney general, the sheriff deputized 120 troopers and
guardsmen and sent them back to Mink Slide.

By this time the blacks bad

submitted to the overwhelming force and sullenly watched as the officers
indiscriminately searched buildings in both Mink Slide a..~d adjacent white
areas.

They ultimately collected about 250 firearms, an arsenal that

officials took considerable pride in displaying.

Though the weapons came

from both black and white homes and businesses, to support the popular
theory that a conspiracy existed among the black citizens,the lawmen insisted that all were found in Mink Slide.

The clean-up operation con-

tinued through Thursday, February 28, and ultimately officers arrested

10c1egg to Hoover, April 30, 1946; Interview by FBI with Lloyd
Kennedy, March 5, 1946, FBI Records; "Terror in Mink Slide," Newsweek,
March 11, 1946, pp. 28-29; Memorandum, James E. Ruffin to Caudle, March
11, 1946, Justice Department Records.
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ninety-eight blacks and the two whites that Sheriff Underwood had previously detained.

11

Within twenty-four hours after the Stephenson-Fleming fight Mink
Slide lay paralyzed and partially destroyed, and one hundred persons
languished in jail.

Officials subsequently released most of the prison-

ers either for lack of evidence or because they posted bond, but the careless manner in which lawmen arrested them and destroyed their property
proved irresponsible.

The state government's reaction to the black

resistance of February

25

crime committed.

appeared to be out of proportion to the alleged

The heavy-hs...~ded tactics of the law can be better under-

stood in connection with the rumors that commanded Columbia's attention.
Fears of a black insurrection shocked local whites, and the sanctity of
Columbia's color line, already threatened by black wartime gains, appeared
to hang in the balance as whites worried over the effect that returning
black veterans might have.

For blacks the situation involving James

Stephenson and the invasion of Mink Slide proved too much to bear, and
rumors of a white assault reinforced their belief that wartime sacrifices had not changed their status.

That whites would attempt to lynch

a black veteran and, having failed, employ the

state's power to wreak

vengeance upon them left many black Columbians incredulous.

Since neither

side lmew the real situation, the violence that erupted on February

25

and

26 emerged from mutual suspicion and ignorance. 12

11Ruffin to Caudle, March 11, 1946, Justice Department Records;
Clegg to Hoover, April 30, 1946, FBI Record.so
12Typescript of notes ta...~en at Columbia defense meeting, March 4,
1946, in "Tennessee, Columbia Riot," LF, NAACP Papers; :Beeler, "Race Riot
in Columbia," 129.
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Ironically, the only fatalities connected with the Columbia episode occurred on February 28.

Police had been arresting and questioning

area blacks, and on that afternoon officers brought three suspects into
the sheriff's office for interrogation.

William Gord.on, James Johnson,

and Napoleon Stewart sat in the office while deputies informed them that
after questioning they could leave if they made $250 bond.

During a lull

in the questioning Gordon and Johnson reached for a group of confiscated

rifles stacked in a corner.

Gordon managed to load one of these, ap-

parently with ammunition contained in a coat pocket, and shot one of
the deputies in the ann.

The shot attracted several nearby officers,

a:n.d they quickly shot both Gord.on and Johnson.

Stewart remained in his

seat during the episode, but officers beat him up.

Since Columbia

possessed no jim crow hospital facilities, officers loaded the victims
into a car and started the forty-mile trip to Nashville.

The

blacks

iied in transit. 13
Because of this incident and the lack of security it implied,
G-ovemor McCord sent an additional 250 guardsmen to Columbia, bringing
the total to about

700. These troops remained in town until March 3,

but sixty-five state troopers stayed longer.

Within a few days officials

iropped charges against all but thirty-five of the prisoners and released
all of them on bond. 14
Columbia remained in a state of consternation as public interest
!:i.eightened.

Mayor Denham issued an ameliorative statement that implored

Columbians to "refrain from congregating and be calm and sane and return

13Ruffin to Caudle, March 11, 1946, Justice DeJ;artment Records;
Seeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 33-35.

14c1egg to Hoover, April 30, 1946, F.BI Records; :Beeler, "Race
Eiot in Columbia," 33-35.
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to normal relations with each other."

Few others, however, cared whether

the city returned to normal, because they appeared more interested in
assigning blame or in attaching political significance to the episode.
The editor of the Columbia Daily Herald expressed one end of the editorial spectrum when he asserted that "the Negro has not a chance of
gaining supremacy over a sovereign people, and the sooner the better
element of i;he Negro race realize this the better off the race will be."
On the other end the communist

Daily Worker warned that "a mass Scotts-

boro fra.IJeup is in the making here in the cradle of the Ku Klux Klan,"
the result of "a violent armed invasion" on Min-1{ Slide by "white militiamen, vigilantes and hoodlums."

Taking cognizance of such stories, the

Christia..l'l Century told its readers that "it is

]:i.ard

to believe that they

deal with the same tragedy," and that "almost everything about the riot
points toward future trouble on a larger scale."

The NAACP 1 s organ Crisis

warned that the Columbia episode appeared to confirm the "predictions of
many persons that mob violence would be used after the war to force the

Negro back into his 'place. 1111 5
Following the violenc~ a series of investigations and court cases
lasted through mid-1947.

Beginning on February 26, state, federal, and

NAACP inquiries got underway, eventually leading to a series of lengthy
court battles.

The state probe proved the briefest and most superficial.

On the 27th Govemor McCord sent his assistant attorney general, Ernest F.
Smith, to Columbia.

Smith remained there only a few days and in his

l5Columbia Daily Herald, February 26, 1946; New Yo:rx Daily Worker,
February 28, 1946; "Tennessee Race Riot a Danger Sign," Christian Century,
March 13, 1946, p. 325; 11 Editorials: Terror in Tennessee," Crisis, 53
(April 19h6), lOS.
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report included a mixture of general factual information and personal
opinion that apparently satisfied officials in Nashville.

From the report

it appeared that Smith made a pest of himself as he attended all official
meetings and counted beer bottles in Mink Slide.

He obviously held a

low opinion of most blacks he encountered, and his report contained
statements and conclusions supporting that view.

Seeing a conspiracy,

he asserted that "every character of gun" was confiscated from the black
district, and that "I am convinced that there bad been a plan devised by
one or more negroes in ColU1:2bia to create ill-feeling toward the white
population."

The tone of the entire report was blatantly prejudicial,

but unfortunately Governor McCord and the other state officials relied
on it as the official investigative documento

In his conclusion Smith

praised the local law enforcement officials and in particular Sheriff
Underwood for doing "everything at his command to quiet the disturbance."
He similarly lauded the state guard for its actions.

Finally, Smith

asserted that the riot would never have occurred had it not been "for
the delibe:rate action of Sol, Julius and Charles Blair and James Morton."
In effect, the official state report blamed blacks for a disturbance
that began with white reaction to a fistfight and the shooting of four
policemen, and culminated in an invasion of the black conmnmity and the
destruction of a large part of it.

16

Meanwhile the Justice Department contacted Govemor McCord to obtain his permission for an FBI probe of the Columbia incident.

McCord

agreed, and on March 1 the FBI directed special agent D.S. Hostetter

16
smith, "Report on Investigation," McCord Papers.

to give priority to the Columbia inquiry and not to hesitate in asking
for extra help.

Apparently pressure from the White House contributed to

the Justice Department's keen interest in the case, especially after an
extraordinary amount of public reaction reached President Harry S. Truman.
The bureau conducted a thorough inquiry lasting about a week, and subsequent follow-up probes resulted as court cases proceeded.

Of the three

major outbreaks in the South during the war years, Mobile, Beaumont, and
Columbia, the Tennessee riot proved to be the only one the F.BI fully investigated.17
The federal government's involvement in the case meant that federal
statutes could have been violatedo

Thus the F.BI agents in Columbia searched

for evidence of a:ny infringement upon the ciYil rights of the Mink Slide
inb..abitants as defined in Sections .5L and
States Code.

Section

52

52,

Title 18, of the United

dealt with "depriving citizens of civil rights

llllder color of State laws," which in this case meant that a:n:y of the defendants could have charged such a violation against the local peace officers, state troopers, or state guardsmen.

In addition, the FBI wanted to

discover the truth of the rumored conspiracy to lynch James Stephenson on
February

25.

Finally, the FBI learned th9.t a series of telephone calls

to and from Chicago had occurred at the residence of a black Columbian
during the riot, leading some agents to suspect either an organized conspiracy to provoke racial discord. or subversive activity.

Hostetter and

other agents began the probe on March 1 and concluded it on March 8,

M.

17Memorandum, J.C. Strickland to D.
Ls.dd, April 2, 1946, F.BI
Records; Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 68-70.
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interviewing almost four hundred people in the process. 18
Although a number of black people remained in the Maury County jail
for several days following the mass arrests without having a:n:y charges
placed against them, only three persons charged that their civil rights
bad been violated in this connection.

Predictably, those three were

Julius Blair, Sol Blair, and James Mortono

They complained that local

officials held them in jail an unreasonable length of time without giving
them the opportunity to make bond and, more important, that their Mink
Slide businesses had suffered unnecessary damage during the state intrusion on February 26.

Although others could have made the same complaints,

intimidation or the desire not to cause further difficulties compelled
them to remain silent.

The Blairs and Morton, however, displayed remark-

able fortitude in their actions which cast them as heroes among blacks
and as troublemakers among whiteso

When the F.BI probe ended on March 8,

the agents concluded that no basis existed for

a.riy

violation of federal

laws, although the bureau continued to make inquiries, and, after a
federal grand jury convened, it engaged in yet another flurry of activityo 19
As the state and federal investigations continued, the NAACP entered the fray.

The association's involvement in the case proved a god-

send for the black defendants but did nothing to quell the acrimony among
whites.

On

the moming of February 26 a frantic telephone call awakened

Walter White in New York, telling him of the riot.

He immediately

18Horace Frierson to Caudle, March 1, 1946, Justice Department
Records; Memorandum, Caudle to Hoover, March 1, 1946; Clegg to Hoover,
April 30, 1946; Memora.ndum, D. M. Ladd to E. A. Tamm, March 2, 1946,
FBI Records.

19c1egg to Hoover, April 30, 1946; Caudle to Hoover, March 8,
1946, FBI Records.

contacted NAACP officials in Chattanooga.

By that afternoon a young white
\..---

lawyer and Navy veteran, Maurice Weaver, was at the scene as the national
office scrambled into action.

While Weaver attempted to talk with some

of the prisoners, White telegraphed Governor McCord asking for an appointment.

z.

When he arrived in Nashville a local attorney, West Indian-bom

Alexander Looby, and the Reverend William J. Faullmer of Fisk Univer-

sity accompanied him to the governor's office where a decidedly hostile
conversation ensued.

White's irritating manner and McCord's provincial

attitudes resulted in heightened suspicion on both sides.

White set up

his base of operations in Nashville, and NAACP special counsel Thurgood
Marshall joined him.

They proceeded to construct a.defense for more than

thirty black Columbians charged with assault to commit mu_T'(ler.
On March

4,

W~..i.te,

20

Looby, Weaver, James Dombrowski of the Southem

O:>nference for Human Welfare (SCHW), and others met with the Blairs and
James Morton.

The three defend.ants retold the story of the mob action

stemming from the Fleming-Stephenson fight, the Mink Slide incursion of
the next day, and their experiences before and after being arrested.

A

sizeable publicity campaign appeared necessary, both to gain financial
support and to keep the attention of federal authorities.

After weighing

various alternatives, they decided to form a loose coalition for the defense of the blacks and simultaneously to attract groups and prominent
individuals to their cause.

On }fu.rch 11 the NAACP formally announced

that it would defend the Columbia blacks, and three days later

20White, A Man Called White, 309-13; Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia,"
49-51; Interview, Maurice M. Weaver to James A. Bur:ran, July 8, 1977,
Chattanooga, Tennessee.
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representatives of nineteen organizations formed the National Committee
for Justice in Columbia, Tennessee (NCJC).

Besides the NAACP and SCHW,

other groups present included the Urban League, ACLU, CIO, National Lawyers Guild, and Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Port~rs.

The group agreed to

allow the NAACP to take the initiative in future actions, which included
asking Attorney General Tom Clark to investigate fully the operations of
the state authorities in the February 26 Mink Slide invasion, seeking an
appointment with President Truman, and raising funds.
On March

21

19 White asked Eleanor Roosevelt and Channing H. Tobias

to serve the NCJC as co-chairmen, and they accepted.

Within a few weeks

the list of participating organizations had grown to about sixty, but
along the way the NCJC suddenly faced a problem that threatened its continuation.

One of the member groups that joined the coalition during

this period was the Communist Party.

On the one hand the NAACP could

hardly afford to refuse membership to the communists since both claimed
to be defenders of the oppressed.

:But some important NCJC supporters,

most notably Mrs. Roosevelt, balked at the addition of communists to the
group.

The situation in Columbia, already unpromising, could be lost

altogether if the commimists tied themselves to the defense effort.
The communists themselves solved the problem.

The Daily Worker

sent Harry Raymond to the scene to photograph the destruction while
Robert Minor, secretary of the legislative committee of the party and
long-time civil liberties advocate, accompanied him.

21

They generated so

Typescript of notes taken at Columbia defense meeting, March 4,

1946; Press release, March 11, 1946, in "Press Releases--Columbia, Tenn.
Riot"; "Minutes of Meeting re: Columbia Riot," undated, in "Minutes,
Columbia, Tennessee Meetings," GDF, N..A...ACP Papers.
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much hostility among the local residents, lawofficials, and FBI, that the
NCJC disassociated itself from them.

Minor committed the main error when

he called a meeting among local blacks to form the Maury County Voters
League, an act that Walter White blasted as "the damndest piece of illadvised action imaginable."

Press reaction proved similarly hostile, with

the Nashville l3anner charging that "Commies" and "celebrities of pink hue"
lay behind "this mess that threatens to disrupt an otherwise happy and
contented people."

22

Meanwhile the NCJC and other groups worked to raise money and focus
attention on the Columbia defense.

These activities included a benefit

dance at New York's Savoy Ballroom on May 3, at least one radio broadcast
and perhaps most important, a series of publicity tours by the defendants.
The idea for these tours came from the NAACP, and from mid-April through
mid-Vay the NCJC and the association's Legal Defense and Educational Fund
branch took most of the defendants in five separate groups to forty-eight
cities, most in the North and Midwest.

These tours raised $7,000 and

prompted thousands of protest letters.

Although most of the NAACP's

strength lay in areas outside the.South, this drive showed its renewed
vitality just as it provided the association with valuable experience it
would employ during the 1950s. 23

22

Telegrams, White to Eleanor Roosevelt, White to Channing H.
Tobias, March 19, 1946; White to Roosevelt, March 25, 1946, in "CoChairmen--E. Roosevelt-a. Tobias (Columbia)"; White to John Hammond,
April 22, 1946, in "Committee, Columbia Tenn. Correspondence--Harold
Oram," GOF, NAACP Papers; Nashville :Banner, April 16, 19460
2 11
3 Along the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (May 1946), 151;
Press release, May 3, 1946, in "Press Releases--Columbia Tenn. Riot";
"Tour Schedule for Columbia Defendants," undated; Memorandum, Madison
s. Jones to White, May 13, 1946, in "Columbia Tenn.--Speakers and
Meetings," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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With the conclusion of the F.BI, state, and NAACP investigations,
there followed a tangle of legal battles, simultaneous hearings on different jurisdictional levels, pleas for changes of venue, arguments over the
composition of the juries, and other squabbles that eventually found their
way to the Tennessee Supreme Court.

In mid-March a Maury County grand

jury handed down indictments against thirty-one Columbia blacks.

Twenty-

eight were indicted for attempted murder or inciting others to murder,
while the jury indicted the other three on lesser charges.

In addition,

the jury indicted four whites, including the two drunks arrested on February 25.

At this time fede:r:al intervention seemed remote, especially con-

sidering the F.BI findings.

Yet public pressure and keen White Bouse

interest prompted Attorney Gene:r:al Clark to convene a fede:r:al grand jury
in Nashville, with Judge Elmer D. Davies presiding.

At issue was the

possible violation of the defendants' civil rights, including the rumored
attempted lynching of James Stephenson, the failure of law officers to
obtain search warrants, the unnecessary damage done to Mink Slide businesses, the unreasonably lengthy detention of the defendants, and the
deaths of William Gordon and James Johnson. 24
The federal grand jury met in Nashville on April 8, and immediately Judge Davies began complaining about civil rights groups and their
publications regarding the Columbia riot.

Davies produced a copy of the

SCBW's publicity pamphlet, "The Truth About Columbia," and suggested that
the grand jury subpoena the SCHW 1 s officials.

If the statements proved

24"Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (August 1946), 251;
:Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 68-70; Strickland to Ladd, April 2,
1946, F.BI Records.
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true, he observed, "you should act accordingly and return indictments
against the persons responsible for those acts."

If the statements proved

false, however, the "circulators of this pamphlet should be exposed for
deliberately agitating matters of this kind to cause difficulties between
races which are trying to live together in peace and harmony."

In the

midst of this and other complaints the grand jury sifted through the eviFinally, on April 29, the

dence but appeared to be getting little done.

court determined that it could proceed no further until the F.BI investigation was made available.

It adjourned until late May as the F.BI re-

2
viewed its files and released the interviews. '
The bureau not only reviewed its files but followed up on leads
and controversial points developed during the initial inquiry.

It man-

aged to identify seveml whites, photographed by newspaper and magazine
correspondents, who appeared to be in the process of ransacking Mink
Slide businesses but took no action against them and did not recommend
local prosecution.

The bureau also investigated the widespread belief

that Columbia blacks had conspired to cause trouble by anning themselves
and holding secret meetings prior to February
ate such beliefs.

25

but could not substanti-

Finally, the F.BI followed its lead involving mysteri-

ous telephone calls to and from Chicago in the immediate aftermath of
the violence, a fact that bad earlier appeared to corrobomte the conspimcy theory.

In May, agents discovered that the calls in question

came from James Eooker, a black man from Chicago, whose purpose lay in

2 11
' The Social Front: Violence," Monthly Summary of Events and
Trends L~ Race Relations, 3 (April 1946), 266; Clegg to Hoover, April 30,
1946, FBI Records.
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confinning the safety of his mother who resided in Columbia.

In an over-

all review to J. Edgar Hoover, Justice Department official H. H. Clegg
chided the director for failure to clear up these problems earlier and
implied that the bureau's handling of the Columbia investigation had been
sloppy.

26
After the grand jury received the F.BI's transcripts of nearly four

hundred interviews and other material, it reconvened.

On June

14

it

issued its report which concluded that local and state authorities bad
violated no federal laws during or after the riot.

The jury noted that

_ "an efficient and adequate guard was not maintained throughout the 'Mink
Slide' area" after the violence·but contended that this did not constitute a violation of federal statutes.

The jury recognized the destruction

of portions of the area but complained that available evidence made it
"wholly impossible to determine the identity of such person or persons
or to elicit facts upon which to predicate an indictment in this respect."
The actions of the state authorities on February 26 in moving through Mink
Slide and subsequent imprisonment procedures appeared perfectly legal to
the grand jury, so the charges by Julius Blair, Sol Blair, and James Morton that their civil rights bad been violated collapsed.

Finally, the

jury found no evidence to support a rumored lynching attempt on February

25, ma.inly because no evidence revealed the purchase of a rope on that
day.

The deaths of Gordon and Johnson on the 28th were ruled justifiable

26
FBI Report on Columbia Riot, Memphis Tennessee, May 10, 1946;
F.BI Report on Columbia Riot, Memphis, Tennessee, May 17, 1946; F.BI Report
on Columbia Riot, Chicago, Illinois, May 17, 1946; Clegg to Hoover, April
30, 1946, F.BI Records.

In the remainder of its report the federal grand

homicide.

jury ex-

pressed alarm at various newspaper reports and pamphlets which had as
their purpose "the malicious intent and desire to incite racial discord
and intolerance and to cause further racial strife."

In a patriotic con-

clusion the jury's report admonis~. .eci "the good citizens of both races [ to]
be on their guard against insidious a...'Yld false propaganda. u 27
£lthough the grand jury answered the question of federal intervention in the case, the fates of the black defendants remained undecided.

On ¥.LS.y 28, as the federal grand

ju_r:; reconvened in Nashville, a ¥.iaury

Cou..'Ylty circuit court convened to try those people indicted by the local
g:r-c:.nc.

jury.

faced two

Twenty-six, includir.g J·..llius a..'r'ld Sol :Blair

and Ja!!les

Morton,

counts of attempting to commit murder in the first degree and

accessory before the fact.

Additional charges of accessory after the fact

and carrying a shotgun faced Morton, and a charge of carrying a pistol

added to Sol :Blair's problems.

. ~. .

t

l.IlO.lC't'.i!len s.

J~es and Glaciys Stephenson faced other

28

Without delay defense attorney Maurice Weaver asked that the indictments be qua.shed because the Y.i.au.ry County grand jury systematically
excludeci blacks.

Prosecuting attomey Paul F. :Bumpus denied such allega-

tions and threatened to contest every move the defense made, but Jmge
Joe M. Ingram agreed to begin hearings on the subject.

In two weeks

Weaver called 223 blacks, most of whom proved qualified to sit on grand

2711 Report of G:ra.nd Jury in the Matter of the Racial Disturbance
at Columbia, Tennessee, June 14, 1946, 11 F.BI Records.

28TY,Pescript of indictments in Columbia trial, undated, in
"Tennessee, Columbia Riot," LF, NAACP Papers; "Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis,

53

(July

1946), 212.
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juries, but the fact remained that no blacks had acted in such a capacity
in the county for fifty years o

On June 12 :Bumpus beg-c::.I1 a refutation of

the defense's charges, and six days later Judge Ingram ruled that he could
see no discrimination in the system of jury selection.

Anticipating this

decision, Weaver and Thurgood Marshall asked for a change of venue.

They

hoped that the proceedings could be moved to Davidson County, where the
defend.ants stood more likely to receive a fair trial.
change of venue took place from July 2 through
change for twenty-six of the defend.ants.

Arguments on the

S, when Ingram granted the

Instead of moving the trial to

Nashville, however, he chose Lawrenceburg, thirty-four miles away. 29
While Weaver, Looby, and the other defense lawyers worried over
their next move, Thurgood Marshall developed pneumonia and bad to bow out
of the case.

He did not return until October.

Meanwhile the citizens of

Lawrenceburg exhibited as negative an attitude toward the change of venue
as the defense COtL'!'lselors.

Mayor R. O. Downey complained, "we feel ~hat

we have been imposed upon and unjustly treated in this matter," and "we
do not feel that we should bear the stigma of something tbat happened
somewhere else and in which we have no part."

Similarly, the editor of

the local Democrat-Union grumbled that "Lawrenceburg people do not feel
an obligation to wash the dirty linen of Columbia ••• or any other
city." 30
Despite these and other protests, preliminary hearings began on
August 3.

Looby and Weaver filed a second request for a change of venue,

29:aeeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 80-90; Weaver to Bu.rra.n, July

8, 1977.
30unidentified memorandum describing Marshall's illness in
"Tennessee, Columbia Riot," LF, NAACP Papers; Lawrenceburg Democ:ratU:iio:!:.. ?,_11:--· J'.?. io~i:;.

producing affidavits from area blacks to support their contention that
Lawrenceburg represented no improvement over Columbia.
request.

Ingram denied the

The defense then asked for postponement of the proceedings be-

cause of Marshall's illness, but the judge would not be delayed.
trial began on August 13.
emerged.

The

Immediately frustrations over jury selection

Weaver planned to use all two hundred of his peremptory chal-

lenges to insure a palatable panel, but Ingram foiled him.

After three

weeks of haggling over the prospective jurors, the judge handed down the
unusual ruling that he, and not the lawyers, would question the veniremen.
For the next two weeks Ingram ad.mi tted several persons to the jury who
proved clearly undesirable to the defense, including one

IJan

believed in separate types of justice for whites and blackso

who said he
Along the

way one of the prospective jurors produced a medical certificate confirming that he suffered from a form of psychoneurosis, whereupon Ingxa.m
leaned over and asked him, "where does it hurt?

What ails you?"

from over four hundred veniremen, the jury was completed.

Finally,

It consisted of

six farmers, two carpenters, a janitor, a chemical plant worker, a merchant, and a saw mill operator.

All were white.

One of the jurors, a

state guardsman, had been on duty in Columbia during the February violence. 31
As the trial got underway the defense attempted to prove that Lynn
Bomar and his state troopers, the first state officials at Mink Slide,
illegally moved into businesses and homes, ransacked them, recklessly shot
up the area, arrested blacks without warrants, and beat some of them while

3l"Along the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (September 1946), 277;
ibid. (October 1946), 309; Columbia Daily Herald, August 3, 1946; Lawrenoeburg Democrat-Union, September 20, 1946; "Mink Slide: The Afte:cma.th,"
Time, October 14, 1946, p. 29; Weaver to Burran, July 8, 1977.
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holding others incommunicado.

Weaver's questioning of :Bomar on September

26 bore out the allegations.

The highway patrol chief admitted searching

and arresting without warrants, kicking down doors, and beating up prisoners but maintained that such tactics were necessary in a state of emergency.

He admitted that his men did not have full police power and that

their only specific duties were issuing traffic citations and confiscating
illegal liquor.
he explained.

"Sometimes we assume some powers we really don't have,"
Later, Weaver asked :Bomar if he bad "any feeling at all

against any of these defendants."

He replied, "I don't have any feeling.

I have some very good friends among the colored people and I have got
more respect for any colored men here than I have you. 1132
In early October the prosecution and defense delivered their final
orations.

:Bumpus ignored the issues and asserted instead that "I will

continue to defend my people against the Fascist tendencies created by
dirty rats who are misrepresenting actual conditions in Tennesseeo"

He

scolded the "agitators" who "poured out a flood of sewerage that would
nauseate a skunk."

L.A. Ransom of the defense then reminded the jury

that the Columbia violence had been started by a white lynch mob and that
the defendants had simply tried to pr~tect themselves.
October

4 the

verdict came in:

fendants not guilty.

At 5:00 p.m. on

the jury found all but two of the de-

Robert Gentry and John McKivens were convicted of

attempted murder. 33

32Alva W. Taylor, "Sift :Blame for Tennesse Riot," Christian Century,
April 24, 1946, pp. 531-32; Tennessee v. Sol Blair et al., September 26,
1946, in "Tennessee, Columbia Riot," LF, NAACP Papers.

33columbia Daily Herald, October 3, 4,
1946; Pittsburgh Courier, October 12, 1946.

5, 1946;

November 11, 21,
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The defense was elated; Maurice Weaver melodramatically shouted,
"this makes a man proud to be an American."

The prosecution, visibly de-

flated, sat stunned as the courtrooE cleared, for the general consensus
as the trial came to a close clearly favored the prosecution. 34

That a

jury composed of rural southern whites freed all but two of the defendants
in a trial emanating from a well-publicized threat to the racial system

proved remarkable.

Civil rights groups frankly expected another kangaroo

court, similar to the Scottsboro trials, and in some ways the two cases
reflected similarities.

The object of the defense lay in taking the case

to the Supreme Court, but the jury's decision precluded that possibility,
especially after the state reversei itself and dropped the charges against
Gentry and McKivens.
The remaining legal battles proved anticlimactic.

The four whites

arrested in connection with the riot, along with Jam.es and Gladys Stephenson, we~t free when the state dropped the charges against them.

Two other

blacks, Lloyd Kennedy and William Pillow, were tried in Columbia during
November on charges of attempting to kill Ray Austin, a state trooper.
The court found Pillow innocent but convicted Kennedy.

The NAACP appealed

Kennedy's conviction to the state supreme court, which upheld the lower
court in a June 1947 decision.

Kennedy went to prison on a one-to-five-

year sentence, and with that the long struggle to free the Columbia defendants ended. 35

34Tra.nscript of telephone conversation, White to Ollie Harrington,
October 5, 1946, in "Dept. of Justice--FBI/Columbia, Tenn.," GOF, NAACP
Papers.
35columbia Daily Herald, November 19, 1946; December 7, 1946;
February 1, 11, 1947; June 5, 1947; Kennedy v. Tennessee, 210 S. W. 2d
132 (1947).
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The most arresting fact about the Columbia riot was that a relatively small outbreak provoked such widespread publicity, inquiries, and
legal action.

The town and its inbabi tants mirrored others across the

South in the wartime population loss, the stringent system of race relations underneath a deceptive picture of harmony, the latent interracial
suspicions, and white fears of the impact of retuming black veterans on
southern society.

\In

the face of political and economic changes many

'-

whites attempted to preserve familiar institutions, and any action by
blacks that appeared to threaten the color line invited swift retribution.
At the same time, however, blacks tired of the continuing discrimination.

They saw white reactions to their improvements as part of an over-

all attempt to deny gains they deserved.

In Columbia,

a threatened

lynching as the result of an inter::acial brawl confirmed their suspicions,
while to whites the fight served as proof that black veterans intended to
challenge racial t+a,ditions.
That both groups interpreted the riot differently reflected the
lack of interracial communication that lay at the heart of the violence
and explained the overwhelming response by the state of Tennessee.

To

whites, the riot started when Mink Slide residents shot four policemen
on the night of February

25.

To blacks, this incident was a regrettable

but unavoidable outgrowth of white preparations to lynch James Stephenson
and perha.po ,even his mother.

For the blacks, the riot started on the

moming of February 26 when well over one hundred lawmen invaded Mink
Slide, wounded several residents, and destroyed property.

To the whites,

including the decision makers in Nashville, the Mink Slide intrusion
proved absolutely necessary to subdue an uprising, and the fact that

J-./

I
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seve:ral officers received injuries represented not black self-defense
but a blatant disregard of established authority.
The FBI investigated the Columbia incident for evidence of violation of civil liberties and subversive activity but found neither.

Those

blacks who faced trial were bitter, for they contended that they committed
no crime in defending themselves against a state-supported extra.legal invasion.

Whites, on the other band, saw the trials as justifiable, coming

from violent and unwarranted action which threatened their concept of
postwar stability.

From this incident such groups as the NAACP gained

valuable experience that it would use in its school desegregation struggles
of the next eight years.
In the end only Lloyd Kennedy went to prison.

The acquittal of

the remaining defendants was generally hailed as nothing short of miraculous, and sages predicted a new era in southern justice.

Yet Kennedy's

fate still proved more the rule and the acquittals more the exception for
this period.

The outcome of the trials must be viewed on two levels--the

national and the local.
incredible victory.

From the national perspective the NAACP won an

But from the local viewpoint the victory meant little.

As soon as the state and federal agencies left Columbia, little change
could be seen, save perhaps increased mutual suspicion.

Southern blacks,

especially those who lived in places lil:e Columbia, could not depend on
the NAACP or the SCHW to rescue them.

They had to live within the tra-

ditions established by the majority, and effective changes would come
only from the grassroots level.

CHA.PTER IX

THE COLOR LINE TRIUMPHANT
The February 1946 Columbia riot was the largest incident of
racial violence in the immediate postwar era.

The number of clashes,

......

however, rose dramatically in the period following, peaking in the summer~~,

months of 1946.

During the course of these outbreaks, the wbi te South's

opposition to postwar gains for blacks crystallized.

The cycle of

southern mce relations seemed complete, for as the international crisis
passed, many of the modest strides southern blacks had taken during the
war passed with it.

The most significant of these gains had occurred

in the economic and political spheres.

For example, the black propor-

tion of the nationwide work force rose during the conflict from about 3
percent to over 8 percent, with southern blacks benefitting to some degree, while the demise of the white primary found an increasing number
of black southerners registering to vote.

The violence and conservatism

that many whites exhibited in reaction forced them into the same separate
and unequal coexistence that existed before the war.

Although this did

not occur with blacks standing idly by, continual attempts to preserve
their gains invariably met with intimidation and violence.

Blacks

clutched at the elusive strands of advancement, but whites always kept
the goals out of reach.

Their efforts stymied, blacks drew back in a

state.of bitterness and alienation. 1

1wynn,

Afro-American and Second World War,
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Thus, by the end of 1946 southem blacks were in much the same
position as they had been in 1940 and earlier--firmly locked behind the
color line.

They did sense a negative difference though.

Before the war

economic destitution seemed to ignore the color line, but with reconversion prosperity appeared to e:rase the familiarity that had once emerged
from adversity.

Whites meant for prosperity to serve them first, especi-

ally with the relatively high :rate of unemployment that produced a
scramble for jobs.

Such economic competition proved directly responsible

for the Athens, Alabama, riot of A¾---ust.

Violence built the wall sepa-

:rating the races even higher than before, and the doors leading to the
American mainstream slammed shut.

This left blacks with two alternatives:

to leave the South altogether or to refine further their generations-old
subsociety.
main.

Some fled, but most opted, mainly out of necessity, to re-

Their wartime gains, then, proved in many ways ephemeral.

In addition to the general tension evident in the postwar South,
other factors perpetuated violence.

The

resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan

and likeminded groups epitomized a reactionary fringe element that historically has emerged in periods of change and instability.

Once the

unity and feverish pace of the war effort subsided, these groups tried
to recreate some imagined golden age of morality and white supremacy.

In October 1945, Jesse B. Stoner, who served as "Kleagle" of the "Realm
of Tennessee," predicted that the KKK would reach its zenith during the
period when jobless veterans and laid-off workers retumed to their homes
looking for employment.

"The conflict," Stoner reportedly said, "will

come when Negroes, who have gotten jobs because of the war and the

'r
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FEPC, won't give up those jobs. 112
The Klan revival lasted only a few years.

By 1952 most state

governments managed to suppress the organization, but revoking charters
or infiltmting "klavems" sometimes had little
actionary feelings.

effect on diverting re-

This resurgence, like that of the 1920s, involved {/

"marginal" white businessmen and blue collar workers, among others.

·'.j\,~-

One

scholar who studied the renewal of Klan activity during the late 1940s
noted characteristics that transcended temporal factors.

"The excessive

vehemence with which some klansmen extol their white status and disassociate themselves from Negro status," he observed, "suggests that basically they may feel themselves as weak, deprived, and helpless as they
i.Iragine the Negro to be."

They appeared to have been thwarted in achiev-

ing worthwhile goals and usually occupied precarious positions within the

social system.

As a result, they saw themselves as the victims of "in-

scrutable conspiracies and enemies."

The postwar Klan, then, embmced

those people whose powerlessness approoched ths.t of southem blacks. 3
By early 1946 the Klan revival proved most evident in Georgia,
Alabama, Tennessee, and Florida, with some activity in South Carolina.
The Appalachian hill country of Fast Tennessee, North Georgia, and North
Alabama provided their strongest bailiwick.

In March a score of burning

crosses lit the night near Chattanooga. and Knoxville, followed in April
by six cross burnings in Birmingham and similar activity in Miami.

On

2

Harold Preece, "The Klan Declares War," New Masses, October 16, (,/
1945, pp. 3-4.

3James W. Vander Zanden, "The Klan Revival," American Journal of
Sociology, 65 (March 1960), 456, 458, 460-62.
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May 9 klansmen burned a giant cross atop their shrine, Stone Mountain,
near Atlanta.

About seven hundred members of the Invisible Empire and

over one thousand spectators attended the ceremony, which featured the
initiation of five hundred new members.

One observer noticed that most

of the parked cars bore license plates from Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama,
and South Carolina.4
During the 1930s, the Klan in Georgia obtained a charter that
described it as a "fraternal organization for white gentiles only."
Following the

Yiay

9 demonstration, an aroused Southern Regional Council,

based in Atlanta, decided to investigate the Klan.

)f ½

Stetson Kennedy, one

of the SRC 1 s most energetic investigators who built a one-man campaign
against the KKK, wrote Georgia Governor Ellis Arnall to ask if he might
consider legal action against the Invisible Empire.

Arnall already had

the same thought in mind, and after consultation with Georgia's attomey
general, the state made Kennedy an undercover agent.

Kennedy did con-

siderable snooping, and as a result on June 20 the state filed a suit
against the Klan.

It asked the group to show reason why the state should

not revoke its charter, especially in light of recent terroristic acts
against innocent citizens.

The Klan representatives simply denied the

allegations and then asked tmt the charges be dropped and tl:Bt the state
be required to pay the court costs.'

4Guzman, Negro Year Book, 217-20; Pittsburgh Courier, March 30
1946; "The Social Front: Violence," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends
in Race Relations, 3 (April 1946), 267; "The Social Front: The Ku Klux
Klan," ibido (May 1946), 3010
5Report by Stetson Kennecy, undated; Transcript of information,
Georgia v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, June 20, 1946, SRC Papers, Box 1.

Whether or not the Klan's charter remained valid in Georgia JIB.de
little difference in its activities.

The KKK, essentially a covert or-

ganization a:nyway, did not really need such formalities as a charter.
Besides, other organizations spawned by postwar fears and insecurities
could take the Klan's place if it collapsed.
proved typical.

The Columbians of Atlanta

Headed by people who believed the doom of the "Aryan"

race was imminent, it caused considerable commotion until late in the
year when a Georgia jury convicted its leaders for "usurping police power."
Such organizations as the Klan and Columbians played an effective role in
provoking the postwar racial ·violence in the South.

6

Politics also proved responsible, at least indirectly, for

longing the resurgence of violence in mid-1946.

/ /

;:M~--,::.

In at least two southern

states, Georgia and Mississippi, race-baiting found its way into the 1946
gubernatorial and congressional elections.

By 1946 the liberalism of

Ellis Arnall, combined with the postwar situation, led many Georgia
voters to react against moderate politics, and blacks provided the first
object of attention.

Gubernatorial hopeful Eugene Talmadge exploited it.

Concurrently with the race for the Democratic nomination came a court
ruling based on Smith v. Allwright that allowed blacks to vote in the
previously lily-white primary.

This action doomed the Amall forces and

gave Talmadge a winning issue.

Georgia's voter registration doubled,

and fearing the black threat, many Talmadgites conducted wholesale purges
of their registration books--blacks faced hostile officials who asked why

6"The Social Front: The Columbiana," Monthly Summary of Events and
Trends in Race Relations, 4 {November 1946), 102; "The Social Front:
The Hate Outfits, 11 ibid. (March 1947), 234.

262
they should not be barred from voting due to "illiteracy, criminal record,
bad character," and the like. 7
The symbolic rejuvenation of the Ku Klux Klan at Stone Mountain on
May 9 added fuel to Talmadge•s fire, the Negrophobic candid.ate and Invisible Empire complementing each other.

In a June speech Talmadge clari-

fied his views on race when he stated, "I was raised among niggers and I
understand them.

I want to see ~hem treated fairly and I want to see them

have justice in the courts.

But I w--c:.nt to deal with the nigger in this way:

he must come to my backdoor, take off his hat, and say,

1

yes, sir.'"

Racial tension heightened in the days before the primary, and violence
thereafter seemed inevitable.

T~imadge emerged victorious in the June 17

----

ballotingoB

Meanwhile the senior seE.~r from Mississippi, Theodore G. Bilbo,
mounted a similar campaign.

:Slacks in his state, under the influence of .. ··
(

.

.~

·-- ...

returning veterans and local leaders, began a voter registration effort \....,..../.::. __.,
to permit their participation L'l1 the July primary.

Alarmed, Bilbo urged

his supporters to use whatever means necessary to keep blacks away from
the polls and repeatedly condoned violenceo

In fact, Bilbo became so

exercised over the thought of their casting ballots in the state tmt be
dusted off one of his pet projects--sending all blacks back to Africa.
By the time of the July 2 primary election, most blacks in Mississippi,
through weeks of intimidation, stayed away from the pollso

7william

Bilbo eked

Anderson, The Wild Man from S
r Creek: The Political
Career of Eugene Talmadge Baton Rouge, 1975, 215-22; Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Report by Kennedy, undated, SRC Paperso

8Anderson, Wild Man, 229-33•
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out a narrow victory over four opponents. 9
The postwar tension and instability, the rise of the Klan and
similar groups, and Negrophobic politics converged in the summer of 1946 \::,,?\::_,
to continue the violence that had escalated since late 1945.

It ma:c:ked

both the climax and the end of the South's postwar racial violence.
July 17 a mob of .four whites shot and killed Ma.ceo Snites in Taylor

County, Georgia.

On
(~;:.::.

He had breached the bounds of racial etiquette by be-

ing the only black person to vote in the primary.

ported that his attackers shot him in self-defense.

A coroner's jury re1O

On the heels of the Snites lynching came another in Holmes Cotmty,
Mississippi.

On July 19 a white fanner, Jeff Dodd, filed a complaint

against one of his black tenants, Leon McTatie, for allegedly stealing
three saddles.

Sheriff Walter Murtagh arrested McTatie the same day and

placed him in the cotmty jail in Lexington.
reappeared and withdrew his complaint.

On the 22nd, however, Dodd

Placing McTatie in his car, Dodd

and five other white men drove the black man to his farm and began beating
him in an attempt to extract a confession.

McTatie continually denied

knowledge of the crime and tried to stall his assailants by mentioning
the names of several other local blacks who might have been involved.

The

ploy failed, for the men continued to beat him until they killed him.
McTatie 1 s wife, hiding in a clump of bushes nearby, witnessed the entire

9Pittsburgh Courier, July 13, 1946; U.S., Congress, Serate, Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 1946, Pursuant to S. Res. 224 2 A Resolution to Appoint a Special
Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Contributions and Expenditures in the 1946 Election, Mississippi, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 342.
lO"America's Roll of Dishonor," Monthly Summa:ry of Events and Trends
The :Best
People Won't Talk," Time, August 5, 1946, p. 25; Atlanta Constitution,
July 26, 1%6.
in Race Relations, 4 (August-September. 1946), 28; "Georgia:
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episode.

After McTatie died Dodd and the others decided to get rid of

the body, so they drove to Sunflower County, about sixty miles distant,
and dumped the corpse in a creek.

County officials discovered the body

and, Uilable to identify it, buried it.

The incident thus came close to

being one of many undiscovered lynchings. 11
The murderers, however, did not suspect McTatie's wife would tell
the sheriff what she saw.
jail pending an inquest.

When she did, Murtagh locked the six whites in
Meanwhile, the sheriff learned that an uniden-

tified black man lay buried in Sunflower Co1mty, so he got a cou_rt order,
exhumed the body, and took it back to Lexington.

Confronted with the

evidence, three of the whites confessed to the beating, though they
denied killing him.

Shortly thereafter McTatie's two young stepsons,

along with a white man, confessed to stealing the three saddles from
Dodd and told the sheriff that McTatie had no knowledge of the theft. 12
Following a brief investigation by the FBI, officials charged

-

( ~i,
.- ··

\

j.,V

five of the six whites with murder and awaited a grand jury hearing. ;:·-.,._S
The sixth man, an Army private, was not charged.

In October a Eolmes

County grand jury indicted the five for manslaughter; apparently the jury
considered a murder charge too severe in connection with the death of a
black man.

The county circuit court inexplicably ordered two of the

defendants acquitted, and after a brief trial the jury deliberated

1

~emorandum, Fred G. Folsom to Tu.mer L. Smith, July 30, 1946,
Justice Department Records; Atlanta Constitution, July 31, 1946. Contemporary sources spelled McTatie's name several eays, such as McAtte
and McAtee. Most spelled it McTatie.

12Folsom to Smith, July 30, 1946, Justice Department Records;
Jackson Clarion Ledger, August 1, 1946; "Mississippi: Awaiting Action,"
Time, August 12, 1946, pp. 20-21.
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only four minutes before acquitting the other three men. 13
Only three days after Leon McTatie 1 s death the most heinous lynching of the entire war era took place and the first multiple lynching in

Georgia since 1918.

It represented the most shocking result of violence

brought about by postwar tension, reactionary activities, and racist
politics.
Mo:nroe

On

July 14, Roger Malcolm, a black farmhand who lived near

(forty miles east of Atlanta), got into a fight with Barney

Hester, Malcolm's former employer.
kept his wife as a mistress.

The black man charged that Hester

Hester received a severe knife wound, and

his brother-in-law, Deputy Sheriff Louis Howard, immedi~tely arrested his
assailant.

Before Howard could deposit the black farmer in jail, however,

ten white men tried to lynch him.

A white woman intervened and per-

suaded the assailants to let him go.

Malcolm remained in jail from

July 14 until July 25, when his wife arranged to free him on bond. 14
:Malcolm's sister and her husband, May and George Dorsey, worked on
Loy Harrison's farm in neighboring Oconee County.
discharged veteran.

Dorsey was ~ recently ( ·~:.- ·.
'--,

They cooperated with Malcolm's wife, and on July 25

persuaded Harrison to help them post bond for the prisoner.

The three

blacks and Harrison drove to Monroe and Harrison posted $600 bond.

They

remained in town for a couple of hours and did not leave on the return
trip until about 5:30 p.m.

Harrison, a 275-pound ex-convict, did not

13Folsom to Smith, July 30, 1946, Justice Department Records;
Jackson Clarion Ledger, August 1, 1946; Pittsburgh Courier, August 10,
1946; October 19, 1946; "The Social Front: Lynching," Monthly Summary
of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 4 (November 1946), 105.
1

½>ittsbu.rgh Courier, August 3, 31, 1946; Atlanta Daily World,
July 27, 1946; Thomas W. Johnson to Walter White, July 28, 1946, in
"Walton County Ga. Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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return on the main highway but instead took a back road.

When the car

reached a bridge spanning Apalachee Creek, which divided Walton and Oconee
counties, it suddenly stopped.

On

the other side of the bridge stood

twenty to thirty armed white men who leveled their guns at the auto
while one pointed at Malcolm saying, "we want that nigger."
gestured at Dorsey and said, "we want you, too."

He then

Harrison offered no

resistance, but as the mob led the two men away, Malcolm's wife recognized
one of the whites and implored him not to kill Dorsey and her husband.
This cost both women their lives.

The leader of the throng, a large,

well-dressed man in his sixties, instructed four of the whites to bring
the women along.

At the same time another white asked Harrison if he

recognized anyone; he naturally replied "no."

The band of whites marched

the four blacks a short distance, lined them up, and executed them.
of the lynchers then told Harrison to leaveo

One

Two hours later he called

the Walton County sheriff and reported the crime. 15
The news of this multiple lynching sent shock waves across the
nation.

As soon as Govemor Ania.11 heard of the incident, he issued a

statement proclaiming that "the decent people of Georgia are humiliated
about the mass murder," and he put up a $10,000 reward for information
leading to the.arrest and conviction of the.lynchers.

He also sent

William E. Spence, chief of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI),
to Walton County.

President Truman called on Attomey General Tom Clark

to undertake an exhaustive investigation to determine whether a federal

15Pittsburgh Courier, August 3, 1946; Atlanta Constitution, July
27, 28, 1946; Atlanta Daily World, July 27, 1946; "Georgia: The Best
People Won't Talk," Time, August 5, 1946, p. 25; "Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (September 1946), 277; New York Times, July 27, 1946,
pp. 1,

32.
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case could be developed and called for renewed consideration of an antilynching bill.
with the Gl3I.

Six F.BI agents arrived on the scene and worked closely
One of the federal agents maintained constant surveillance

over Loy Harrison, the only known eyewitness.
Meanwhile, an outraged NAACP contacted a white Macon lawyer,
Thomas W. Johnson, and employed him as an investigator.

In his first

report to the New York office on July 28, Johnson confirmed Harrison's
bootlegging activities, observed that the lynching appeared to have been
planned in advance, and suggested that Eugene Talmadge 1 s recent campaign
was indirectly responsible for the violence.

The NAACP forwarded the

reports to Attorney General Clark as an indication of the association's
interest in solving the case.

The NAACP also matched Arnall's $10,000

reward, and other groups added to the sum.

16

Other groups and individuals expressed similar concern and outrage
over the incident, but Talmadge, vacationing in Wyoming after his arduous
primary campaign, dismissed the matter casually.

"Things like that are

to be regretted," he remarked, adding that "nothing can be gained by
giving equal rights to someone with an artificial civilization that has
been forced upon him only 1,50 years ago. 1117
Loy Harrison's role in the murders raised several crucial questions.

His proclaimed innocence in the lynching appeared extremely

16Atlanta Daily World, July 28, 30, 1946; Atlanta Constitution,
July 28, 29, 31, 1946; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Harry S. Truman, 1946 (Washington, 1962), 368; Interoffice
memorandum by White, July 2.5, 1946; Johnson to White, July 28, 1946, in
"Walton County Ga. Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers.
l7Pittsburgh Courier, August 3, 1946.
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questionable.

As a lifelong resident of the area and a well-known boot-

legger, Harrison certainly knew many area residents.

When questioned,

he described the leader of the mob as tall, dignified, in his sixties,
wearing a brown suit and wide brimmed straw bat, and raving "a good
Florida tan."

Yet Harrison insisted that he could not identify him or

any other member of the mob, all of whom were unmasked.

He admitted

that Malcolm's wife had recognized one of the lynchers as they mrched
into the woods and yelled his name, but protested that he had not heard
the name clearly, so he could not remember it.

Harrison also offered

no explanation for driving home from Monroe on a back road instead of
taking the Atlanta-Athens highway as he bad on the initial leg of the
trip.
Investigators discovered that on July

4 Harrison

had beaten his

tenant, George Dorsey, and ordered him off the farm, possibly as a way of
gaining possession of his crop.

Officials found no record of the $600

bond supposedly posted by Harrison on July

25, but they did learn that

the deputy sheriff who released Malcolm to Harrison's custody was a
relative of :Barney Hester, the man Malcolm had stabbed.

18

A virtual conspiracy of silence by blacks and whites thwarted
attempts by investigators to discover substantive facts.

By July 30

the GBI knew the identity of at least five of the mob members and that
Loy Harrison was unquestionably a co-conspirator, but the authorities
possessed no evidence against them that would stand up in courto

The

six FBI and five GBI men thus proved unable to surmount the hostility of

18

Ibid.; "The Social Front: Lynching," Monthly Summary of Events
and Trends in Race Relations, 4 (August-September 1946), 4.
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local authorities and the unwillingness of many of the area's inhabitants
to talk.

In addition, local lawmen and townspeople bad t:rampled the scene

of the crime, picking up the physical evidence in the process.

As a re-

sult, investigators found nothing at the scene to help them--not even a
bullet or shell case.

Desperate for a lead in the case, the GBI considered

bringing in either lie detector equipment or sodium pentothal (truth
serum) o It discarded this_ plan, however, and relied on more conventional
techniques in unraveling the mystery. 1 9
Meanwhile public interest in the case continued to mounto

The

re-

ward money, which stood at $20,000 following the NAACP's contribution,
soon rose to $32,000, and ultirra.tely reached $64,000o

Contributions came

from such organizations as the Civil Rights Congress, the Southern Regional
Council, and the American Civil Liberties Union.

During the weeks follow-

ing the incident, Atlanta, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia held pro-

test parades, rallies, and official days of mourning.

Max Yergan, head

of the National Negro Congress, led a protest march of one thousand people
down Constitution Avenue to the White House.

Thousands of letters poured

. f rom groups and.ind'ivi'dua1 s. 20
in

All the demonstrations, protests, and letters, however, could not
expedite the investigation, though the NAACP did manage to discover four
blacks who claimed to be eyewitnesses to the lynchingo

Willie Johnson told

of how he sat Ulllloticed in a store as carloads of armed men headed for the

19Press release, July 30, 1946, in "Walton County Ga.

Lynching

(Dept. of Justice--FBI), 11 GOF, NAACP Papers.
20
Atlanta Daily World, July 30, 1946; August 2, 1946; "Progr-c:.!ils
of Action: Action Taken on Monroe, Georgia, Lynchings," Monthly S1.l!iE:.ary
of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 4 (August-September 1946), 29-300
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fateful bridgeo

He and a friend followed them on foot and hid in the

bushes while the crime took place.
Augusta.

The NAACP tracked down Johnson in

The other eyewitnesses, Johnny Burdette and his girlfriend,

were patted on the back road near where the lynching took place and
witnessed the murders.
tify publicly.

Fearing for their lives, they refused totes-

The NAACP's discovery, therefore, added little to the

development of the case.

The major investigations led nowhere, and by

mid-August rumors floated across the area that the GBI and FBI planned

.
.
.
21
up on~·he inqw.ry.
t ogive
Finally, Attorney General Clark empaneled a federal grand jury
to convene on December 2 in Athens.

"I am sorzy to say there is no

field of law in which the Federal GoveI.'!lIIlent is expected to do so much
with so little," he added pessimistically.

"The right of life, liberty

and property, the Supreme Court of the United States bas repeatedly held,
is not a federally secured right."

After weeks of intense investigation

and questioning 2,500 Walton County residents, the Department of Justice
entered the grand jury hearing with little hopeo

22

The jury that convened included two blacks, but they undoubtedly
felt pressure from their white co-jurors.

Two of the other members, the

NAACP complained, were relatives of Barney Hester.

In all, the twenty-

three man jury included "thirteen farmers, two merchants, two coal dealers,

21Deposition of Willie Jolmson, undated, in "Walton County Ga.
Lynching"; \fuite to Tom C. Clark, August 12, 1946, in "Walton County Ga.
Lynching {Dept. of Justice--FBI)," GOF, NAACP Papers.
2211 The Social Front: Lynching," Monthly Summary of Events and
Trends in Race Relations, 4 (November 1946), 104-5; Press release, December 2, 1946; White to Clark, December 1, 1946, in "Walton County Ga.
Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers.
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a barber, a cotton gin opera.tor, a banker, a laundry manager, a clerk and
a 'retired fanner. '"

U. S. District Attorney John Cowart presented the

government's case, and Loy Harrison was the chief witness.

The key issue,

as always in an investigation of this nature, centered on whether the
lynching involved the violation of federal civil rights statuteso

The

jury deliberated for seventeen days but on December 20 unanimously agreed

that it could not identify "any person or persons participating in the
murders or in any violation of the civil rights statutes of the United
Stateso 1123
By the time of the grand jury's report, most of the parties involved concluded that no indictment appeared possible.
emerged, few people seemed surprised.

When the results

The result pointed up once again,

this time in the boldest relief possible given the nature of the lynching,
the critical need for federal anti-lynching legislation.

As the most shock-

ing lynching of the war era, the case made martyrs of the four victims and
provided much-needed publicity that later sparked renewed efforts in Congress for passage of an anti-lynching lawo

The crime itself revealed some-

thing about the rature of southem race relations and the lack of interracial understanding, just as it illustrated the continued deterioration
of relations stemming from wartime changes.

The inability of many "1hites

to countenance even modest changes in the status of southem blacks indicated that they felt threatened by what postwar America might bringo 24

23 Press release, December 2,
December 28, 1946.

1946, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier,

2411 The Social Front: Crime and Punishment," Events and Trends in
Race Relations: A Monthly Summary [title changed as of January 1947], 4
(February 1947), 202.
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If the Monroe incident stood as the largest and most gruesome of
the wartime lynchings, the episode that followed proved the most bizarre.
While southerners watched as the Monroe investigation proceeded, an
attempted double lynching took place near Minden, Louisiana.

~··>

Again, the \.
•,.

sordid story included a black veteran, John C. Jones, a twenty-eight-yearold ex-GI.

He returned home after his discharge on January 7, 1946, to

Cotton Valley, a small town several miles north of Minden and just east
of Shreveport, situated in the oil-rich lands of northem Louisianao

Once

home Jones found the audacity, gained through his service in the Army, to
ask embarrassing questions about his grandfather's fleecing at the bands
of the Premier Oil Company.

It seems that the seventy-six-year-old man,

who could neither read nor write, owned land that had produced oil for
yearso

The company took advantage of the situation by signing a lease

for the oil at ridiculously low prices--thirty-nine cents a month for one
well, $1.50 a month for another.

Jones questioned tmt arra.ngement--a

breach of local racial etiquette that provoked local whites.

In addition,

Jones' bra.very as a corporal and Battle of the Bulge survivor represented
a threat to racial harmony in Cotton Valley, and the black man soon earned
the reputation of being "uppity" and a "smart nigger. 1125
On

July 31 local police arrested Jones' younger cousin, Albert

{}>· .

Harris, Jr., and charged him with helping Jones rape a young white womano

In this way local whites hoped to fabricate a charge against Jones, for
after beating Harris the young man, fearing for his life, told them that

2511 The Social Front: Violence," ibid. (August-September 1946),
4-5; Press release, September 5, 1946, in "Minden La. Lynching," GOF,
NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, August 24, 1946.
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he and the veteran had attempted the rape.

A few days later Jones joined

Harris in jail, but on August 8 authorities were forced to release them
because the alleged victim insisted that neither of the prisoners fitted
the description of her assailant.

26

That evening the police watched Harris and Jones walk out of the
Minden jail and into the hands of ten white men lying in wait.

After

abducting the blacks, the whites drove to an isolated area along Ba.you
Dorcheat, several miles north of town, and began beating them.

Harris

lost consciousness and the whites, assuming he was dead, turned their
full attention to Jones.

The beating soon turned into a sadistic spree

and the lynchers used a meat cleaver and acetylene torch.

Satisfied tmt

they had ta.ken care of the area's principal black troublemaker, they
left.

Harris regained consciousness shortly thereafter and stumbled

home.

His father hastily placed him in an auto and sped away. 27
For a week the lynching remained shrouded in secrecyo

Local authori-

ties, who obviously participated in the overall plan, were anxious that
news of the crime remained a local matter.

Whites in the area shared

the same concern, while local blacks dared not talk.

Finally, on August

15, the date of Jones' frmeral, news leaked out. Immediately, the story
appeared in several Louisiana newspapers, and Daniel E. Byrd, head of the

26Daniel E. Byrd to NAACP national office, rmda ted, in. "1-1".inden Lao
Lynching--Correspondence"; Affidavit of Albert Harris, Jr., August 29,
1946, in "Minden Lao Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Couxier,
September 7, 1946.

27Pittsburgh Courier, September 7, 1946; Atlanta Constitution,
August 16, 1946; New York Times, August 16, 1946; Press release, August
19, 1946; Affidavit of Albert Barris, Jro, August 29, 1946, in "Minden
la.. Lynching,"

GOF, NAACP Papers.
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state's NAACP branches, telephoned Walter White.

On August 22 White con-

tacted the Justice Department, and once again investigators went to work.
The NAACP 1 s main hope in effecting prosecution rested with ilbert
Harris, but his father had taken him to an undisclosed cityo

Realizing

that his testimony would provide the only real evidence of a violation
of civil rights, the association decided to search for him.

After two

weeks, NAACP investigator Madison S. Jones found Harris in Muskegon,
Michigan, and persuaded him to fly to New York and swear out an affidavit.

l3y

the end of August, Harris bad revealed the story to Justice

Department officials, and on that info:cna.tion the department plunged into

28
the case.
Results came quickly.

On October

18 a fedeml grand jury in Monroe,

Louisiana, indicted six white men on charges of violating the Fourteenth
Amendment and related civil rights statutes.

The Justice Department

quickly dropped all charges against one of the defendants for lack of
evidence, and when a fedeml district court trial began on February 14,

1947, five accused lynchers faced conviction. As in the grand
ing, Albert Harris provided the crucial testimony.

jury bear-

U. So District Attor-

ney Malcolm Iafargue, the chief prosecutor, argued trat Harris had been
arrested and confined to jail on a false pretext and that the defendants
lynched Jones and tried to lynch Harris from personal vendettas.

He also

charged that the mob members and lawmen planned the incident together.

28Pittsburgh Courier, August 24, 31, 1946; Theron L. Caudle to Smith,
August 22, 1946, ·Justice Department Records; "Along the NAACP Battlefront,"
Crisis, 53 (October 1946), 309-10; Press release, September 5, 1946; Interoffice memomndum, undated, in "Minden La. Lynching--Correspondence," GOF,
NAACP Papers.
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The defense, led by A. S. Drew, complained that the F.BI had come into the
state like a "swarm of locusts" and had used intimidation and threats in
securing evidence for the October grand jury.

Du.ring the final summa-

tion, Drew resorted to wailing over "the sanctity of our womanhood" and
protested the interference of "that negro uplift society up north."
Elements in the East, he grumbled, were t:r.ying to ·force "co-mingling
of blacks and whites."
this state,

my

Lafargue countered by asserting, "I come from

grandfathers had slaves, but to me civil liberties mean

human rights, God-given rights, for all Americans.

If you want a feudal

society, with overlords, or a Hitler or Mussolini government then this
country is not for you."

After less than two hours of deliberation the

all-white jury acquitted the defendants. 29
The wave of lynchings continued into the late summer and fall

hostility against blacks, and especially veterans, remained high.

as(~ '

In mid-

August a .band of twenty whites hunted down and killed a twenty-year-old
ex-soldier, J.C. Farmer.

A farmhand who lived near Wilson, North Caro-

lina, he fought with a local constable and shot the lawman in the hand
with the officer's gun.

Enraged citizens tracked down the fleeing Farmer

and killed him near his home.

On

August

12 three whites shot and killed

James Walker in front of his house near Elko, South Carolina, the result
of a squabble in a local bar.

Walker had incurred the enmity of whites

in the area, since he was a member of the Charleston branch of the NAACP.

Later in the month a coroner's jury decided that the Walker killing

29Pittsburgh Courier, October 26, 1946; "Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (December 1946), 373; ibid., 54 (April 1947), 116;
Caudle to Malcolm E. Lafargue, November 21, 1946, Justice Department
Records; Press release, March 7, 1947, in "Minden La. Lynching," GOF,
NAP..CP Pe.Der~.

·-.7L
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constituted "justifiable homicide," and the Justice Department concluded
that the incident did not fall within its jurisdiction. 30
Although never officially confirmed, two lynchings occurred in
mid-August near Marshall, Texas.

In the July 27 primary election the Army

'?\_·. ,

stationed MPs at Marshall's polling places (as it did elsewhere) to pro- (
.

tact black veterans as they voted.

.......,_....,

This irritated many of Marshall's

conservative whites, and in mid-August two veterans, Richard Gordon and
Alonza :Brooks, died in separate incidents at the hands of white mobs.
The local police reported Gordon's death to have resulted from a hit-andrun driver but offered no explanation of why his throat had been slashed
from ear to ear or why the rest of the body bore definite marks of having
been dragged behind an automobile.

:Brooks died the same week, but his

body remained undiscovered until three days after his death.
corpse showed signs of lynching.

Again, the

In both cases the police proved unco-

operative, but eyewitness accounts enabled NAACP investigators to piece

i

\!

the stories together.
.

ings.

No legal action results in either of the lynch-

31
l

Yet lynching declined after World War II in the South.

'\
There would ~=<..-·
I

be other killings, especially during the civil rights revolution, but the
tradition of mob lynching was passing from the scene.

In assessing such

JOPittsburgh Courier, Augu.st 24, 31, 1946; "Memorandum on Elko,
S. C. Lynching," by John H. McCray; Caudle to Robert L. Carter, September 6, 1946, in "Elko S. C.," GOF, NAACP Papers.
31Press release, August 22, 1946, in "Lynching--1946," GOF, NAACP
Papers; "Along the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis, .53 (October 1946), 311.
Other incidents reported included the lynching of John Gilbert on August
3 near Gordon, Georgia, and the lynching of Dan Carter Sanders on
November 18 near Smithfield, North Carolinao Various sources during
1946 continually referred to mysterious deaths that never appeared in
print.
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violence, the most arresting fact is that lynchings continued long after
the legal system caught up with America's vigilante tradition.

As late

as World War II, the United States still suffered from a form of violence that federal laws did not expressly prohibit.

Since lynching had

increasingly become a southern problem, it reflected the violent side of
a rigidly enforced caste system based on race.

The decline of lynch- ---1

I
\

ing after the war era resulted from a retum to more prosperous times,

increased efforts especially on the federal level to stop it, the return \
I

of black southerners to a traditional position within the racial system,

I

f

i
I

and the continued exodus of blacks from the South.

Peace and relatively

1

tranquil domestic life added to the factors that helped cause the virtual disappea:r:ance of the concentrated lynchings that had plagued the
South for decades.

Civil rights legislation later effectively ended

the lynching threat.
Proof of the interracial hostility generated by postwar tensions
~

and particularly by economic competition came not only from the lynching :::t,
wave of mid-1946, but also from the Athens, Alabama, race riot.

Like the

Columbia riot of February, the Athens incident took place in a small city
and reflected the problems of unemployment, veterans' rights, and strained race relations caused chiefly by white desires to force blacks back
into prewar political and economic positions.

Although it proved a

relatively small occurrence, it merited national attention in part because conditions existed in many other cities that could have caused
similar disorders.

It showed once again that the white South's concern

over fissures in the color line, compounded by economic competition
between whites and blacks, led the majority forcibly to attempt a return
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to prewar standards and in the process threatened modest wartime gains
by blacks.
Athens, a city of about 4,300, lay about twenty miles south of
the state's northern boundary, near Huntsville.

Decatur, the scene of

the Scottsboro trials, was about fifteen miles southwest.

The city

served as the seat of Limestone County and contained about nine hundred
blacks.

The region's economy depended upon cotton, so Athens was a

typical fann town, providing the necessities of an agrarian populace. 32
In mid-1946 Athens labored under a host of postwar difficulties,
most of which resulted from unemployment and other economic problems.
By 1943 the county had lost 11.1 percent of its population to urbanindustrial centers, characteristic of many rural counties.
the area still suffered from this loss.

At war's end

Retuming veterans and defense

workers made up part of the wartime decline, but the county's population
still fell short of 1940 levels.
pated problems.

In addition, veterans brought unantici-

As unemployment rose, more veterans retumed, worsening

the economic situation.

Desperate for jobs, many whites tried to take

over jobs held by blacks.
Veterans also brought political problems.

Former Gis, both black

and white, wanted to assure themselves of a political voice in Athens,
so in the 1946 primary they ran a GI ticket to replace entrenched politicians.

This resulted in a sizeable increase in black voting, from fifty

or sixty to over three hundred, most of whom were fomer soldiers.

The

321. Maynard Catchings, "Analysis of the August 10th, 1946, Racial
Disturbance at Athens, Limestone County, Alabama," August 14, 1946,
Johnson Papers, Box 143.
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ex-Gis lost, but they were heartened by the successful GI revol-t in nearby Athens, Tennessee.

In that election a faction of the Crump machine

that ruled most of the state fell to a GI ticket.

Open warfare accom-

panied the balloting which resulted in three deaths and fifty injuries.
Veterans in Alabama's Athens look~d with a mixture of pride and envy
upon that political coup. 33
A rigid hierarchy among Limestone County whites added to area

difficultieso

Two distinct classes existed, the townspeople and pros-

perous famers, and the lower class subsistence-level whites who inhabited enclaves outside of town.

A familiar southern paradox prevailed:

even though the lower class whites and blacks shared economic and political goals, poor whites hated blacks more than anyone elseo

The "better"

sort of whites, meanwhile, exhibited contempt for both of the "meaner"
groupso
To further compound the problem, some black veterans returning to
Athens demanded fair treatment from whites.

Having served in the fight

for democracy, they made it plain that they intended to exercise their
rights.

More conservative blacks must have counseled moderation in view

of postwar tensions, but even the sight of a black veteran brought to
whites the disconcerting picture of a new and dangerous threat to the
local system of race relations and the sanctity of the color line. 34

33Ibid.; U. S., Bureau of the Census, "Civilian Population by
Counties: November 1, 1943," pp. 3-5; Nashville Tennessean, August 2,
1946; Birmingham World, Augu.st 16, 1946;

34catchings, "Analysis of Racial Disturbance at Athens," Johnson
Papers.
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On August 10, a Saturday, the tense racial situation exploded.
As a farm community, Athens became on Saturdays a city of twice its normal size as citizens from the hinterland, both black and white, converged
to conduct their weekly business.

Some people milled around the main

streets, and stores did a lfrisk trade, while others simply loafed or
took in the town's modest amusements.

Around midday a shoving match

occurred in front of the .town's only theater, the Ritz.

L. C. Horton,

a black veteran and employee of the theater, and two white brothers,
Ben and Roy Massey, the former a veteran and the other an Army private,
began jostling each other.

Horton struck one of the whites and fled

around the corner of the theater toward the "colored" entrance.

The

police arrived immediately and arrested the two whites on charges of
public drunkenness.

As word of the incident spread, whites became in-

furiated at the thought of two whites locked behind bars while the black
man escaped punishment.

Within a few minutes a crowd of several h1.u1dred

whites collected, chiefly younger men led by poor whites from surrounding
areas. 35
The mob moved toward the theater, surrounded it, and prepared to
storm the building in an attempt to locate the black fugitive.

At that

juncture Judge D. Lg Rosenau arrived and persuaded the crowd to appoint
six of its members to search the building.
HortonQ

A search failed to produce

Enraged, the mob drifted over to the jail and tore down the

front door, attempting to free the Massey brothers.

Fearing that the edi-

fice might suffer considerable damage, city officials hurriedly arranged
for the release of the prisoners to their father's custody.

35Ibid.; Huntsville Times, August 11, 12, 1946.
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might have stopped there, but one of the ringleaders took the opportunity
during this momentary lull to climb upon a bread truck and harangue the
crowd about how the law had turned "partial" to blacks and that they
had been getting "out of their places."

Wo:r:ked up to a frenzy, the mob

of about two thousand then split into smaller groups and began beating
blacks and chasing them from town.3 6
The disturbance lasted four hours, and an estimted fifty to one
hundred blacks received injuries.

J. R. Powell of Nashville, a :Baptist

minister, did not suspect trouble until he alighted from a bus and fell
into the hands of an angry throng.

Another black who worked for a local

businessman was surrounded and threatened if he did not give up his job
to a white man.

The manager of the store arranged for the black man's

escape to his home but otherwise did nothing to protect him.

Other small

bands invaded stores along the main streets where blacks worked and demanded their replacement with whites.

If they encountered resistance

they often pounced upon the black employee in question.

In one case a

band of rioters invaded a business and demanded tmt a black employee be
replaced, whereupon the manager asked the whites if they would accept the
job his black worker held.

One of the whites asked how much he earned,

learned that the job paid $25 per week, and revealed that it would take
$35 for him to accept the position.

In other cases white proprietors took

firm stands against the whites, who then wandered back into the streets
to beat the first blacks they encountered.

Clearly, tensions brought

36catchings, "Analysis of Racial Disturbance at Athens," Johnson
Papers; Huntsville Times, August 11, 12, 1946; Guzman, Negro Year :Book,
253-54; Birmingham World, August 13, 1946.
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by interracial economic competition proved crucial in producing much of
the violence.
Many

blacks escaped unharmed.

As soonas the violence b:roke out,

a few businessmen drove their black workers home where they remained in
the relative security of the black community.

Others simply fled the

city before falling into the hands of the rioters.

A white filling sta-

tion opera.tor locked his black employee, Robert Caldwell, in the "white"
restroom where no one thought of looking.

And one black man, caught in

the downtown area, surprised his would-be assailants by driving them away
with a knife.
During the outbreak the local law authorities stood helpless.

The

combined forces of the police and sheriff's departments numbered a paltry
eight men unable to cope with the violence.

Recognizing the hopelessness

of the situation, Mayor R.H. Richardson hurriedly phoned the govemor's
office in Montgomery but discovered that Chauncey Sparks had gone fishing.

George C. Clear, the state's adjutant general, responded in the

governor's absence by ordering elements of the state guard to the embattled area, and fifty state troopers raced to the scene.

These men,

however, reached Athens after the major violence had subsided.

Ey mid-

night law officials had the city under occupation, and a semblance of
order retu.rnea. 37
Without delay embarrassed city officials arrested nine whites,
charged them with unlawful assembly, and jailed them.

Eight of the nine

37 catcbi.ngs, "Analysis of Racial Disturbance at Athens," Johnson
Papers; ::Birmingham World, August 13, 1946; Pittsburgh Courier, August 17,
1946; New York Times, August 12, 1946, p. 21; Huntsville Times, Augu.st
11, 12, 1946.
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turned out to be teenagers, the youngest of whom was thirteen years old.
The main contingent of the rioters, residents of the poor white sections
of Limestone Coimty, provided the city administration with a scapegoat
for the incident since most of them were not residents of the city.

The

next day, Simday, only two of the city's black churches held services as
the victims remained at home dressing their woimds; Limestone County contained no jim crow hospital.

Mayor Richardson called an interracial meet-

ing for Sunday night, and prominent blacks and whites congregated to dis-

cuss the problem.

Richardson and his associates used the occasion to

disclaim complicity in the incident and promised complete protection for
the black community; the black conferees accepted the mayor's assurances.
In reality, of course, most blacks remained hostile and bitter.
The lawmen from outlying areas remained in Athens for several days

following the riot to make sure violence did not recur.

A rumored assault

on the jail to release the nine whites held in connection with the affray
never took place, probably because of the presence of the state authorities.

In the immediate wake of Saturday's incident, local whites expressed

little remorse, and as one of them noted, there was "gonna be more trouble,
too.

It's got to the place white fol.ks can't walk on the streets for

niggers.

It's nigger Gis that's getting out of their place. 1138

The city took immediate but relatively mild action against the ringleaders of the mob while the Justice Department, following a cursory
examination, remained out of the picture.

On August 12 officiaJsordered

38catchings, "Analysis of Racial Disturbance at Athens," Johnson
Papers; "Trouble at Athens, Alabama," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends
in Race Relations, 4 (August-September 1946), 50-51; Birmingham World,
.August 16, 1946.
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a special session of the county grand jury convened.

Circuit Solicitor

George C. Jolmson declared, "I will not tolerate mob rule in Limestone
County" and asserted that the riot represented "a disgrace to a town that
has for more than

150 years had no race disturbance." On August 23,

after hearing seventy-seven witnesses, the jury indicted sixteen whites
on various misdemeanor charges.

In April

1947 a non-jury court convicted

eleven of these persons and fined them $80 plus court costs.

Justice bad

been done while the light penalties assured no pe:c:nanent discomfort to
the defendants. 39
The Athens riot reflected forms of collective behavior common -~o
other mob actions of the war years.

First and fo:!:"emost, perceived tb:ree:~s

against the racial caste system resulted in the appearance of a determined defense of traditional racial p:3,tterns that characterized much of
the white South from

1940 through 1946. Many whitesj unable to cope -with

changes in the racial system or other alterations in political or economic
areas, drew together in opposition and lashed out at the most accessible
symbol of their problems.

Blacks, who hoped to gain permanent changes

for the better in the wake of the war, saw their hopes dashed against
the formidable color line and emerged from the entire experience frustrated and bitter.

Jobs seemed to be at the heart of the Athens riot,

and along with heightened tensions that returning veterans brought, the
general atmosphere of postwar confusion and the deterioration of race

39caudle to J. Edgar Hoover, August 19, 1946, Justice Department
Records; New York Times, August 13, 1946, p. 16; August 24, 1946, p. 13;
Birmingham World, August 16, 1946; Pittsbuxgh Courier, August 31, 1946;
Huntsville Times, August 23, 1946; "The Social Front: Violence,"
Events and Trends in Race Relations: A Monthly Summary, 4 (May 1947),
302.
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relations produced conditions that many other southern towns ancfcities
faced.

The riot unfortunately forced blacks and whites even further

apart, and with separation came a loss of interracial understanding.
On the surface blacks bad to play traditionally subservient roles, but
underneath indignation festered.

Athens blacks, like others in the South,

felt betrayed.
The racial violence of late 1945 and 1946 shocked civil rights
groups and spurred them to seek redresso

The Columbia riot, the lynch-

ings of mid-1946, the Athens riot, and other incidents provoked concerned
organizations to find solutions even as the violence continued.

On

August 6, 1946, a thoroughly aroused NAACP convened a meeting of t~se
groups and formed the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence,

/,/

In issuing the call, Walter White emphasized that it would act as a
"working conference to devise and implement most effective methods of
organizational, governmental and public action on forces of bigotry which
threaten all Americans."

In addition to the NAACP, the Southern Regional

Council, Southern Conference for

Human

Welfare, American Federation of

Labor, American Jewish Congress, National Urban Leagu.e, American Civil
Liberties U:¢.on, and thirty-three other groups convened.

Spurred by the

Monroe lynching, one of the new committee's first actions was to send a
telegram to President Truman expressing its condemnation of that incident as well as those that had preceded it.

Truman proved receptive, and

on September 19 a delegation met with him to discuss the problem of increasing mob violence.40

40White to "various organizations," undated; National Emergency
Committee Against Mob Violence to Harry S. TrLlillB.Il and Tom Clark, August
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At the same .time a group known as the American Crusade to End
Lynching began a series of publicity activities, which included a h1.U1dredday campaign climaxed by a September 23 meeting with Truman.

This dele-

gation, headed by Paul Robeson, delivered a three-point plan to the
President that requested apprehension and punishment of lynchers, a
federal anti-lynching law, and removal of the Klan from the Senate--an
obvious reference to Theodore G. Bilbo.

The crusade also sponsored a

mass rally at the Lincoln Memorial tba.t attracted five thousand spectators.41
These campaigns and the rising tide of violence managed to jolt
the federal government into action.

Attomey General Clark called upon

"every loyal citizen and law enforcement officer" to help prevent mob
violence.

"Every resource at

my

command as the head of your Department

of Justice has been marshaled and has been ordered into action to discover the perpetrators of the horrible crimes which have been committed."
Clark then declared that "the time has come when Congress may have to pass
legislation to insure to all citizens the guarantees under the Constitution."

Congress made a gesture toward an anti-lynching bill but did

little else.

In response to Clark's appeal and continued violence, Sena-

tors James M. Mead and Robert F. Wagner laid plans to rescue such a bill,
introduced on Augu.st 2, that had disappeared in the Judiciary Committee.
Their efforts succeeded in raising concem over lynching but failed to

6, 1946; Press release, September 19, 1946, in "National Emergency Committee on Mob Violence," GOF, NAACP Papers.
4l"The Monroe, Georgia, Lynching Case," Monthly Summary of Events
and Trends in Race Relations, 4 (October 1946), 77-78.
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revive the legislation.

More significant, Truman created the Committee'."'·.\_
•-.;·_/

on Civil Rights, a direct outgrowth of the protests against·postwar
violence.

Established in December, the committee consisted of fifteen

prominent persons who issued a report in October 1947 condemning segregation and discrimination in government institutions.

Truman bailed the

report and proposed civil rights refoms based on its recommendations
that seriously threatened southern racial traditions and led to a split
in the Democratic Party by 1948.

While the Committee on Civil Rights

sparked widespread discussion, however, effective implementation of most
of its recommendations ca.me only after the mid-1950s. 42
A fitting end to the postwar racial violence in the South came in -

!\- ;

late 1946 with the collapse of the Talmadge era in Georgia and the Bilbo
reign in Mississippi.

Negrophobic politics in the 1946 elections emerged

as one of the roots of the racial violence of that year, coming as it did
in the midst of postwar reconversion difficulties, so the deaths of two

of the most vitriolic perpetrators of racial hatred served as the symbolic
end of an era.

After winning both the primary and general elections for

governor on an anti-black campaign, Eugene Talmadge gratified his opponents
by suddenly dying on December 21.
ignominious fashion.

Theodore :Bilbo fell from power in more

:Because of his unabashed threats against blacks who

tried to vote in 1946, a Senate committee decided to investigate his campaign.

The NAACP in Mississippi proved instrumental in this development.

The national office recognized that this hearing could eventually bar

42Pi ttsburgh Courier, August 24, 31, 1946; Roland, Improbable Era,
31-33-
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Bilbo from the Senate, so it bent every effort toward that end.43
Its efforts proved fruitless.

After four days of hearings, the

committee, chaired by South Carolina Senator :Burnet R. Maybank, decided
that :Bilbo had done nothing wrong during the primary campaign.

Even

though the Mississippi senator bad repeatedly urged his white constituents "to resort to any means" in stopping the black voting threat, the
evidence against him did not appear to carry much weight during the proceedings.

A concurrent Senate War Investigating Committee hearing into

Bilbo's activities with state war contractors had a greater impact on
his downfall, for in the end it decided to condemn his activities and
table his credentials prior to the swearing in date.

Bilbo never re-

turned to Congress, and in late August he died of cancer.44
Bilbo's fate, along with that of Talmadge, in a symbolic sense
marked the end of racial violence in the South during World War II.

Vio-

lence did not end, of course, with the_death of Talmadge or the downfall
of Bilbo.

Nor did the violence stop at the end of the year.

Acts of

lynching and other mob violence continued into 1947, but on a lesser
scale as it appeared to die out with each passing month. 45 As the nation

43Anderson, Wild Man, 236; White to Allen J. Ellender, November
23, 1946, in "Meeting Wash.--Sept. 24--re: Bilbo," LF, NAACP Paperso

44.u.

S., Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Special Committee
to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, Mississippi, 1-11, 2337, 333-44; Richard C. Ethridge, "The Fall of the Man: The United States
Senate's Probe of Theodore G. :Bilbo in December 1946, and Its Aftermath,"
Journal of Mississippi Historz, 38 (August 1976~, 243-44, 248-55; A,
wigfall Green, The Man Bilbo Baton Rouge, 1963, 109-19.

*

45For a summary of the violence of 1947 through the middle of the \ ·
I 'year, see 11 The Social Front: Violence," Events and Trends in Race Rela- .1 ·
tions: A Monthly Summary, 4 (July 1947), 365-68.
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successfully reconverted and the abnormal years of World War II receded
into memory, the violence directly associated with it correspondingly
expired.

The summer of

1946, as part of the overall spate of postwar

violence, reflected the continued attempt by whites to force blacks out
of the American mainstream and in the process kept the battered system
of race relations from healing.

The postwar violence represented the

most obvious reaction of a society unsure of itself and marked one of
the two high points of racial discord during the entire war era.
World War II left a mixed legacy for black southemers.

In cer-

tain restricted areas they enjoyed modest gains, such as in employment
and politics.

Yet in. the immediate postwar months many of those ad-

vancements disappeared, and in other areas the situation remained at or
near prewar standards.

Traditional mcial mores had caused separation,

and with separation came a loss of interracial communication.

The vio-

lence of the war years was the most obvious reaction to real or perceived
threats by blacks against racial traditions on which the white majority
placed disproportionate emphasis.
the years from

1940 through 1946

against black gains.

Instability and confusion characterized
in the South, prompting violent reaction

The South did not experience all of the wartime

racial discord, but suffered most of it because rigid racial mores held
vast importance, and the mjority of America's blacks lived there.

In

the end, little improvement for black southerners could be seen, whether
in small towns like Columbia, Tennessee, or in cities like Beaumont,

Texas, or Mobile, Alabama.

The one area in which black militancy ignited

violence, the military, came from the bitter realization that fighting/

ft

for democracy abroad apparently did not entitle black Gis to equal rig~-
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at home.

Such violence only produced more intense reaction from whites

who viewed black soldier militance as dangerous and contagious.
Southern blacks remained repressed, bitter, and alienated until
the mid-1950s, despite the finn stand that President Truman took on civil
rights.

Changes in the nature of race relations could have been per-

manently effected during the war years in the South if whites bad not
reacted so forcibly, but such alterations seemed too drastic at the time.
Changes bad to come from the grassroots level as well as from the top,
and this did not occur until after 1954.

From the mid-1950s through the

1960s the federal government and a new generation of blacks and whites
tried to implement those long-overdue modifications.

The Second Recon-

struction did not begin in the South until the fifth decade of the
twentieth century.

~
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